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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MARCH
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Michel Tatu
The Beginning of the End?

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GENERAL MALETER: *A Memoir by Peter Gosztony*

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Economics and Politics: II

EDITORS' NOTE: Continuing our series on new economic trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe, we present, first of all, a survey of Soviet developments in automation and cybernetics, with special emphasis on their past and current political implications. The next two articles examine the proverbial "Achilles' heel" of the Soviet economy—agriculture. Mr. Schwarz deals exclusively with an extraordinary Soviet document—the stenographic report of the special March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, while Mr. Laird offers an analysis of all major agricultural policies since Khrushchev's removal in October 1964. What emerges clearly from both these articles is that the Soviet leaders are still not prepared to revise their basic *approach to agricultural management and especially to the Soviet farmer—this despite the accumulated evidence of decades of abortive structural and administrative reforms. Finally, turning to East Europe, we present a report on the course of economic reform in the German Democratic Republic. The next issue will feature reports on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.*

Automation, Cybernetics, and Party Control

By Gerald Segal

For some time, it has been a fashionable Western view that whatever might be said against the Soviet system from the standpoint of political liberty, it could not be denied that the USSR has coped successfully with the vast social problems—unemployment, depressions, and so on—that have accompanied the advance of technology in the West.

In recent years, however, it has become obvious that some of the problems that have plagued "capitalist" societies have also been experienced by the "first socialist country in the world." In particular, the introduction of automation, even at the present stage of Soviet industrial development, has brought about a redundancy of labor and widespread unemploy-

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ment. This is acknowledged by Soviet sources. For example, the Soviet economist Ye. Manevich admitted in a recent article that "at the beginning of the Seven-Year Plan unemployed labor was to be found in Leningrad, Odessa, Moscow and other large cities of the USSR." [1] Two other economists, V. Yagodkin and I. Maslova reported that "due to the introduction of new techniques and technology, in various industrial branches of the Moscow Economic Region 7,225 workers were made redundant in 1962 and 8,007 in 1963"; in addition, they felt there was much concealed redundancy.[2] There has also been evidence from other regions of the country—the Caucasus, Belorussia, Central Black Earth, Moldavia and Lithuania—that various categories of workers have become redundant.

As significant as the admission of this problem is the fact that the authors quoted see it as the other side of the coin of technical, and therefore economic, progress. According to Manevich, "freeing enterprises of redundant workers will be of really tremendous significance for the further development of socialist production and will allow us more fully to utilize the advantages of the socialist economy." [3] In effect, what was once deemed the curse of capitalism is now regarded as the virtue of communism. Yagodkin and Maslova are even more emphatic in welcoming redundancy as a measure of technical progress: "The process of making the working force redundant," they state, "is one of the forms of the law of economizing labor time." [4]

The need to economize on labor time, or—what is another way of saying the same thing—the need to raise labor productivity by using the latest techniques in production and management (automation and cybernetics being the symbols of this process in both East and West) is one of the most pressing of current Soviet problems. Unless this need can be met, there can be no hope of the USSR's catching up with US production levels and offering the Soviet population a standard of living comparable to that achieved under the American system of capitalism. Also involved in this problem is the Soviet hope of realizing the Marxist dream of abolishing heavy manual labor and eradicating the difference between manual and mental work.

The Politics of Progress

It is the argument of this paper that in the Soviet system the problem of achieving technological and therefore economic progress is—and always has been—as much political as economic and social in nature. Political issues may arise as differences within the Communist Party over future industrial and investment policy, as conflicts between the planner-administrative bureaucrats and the managers, or as conflicts between the managers and the party secretaries in the factories.

Underlying such political tensions are certain fundamental issues relating to the nature of the society which was born of the 1917 revolution, and to the role of the Communist Party in that society. Since the stated goals of the Communist leadership are the maximization of economic growth and the ultimate creation of an abundance of material goods, the question of how best to achieve these goals is of course of primary concern.

A Communist state such as the Soviet Union can function effectively only if it has a system of coordinated planning based upon criteria which accurately measure the social costs of production at both the enterprise and state levels. Yet in its attempts to fashion this system, the ruling Communist Party has faced two difficulties: First, such criteria as have emerged have been "capitalist" in content. This problem can, however, be circumvented by the relatively simple expedient of making adjustments in Communist theory. More bothersome is the second problem—namely, if the economy is rationalized, what function is left to the Communist Party? In brief, when it comes to the application of such criteria, the party—with its standard methods of exhortation and agitation—finds itself of little use, and its freedom of maneuver severely limited.

A Look Backward

The essential conflict between party supremacy and economic-scientific rationality began to emerge in concrete outline during the 1930's.

[1] Ye Manevich, in *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow) No. 6, 1965, p. 23.
[2] V. Yagodkin and I. Maslova, in *ibid.*, p. 31.
[3] Manevich, *ibid.*, p. 30.
[4] Yagodkin and Maslova, *ibid.*, p. 32.

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By the end of 1934, the First Five-Year Plan had been completed and—according to Soviet theory—the foundations of socialism had been laid. Industry had been nationalized, agriculture collectivized, and the class struggle was presumably over. The problem now was, or ought to have been, how best to secure the technical and economic progress of the socialist economy.

On July 10, 1934, the Commission for Telemechanics and Automation was formed as part of the Technical Section of the Academy of Sciences. Its work was concerned mainly with electrical technology, with the control of power stations and of the drives and motive power of expanding heavy industry, and also with railway transportation.

In 1935 the first All-Union Conference on Automation, Telemechanics and Dispatching was convened to lay down future trends for the development of automation in the USSR. So far as the writer has been able to check, the proceedings were never published. The reference to dispatching is of great interest because it must surely have involved the whole question of intrafactory organization, including production-scheduling and labor-utilization. It also would have involved the intrafactory mechanization of dispatching operations, which is a direct investment problem and a very tricky one (even in recent years the Soviet press has been full of complaints that much of the investment in automating the basic production processes is lost because little or no attention is paid to auxiliary processes).

Probably around 1935, the new Commission was instructed by Academician G. M. Krzhizhanovski, Chairman of the State Planning Commission and Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, to provide for the future development of automation and telemechanics in the Third Five-Year Plan. When the plan was later published, it did indeed declare that "the most important condition for the fulfillment of the production-growth program is the wide extension of work on the introduction of the latest techniques and the scientific organization of production."

There was, however, another trend at work. According to a latter-day report by A. V. Khramoi, the historian of Soviet automation:

Under the influence of the dogmatic approach to questions of the scientific organization of labor inherent in the period of the personality cult, adverse conditions arose impeding the development of research in this field. Indeed the Scientific Research Institute of Labor and the Central Institute for the Organization of Production were closed, and research on dispatching was excluded from the work of the Commission. Thus for a long period of time work ceased which could serve as a basis for research into such problems as man and the machine and the operational management of the production control of large systems. Only in recent years have these problems been studied essentially from the beginning again.[5]

It would seem to be a fair summary of the position around 1937 (the year Stalin proclaimed, against all logic, that the class struggle intensifies with the advance to socialism) that while automation was welcomed as a scientific and industrial technique, the study of its wider implications for the economy and for labor was being very firmly discouraged.

Nevertheless, about this time other developments were taking place at both the factory and state planning levels—developments which may have been linked, and which involved a new approach to problems of production-organization, planning and technical progress. At some point in the late 1930's L. V. Kantorovich, then professor at the Leningrad University, was asked to calculate for the Leningrad Plywood Trust the best use of a range of machine tools operative in the factory. His solution was published by the university press in 1939 under the title, "Mathematical Methods for the Organization and Planning of Production." He solved the problem—and in the process incidentally invented linear programming some years before its subsequent introduction in the West. Yet his solution was even more meaningful, for it emerged that the criteria—or multipliers as Kantorovich called them—that arose in his solution would universally determine optimum resource utilization using, in effect, capitalist concepts of scarcity and marginal utility.

On the face of it, this was a heresy which in Stalin's time should have led to a Siberian labor

[5] *Avtomatika i Telemekhanika* (Moscow), No. 6, 1964.

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camp, if not worse. The generally accepted view in the West is that Kantorovich survived precisely because the truly revolutionary nature of his work was concealed beneath his mathematical formulae, and his book in any case was not widely circulated.[6]

Another possible interpretation would link Kantorovich's work directly with Nikolai Voznesenski, who by 1939 was the chief Soviet planner and who, 11 years later, was executed on Stalin's orders for reasons which have never been divulged—but which in the writer's view may be connected with his plans for the Soviet economy. With regard to Kantorovich's study, it is difficult to believe that a factory director in Stalin's Russia would, off the cuff, have asked a local professor to act as his consultant on a problem concerning the work organization of his plant. At the least, the request must have come through or been arranged by the local Leningrad Planning Commission, which was headed until December 1937 by Voznesenski. Allowing time for Kantorovich to have done his work and get it published, it would seem reasonable to backdate the original commissioning of the project to the period of Voznesenski's chairmanship. This hypothesis would seem to be supported by a remark of Voznesenski's biographers, who write that "he made a great contribution to the rational utilization of equipment and production capacities in the city's [Leningrad's] industries."[7]

Moreover, by Kantorovich's own admission, he was aware from the start that his theories had broad implications. Writing in 1960, he remarked:

Soon after starting this work it became clear that the methods developed for finding an optimal solution had a simple and obvious economic significance and had much wider application in the general questions of economic calculation and planning.[8]

It was not long before his views were being presented to a larger audience; a series of lectures in which he developed his multipliers into economic values or prices (or objectively determined valuations, as he preferred to call them) was first given to the Institute of Mathematics in Kazan in 1942 and repeated the following year at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

This was the very year that Voznesenski, by then the effective ruler of the whole of Soviet wartime industry, was himself elected academician and began to arrange for the Institute of Economics (one of his sponsors) to take part in the postwar work of the State Planning Commission.[9] The same year saw the publication of the famous unsigned article which declared: "The law of value holds under socialism, but in transformed form."[10] The law of value in this context means the whole gamut of what are normally thought of as capitalist categories—profits, prices, incentives, differentials, bonuses, and commodity-exchange relationships—and the implication is either that a new approach to planning was envisaged for the postwar period or that new methods had already been introduced into the running of the wartime economy, or both. In the writer's view, the latter was the case.

Naturally, the entire complex of problems involved in labor productivity, technical progress, and the economic means of securing both, arose with catastrophic urgency in World War II—and no single person was confronted so pressingly as Voznesenski, then still chairman of Gosplan and also the member of the Supreme War Council responsible for the running of the economy. Nothing could be allowed to impede the expansion of war production, and Voznesenski revealed in a later study how by the widespread use of economic incentives, wage differentials and new technological methods this growth was achieved.[11] He described the intro-

[6] See, *e.g.,* Robert W. Campbell in *The Soviet Economy,* edited by Harry G. Shaffer, London, Methuen, 1964, pp. 350 ff.

[7] V. Kolotov and G. Petrovich, *N.A. Voznesenski (biograficheskii ocherk)*, Moscow, 1963.

[8] L. V. Kantorovich, *Eknomicheski raschet nailuchshevo ispolzovaniia resursov* (The Economic Calculation of the Best Use of Resources), Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1960, p. 12.

[9] Kolotov and Petrovich, *op. cit.*

[10] "Nekotorye voprosy prepodavaniia politicheskoi ekonomii" (Some Problems of the Teaching of Political Economy), *Pod znamenem marksizma* (Moscow), No. 6, 1943, p. 75. The view that the Law of Value holds under socialism seems to have been adopted at some unpublicized conferences first held in 1940: see article by A. Birman in *Novyi mir,* No. 11, 1965, p. 197. This, plus other evidence cited in footnote 17, seems indicative of a trend in Soviet economic practice that was interrupted by the war.

[11] N. A. Voznesenski, *Economy of the USSR during World War II,* (translation, Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1948, ch. 14.

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duction of continuous flow methods for aircraft and tank production, noting—among other features of planning and production-scheduling in wartime plants—the emphasis put on providing enterprises with stocks of raw materials, fuel and semi-manufactures for all stages of the production cycle. He also mentioned the need for progress charts and general coordination to keep the assembly line moving efficiently, adding: "The smallest interruption in one or another stage of the production cycle affects the output and subsequent work of the whole enterprise." Obviously this approach implied a reconsideration of dispatching.

On August 6, 1947, Voznesenski—predating Khrushchev and his 20-year-plan concept by more than a decade—initiated preparations for a 15-year plan which was to provide for the "technical re-equipping of Soviet industry and the overhauling of the leading capitalist countries in production per head of population."[12] The details of the plan are not known, but that it must have been comprehensive is clear from the fact that Voznesenski set up 80 sub-commissions comprising the country's leading ministerial, managerial and technical personnel (including Academician A. S. Kulebakin, then head of the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics; and A. I. Berg, now the USSR's leading cybernetician, then a radar and electronics expert.

The Stalinist Counterattack

Voznesenski was dismissed from his posts in March 1949 and executed in July 1950. Presumably the various commissions were terminated at about the same time. Yet it may have been their activities—and Voznesenski's policies—which led to the construction in the Soviet Union of the world's first automated factory. It is easy now, when automation by definition involves computer control, to disparage the importance of the Soviet Automated Aluminum Piston Manufacturing Plant, which was already operative in 1951. The truth is that at the time it represented the most advanced application of production-line automation—or integrated mechanization, if one prefers—in the world. Raw materials went in at one end of the production line and emerged at the other end as finished, packaged pistons. The same was true of the Automated Ball-Bearing Plant—a small section of the First State Ball-Bearing Factory in Moscow—which appears to have become operative about 1953.

The economics of these projects apart, they could be regarded from the sociopolitical point of view as representing an advance towards communism, in the sense that workers in the automated plants were elevated from the status of ordinary on-line workers to that of skilled technicians servicing the machinery. Voznesenski himself had written on this:

Basing ourselves on the growth of the material welfare of the people, . . . on the development of commodity production *by means of electrification and automatization, we must progress another step in the direction of raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineering and technical personnel.*[13]

On the supposition that the use of the word "commodity" in this context was not a slip of the pen (Marx had described commodity production as being typical of capitalist society), this statement goes a long way toward confirming what was implicit in the concept of the transformed law of value that Voznesenski was contemplating—namely, the use of capitalist criteria as a means of furthering the technical and economic progress of the socialist state.

This interpretation would also make more comprehensible some of the allegations made against Voznesenski two years after his death, overtly by Suslov and covertly by Stalin.[14] These charges center on two main points: first, that he fetishized the law of value, and that in arguing it applied to labor distribution, he was in fact abandoning the principle of the priority development of heavy industry because light industry would be more profitable; second, that he believed the law of the planned (proportional) development of the economy to be the

[12] Kolotov and Petrovich, *op. cit.*, p. 42. It is interesting that Voznesenski had made a similar proposal at the 18th CPSU Congress in 1938, without Stalin's consent; two years later a renewed proposal to Stalin and Molotov was left unanswered. *Ibid.*, pp. 23 and 25.

[13] Voznesenski, *op. cit.*, p. 110 (in a discussion of the postwar socialist economy). Author's italics.

[14] Suslov, in *Pravda,* Dec. 24, 1952; Stalin, in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (translation), Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, p. 27.

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

АВТОМАТ-АТЕЛЬЕ

Рисунок Ю. ФЕДОРОВА

Caption below: "AUTOMAT-WORKSHOP"
Signs (following arrows); "Drop coin; meter; defectoscope; determinant—men, women; size; signal; price."

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1965

economic law of socialism (it is assumed here that Stalin was in fact attacking Voznesenski when he, Stalin, denied in his own work that the planning law was the economic law of socialism). Such allegations, however, were a distortion of Voznesenski's views; never for a moment did he deny the need for the priority development of heavy industry, and he treated the law of proportional development of the economy as only one of many socialist planning laws.

What is more to the point is to consider what Stalin—having denied that the planning law was the law of socialism, and having asserted that the law of value applied only in the case of sales of farm produce by collective farmers and peasants (as well as in foreign trade)—himself offered as the economic law of socialism; it was "to assure the growing material and cultural requirements of all society through the steady growth and improvement of socialist production, employing the most advanced technology."[15] But Stalin gave no indication of *how* this goal was to be pursued or the most advanced technology achieved. Voznesenski presumably thought that by using the law of value and the planning law—*i.e.*, by combining realistic pricing, material incentives, profit and loss accounting (conceivably Kantorovich's investment criteria) with long term plans for technical advancement—he knew how.[16]

The question arises why Stalin and Suslov should have objected to the Voznesenski approach to the economy as it has been portrayed above. Leaving aside the possible political reasons for the liquidation of the Leningrad group as a whole (such as its association with Tito and with the Zhadanovite forward policy in foreign affairs), other answers may be suggested. First, the prospect of a society that would be economically motivated and rigorously planned on the basis of rational economic criteria may have caused the leaders some due concern over what place there could be within the economy for the Communist party network. Second, there may well have been a quarrel not only about the future rate of growth of light industry but also about the direction of investment within heavy industry.

On the first point, it may be relevant that the Voznesenski era in Soviet planning coin-

[15] Stalin, *ibid.*, p. 45.
[16] Voznesenski, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

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cided roughly with Zhdanov's reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat [17]—a change that transformed it from a production-branch organization, with sections directly responsible for the different branches of industry, into a functional set-up that provided for supervision of party cadres, propaganda and organizational work but not for direct control over the branches of industry. Upon Zhdanov's death on August 31, 1948, G. M. Malenkov assumed command of the Secretariat and restored the production-branch principle. The intended effect was to "raise the leading role" of the party organizations "and to strengthen their control over the activity of governmental, economic and public organizations." [18] Malenkov, incidentally, had long been a rival of Voznesenski, and Khrushchev was later to accuse him of having been responsible for the "affair" in which Voznesenski perished.

The second point—the issue of the direction of investment within heavy industry—merges into the new dimension given to technical progress by the electronics and cybernetics revolution which had taken place in the years between Voznesenski's dismissal and Suslov's attack.

Enter Cybernetics

The transistor had been invented in 1948, and within four years the consequence was beginning to be seen as a revolution in all previous electrical and electronic technology. In the same period, new instrumentation for control purposes—for example, radio-isotopic and nucleonic—was developed as a by-product of the atomic energy industry. The electronic digital computer had demonstrated its potentialities both in research and in management of business. Cybernetics, defined as the science of control in the animal and the machine, had been established as a separate discipline in 1948 by Norbert Wiener, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was causing much excitement in the scientific world—although the word itself had not appeared publicly in Russia. What was involved in all this was a dynamic change in the existing methods and materials of production and organization, and the elaboration of new ones.

The first mention of cybernetics in the USSR came about three months after Stalin's death, with the publication of an article entitled "Whom Does Cybernetics Serve?" [19] The provocative title and the article itself suggest that the author, who hid behind the pseudonym "Materialist," was challenging certain groups in the Soviet Union who clearly must have been thinking that cybernetics would serve their work; [20] in any event, he defined the subject as a "bourgeois pseudo-science serving the American millionaires and imperialists, and destined to perish with the inevitable downfall of imperialism itself."

On the face of it, it is difficult to see why the Soviets did not make the new science their own. The heart of cybernetics—the feedback concept of the continuous interchange of information between man and his environment—might have been regarded as a dialectical process and Marx might have become the first social cybernetician. "Materialist," however, chose by selective quotations from Western writers to indict the new discipline as an endeavor to reduce the human brain to the level of a machine. Some Western cyberneticians did argue in this way, but it was open to Soviet Marxists to put them right.

Quite possibly, the Soviet objection to cybernetics on philosophical grounds was simply a cover for other considerations. At least two other reasons for their reaction seem possible: first, the investment necessary to pursue cybernetics, which had become the gimmick-word for the new electronics and computers in all their manifold applications, could not be found outside the military-space-defense network; second, cybernetics appeared to offer the option of a rigorous, economically rational means of planning at both the enterprise and top administrative levels, which as in previous years might have been seen as a threat to the freedom of action of the party.

[17] See Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled,* London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 196-99. Another relevant bit of evidence was the appearance in *Pravda,* Sept. 10, 1940, of a letter from four Leningrad factory directors asking for increased managerial powers over the Wages Fund and Enterprise Fund (foreshadowing Kosygin's reform of last September by some 15 years).

[18] *Moskovskii Bolshevik* (Moscow), Feb. 2, 1949; quoted in Fainsod, *op. cit.*

[19] *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1953, p. 210.

[20] For a somewhat different interpretation, see Lee Kerschner, "Cybernetics: Key to the Future?," *Problems of Communism,* No. 5 (November-December), 1965.

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There is some evidence to suggest that the investment issue was the vital one, that it had in fact arisen in the period of Stalin's rule, and that it may indeed explain Suslov's attack on Voznesenski more than two years after the latter's death. It is generally accepted in the West that Stalin was planning a sweeping purge focussed on the "Doctors' Plot" but taking in high-ranking party members (including Mikoyan and Molotov, according to Khrushchev in his "secret speech" of 1956) and also various economic ministers who had already been accused in *Pravda* of lack of vigilance.[21] These latter were the Ministers of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Geology, Health and the State-Supply Organization (Gossnab). The British Sovietologist Robert Conquest also calls attention to other economic figures who have not been heard of since January-March 1953, including V. P. Pronin, former Minister of Labor Reserves and a member of the Central Committee, and G. V. Alekseenko, former Minister of the Communications Equipment Industry.[22]

Excluding the Minister of Health, who could be directly implicated in the doctors' plot, all these men can be linked to a possible struggle over investment policy consequent upon the cybernetic revolution. The development of the transistor industry would have required investment in a whole range of non-ferrous metals—arsenic, germanium, iridium, gallium—which were the concern of the Minister of Geology. As cybernetics in all its ramifications is directly concerned with improved methods of communication, the involvement of the Minister of the Communications Industry is obvious. The State-Supply organization would also have been directly concerned in any investment switch of this kind, as would the Minister of Labor Reserves, since labor retraining and productivity would have been involved.[23]

Whether or not these interpretations of the attack on cybernetics and the proposed purge of the economic ministers are correct, the fact remains that the necessary investment decisions which, if taken in time, could have raised the Soviet electronics industry to Western levels were not taken. As late as 1963, when Western research was reaching beyond the miniaturization (transistor) level towards microminiaturization (integrated circuitry), leading Soviet experts (Academician A. I. Berg and Dr. M. Rozenblat) were calling for the use of the cold cathode tube and even magnetic amplifiers as computer components to make up for the dearth of transistors in the USSR. About the same time, some of the world's leading experts in the field of automatic control, attached to the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics in Moscow, were pressed by similar circumstances to work on pneumatics and pneumatic computers. They persuaded themselves—and sought to convince Soviet industry—that these devices might be used as substitutes for electronic computers in the control of chemical processes where the reaction times did not require electronic speeds.[24]

The Pre-Khrushchev Interregnum

During the three years that elapsed between the appearance of "Materialist's" article and the 20th CPSU Congress (1956), the issue of

[21] See Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, MacMillan, 1961, p. 177.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] There is further evidence, dating back to 1946, to confirm the author's thesis that the indictment of cybernetics as a bourgeois pseudo-science in 1953 was also a retroactive condemnation of earlier trends in the Soviet Union that had led to controversy in the area of postwar technical policy and planning, and that were still viewed as a challenge by the Soviet leadership. This evidence is contained in the report of a technical conference held at the Krzhizhanovski Power Institute some time in 1946 to discuss plans for the next five years. L. I. Gutenmakher, head of the Electro-Simulation and Electrometry Laboratory, stated that his lab was engaged on two kinds of projects: (1) developing new measuring techniques to meet the demands of telemechanics (remote control), automation, and the control of electric systems; and (2) creating methods for the analysis and synthesis of special electrical networks to reproduce complex physical phenomena. He continued: "These problems are intimately interwoven. The acceleration of all technical processes predetermines the successive exclusion of the labor of man, which is restricted in its speed, initially from the field of measuring techniques and then also from the field of the monitoring and control of a process. Measuring devices are endowed with the capacity to observe and record phenomena, and in this connection they play the part of our sensing organs. On the other hand, calculating machines are endowed with the properties and qualities necessary to compare the variables of the process and the performance of still more complex functions, *in virtue of which they perform functions similar to that of the human brain.*" (*Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 2, 1947, p. 65. Author's emphasis.) It is notable that this statement was made two years before Norbert Wiener defined cybernetics as a separate discipline.

[24] See, *e.g.*, M. A. Aizerman, *Avtomatizatsia proizvodstvennykh protsessov* (Automation of Production Processes), Moscow, Seria Nauka, 1961.

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automation and cybernetics seemed to recede into the background; most of the headlines of the period dealt with agricultural problems and the virgin-lands campaign. But with the publication of the Draft Directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60), interest was again publicly focussed on automation. The document "set the task of introducing automation on a large scale, of proceeding more rapidly from the automation of machines and operations to the automation of factory departments and technological processes and to the construction of fully automated plants." In discussing the Draft Directives at the 20th CPSU Congress, N. A. Bulganin—then Chairman of the Council of Ministers—gave a clear statement of what was involved in industrial automation, including the use of computers; but he avoided mentioning cybernetics, in effect excluding the computer from what was to become one of its most important growth areas—business data processing.[25]

A month later the First All-Union Conference of Scientists and Technicians on Computers was held in Moscow. The proceedings were never published, but excerpts from a speech by E. I. Mamonov appeared in the journal *Priroda*.[26] Noting that the conference was the first in the USSR devoted to a "most pressing and rapidly growing branch of science and technology," Mamonov said the conferees' task was to "sum up the results of work on computers and the future development of computer trends." His conception of the range of computer applications—control of industrial plants, statistics and accounting, library retrieval systems, and language translations—was considerably wider than that implied by Bulganin. At the same time, he expressed much dissatisfaction with the quality of the Soviet computers then available and stressed the need for new components—ferrite cores and semiconductors.[27]

In the summer of 1956 Professor Yevsei Liberman first raised the issue of improving economic efficiency in the USSR by subjecting factory performance to a profit criterion measured in relation to total enterprise funds and linked to material incentives. That his scheme was connected with the issue of technical and organizational progress is clear from the following passage of his article:

The development of techniques results not only from the introduction of more or less large-

[25] N. A. Bulganin, speech in *Stenographic Report of the 20th CPSU Congress*, Moscow, State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1956.

[26] No. 7, 1956.

[27] It may be noted here that semiconductor elements include transistors and that the pioneer work in this field had been done by Academician A. F. Joffe in Leningrad in the 1920's. Yet even as late as 1956, little further progress had been made to satisfy the growing demands in this field, as may be seen from Mamonov's remarks.

CONSUMER CONSCIOUSNESS

—"Comrade artist, our trademark should be small, modest, and above all—unnoticeable!"

—From **Krokodil** *(Moscow), May 30, 1965.*

— Товарищ художник, наша фабричная марка должна быть небольшой, скромной, а главное — незаметной!

Рисунок Н. ЛИСОГОРСКОГО

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scale centralized planning measures, but from daily, persistent, painstaking work by enterprises on the mastering of new methods, the modernization of equipment, and the carrying out of small-scale mechanization and automation of labor processes.[28]

By the end of 1956, then, the door stood open to a reconsideration of the future direction of the Soviet economy in the light of the latest automation and cybernetic techniques, and to the introduction of a new set of economic criteria both for performance measurement and for motivation. These possibilities were swept aside, however, by the industrial reorganization effected by Khrushchev in May of 1957.

The Khrushchev Era

It is generally agreed—and indeed was asserted by Khrushchev himself—that the main result of the 1957 reform, creating the Regional Economic Councils (Sovnarkhozes) and dissolving the ministerial system, was to put the economy in the hands of the party organizations. Ideology—the moral code of the builders of communism—coupled with emotional appeals, exhortations and slogans (*e.g.*, overtake the Americans), again became the means most stressed for securing technical progress. But the simplest truth about this whole period is that Khrushchev's persistence in maintaining the party's direct control of the economy, and his refusal to countenance—except theoretically—the possibilities of rational costing and pricing and the linking of rewards and incentives to a profit criterion, had the effect of putting the USSR at a further disadvantage in the exploitation of the latest automation techniques.

The economic regions set up in 1957 were roughly coextensive with the domains of the local party secretaries. The attempt to run industry on this basis led to the affliction of localism— paying attention to the needs of one's own locality and ignoring the needs of others. When the "specialization and cooperation" policy (without which automatic flow-line production would be inconceivable) was applied on a regional basis—that is, within each sovnarkoz—it adversely affected the potentialities for automation and labor productivity in the country as a whole.

The inadequacy of the Khrushchevian approach can also be seen in the history of the 50 trial-demonstration or model enterprises that were envisaged in the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65). The aim of this project was to achieve a high degree of automation in the production and management practices of 50 chosen plants, which would then be emulated by the remainder of Soviet industry—presumably in the course of a modernization drive which the party would take the lead in promoting. At the time of writing it appears that not one of the model factories has been completed. Yet this fiasco notwithstanding, a Soviet official recently made another announcement that 119 large-scale plants would be converted in the next two years to a system of automated-production management, using electronic computers.[29]

The Likhachov Automobile Plant in Moscow was designated as one of the original 50 models and is also listed among the later 119 mentioned. In this plant, the attempt to use a computer for accounting and production control failed due to the inadequacy of the computer installation—one of the latest Soviet models, the Ural-4. The experiment showed that in order to solve economic problems, machines are required with a larger memory and higher data input-output speeds than the Ural.[30]

It was also planned to change two of the factory's production lines, in the process introducing improved technology, in order to manufacture two new auto models, the ZIL-130 and the ZIL-131—it being a crying scandal that the factory had been turning out the same model for 15 years. The factory was allocated "scores of millions of rubles" to complete these conversions by 1964,[31] but by the middle of that year they had only begun to initiate the production of one line, the ZIL-130, and the factory had spent all its funds without finishing the reconstruction.[32] On December 31, 1964, *Pravda* featured a report from the factory announcing

[28] *Kommunist* (Moscow), July 1956, p. 75.

[29] Tass report of an interview with V. Lebedev, formerly Deputy Chairman of the USSR Sovnarkhoz, in the *Times* (London), March 11, 1965.

[30] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1963, p. 116.

[31] See *Pravda*, Aug. 23, 1964, p. 2 (article by O. Volkov, an official of the Likhachov plant, who wrote in support of the Liberman-Trapeznikov profit proposals and called for the creation of a socialist market).

[32] *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1965.

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completion of the line and a letter of congratulations from the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. Yet Brezhnev, in his speech at the party plenum in September 1965, complained that while the ZIL-130 had a load capacity identical to that of the Gorki-produced GAZ-53A, none of the parts were interchangeable—highlighting the old problem of the need for efficient automation of the production of standardized parts.

The Adoption of Cybernetics

Part of Khrushchev's case in forcing through the 1956-57 reorganization had been that it would cut out the bureaucratic planning-administrative network associated with the ministerial system. However, the situation did not improve. The increasing load of administrative detail imposed by planning in an ever-more complex economy was underscored in a 1962 study by Academician V. M. Glushkov, Director of the Kiev Institute of Cybernetics, who calculated on the basis of current practices that by 1980 the entire Soviet adult population would have to be engaged in the planning process.[33]

To some, computers seemed to offer the way out; their problem was no longer that of the early 1950's—official proscription of cybernetics—but rather the simple one of a shortage of computers and the question of how to use those available. The initial hope (expressed, among others, by Academician A. I. Berg in 1960 and by the economist Yu. Cherniak in 1961) was that the manifestly successful use of computers for intra-firm management and control purposes in the United States could be adapted to the state scale in the Soviet Union. This, they felt, would be particularly advantageous to the USSR, since in Soviet "business," computers would not be wasted on the cruel competition of the capitalist market.[34] Writing again in 1963, Cherniak argued that although the Americans had 15,000 computers, the Soviets would need only one-tenth of that number—incidentally revealing that at the time they had less than 1500[35] (and those that were available were known to be at least seven years out of date). Would it be possible to use a network of some 1500 computers, assuming the appropriate algorithms (mathematical programs) could be devised, to manage an economy as diverse as that of the USSR? On the face of it, it seemed doubtful. A. I. Berg, Chairman of the Learned Council for Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences, did propose a comprehensive three-stage plan for the cybernation of the Soviet economy, involving the creation of a network of computer centers located in the regional economic councils and the largest factories, but it was admittedly a very long-term program and could not have any immediate effect.[36]

In the end it was seen that the computer could not offer an easy way out of the deeper problems of the Soviet economy. In an article in *Pravda* which inaugurated the final attack on Khrushchev's economic policies, Academician V. A. Trapeznikov, director of the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics in Moscow, declared boldly that it was useless to talk of a computerized optimal system until the problems of the pricing system were tackled.[37] Soon after Khrushchev's fall, Dr. D. Belkin—who as director of the Laboratory of Information Transmission Systems was responsible for designing the data transmission links for Berg's proposed network—wrote: "However perfect the electronic technique, a system by which everything to the last nut is planned and directed from the center is an unreal phenomenon." And again: "The nub of the computer problem is that we need economic premises, we need the reorganization of planning and management, the creation of economic incentives operative in the correct direction. Only then will a single network of computer centers be of use."[38]

A few weeks later, an article in *Pravda* by Academician N. Fedorenko finally dismissed the original sanguine notion of rescuing the economy with the computers on hand and obliquely admitted—albeit in optimistic terms—that the Soviets had a way to go in the race to reach US productivity and technical levels. American computer production had to be met, Fedorenko implied, but "with our planning system we can easily manufacture the 18,000 computers currently needed to match the Ameri-

[33] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Sept. 25, 1962, p. 1.
[34] Yu. Cherniak, *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 11, 1961.
[35] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 8, 1963, p. 52.
[36] *Problemy kibernetiki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1961.
[37] *Pravda,* Aug. 17, 1964.
[38] *Izvestia,* Dec. 4, 1964.

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can total" (he did not specify the economic uses to which they should be put).[39]

* * *

Whether the changes introduced in the Soviet economy by the September 1965 plenum of the Communist Party will vouchsafe the economic premises Belkin mentions, result in further computerization at all levels à la Fedorenko, or enable the USSR in the future to avoid the costly and ineffective investment in automation recently deplored by Trapeznikov,[40] remains to be seen.

At present the situation created by the newest reform program is confused. If the increased rights granted to plant managers, in particular the power over the wage fund,[41] are to have any real effect, the managers must surely be free to sack workers where it is necessitated by production and profit optimization. This would certainly emphasize the problem of redundant labor. On the other hand, both Kosygin and more especially Brezhnev have laid stress on the increased power of the party organizations under the new reforms[42]—an emphasis that seems to portend the continued hampering of management and that underscores the essential and as yet unsolved dilemma of how to reconcile party rule with rational economic development and technological advance. At least some ramifications of this problem seem likely to come up for discussion at the impending 23rd Congress of the CPSU. Until that time—or until there is further clarification and testing of the policies of the current regime—the future of the Soviet economy in general, and of automation and cybernetics in particular, is an open question.

[39] *Pravda,* Jan. 17, 1965.
[40] For Trapeznikov's statement, see *Izvestia,* Sept. 25, 1965.
[41] See the new statute on enterprises, in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), Oct. 20, 1965.
[42] For their respective statements see *Pravda,* Sept. 25 and 30, 1965.

Agriculture: The Curtain is Lifted

By Solomon Schwarz

In March 1965, the Central Committee of the Communist Party met in Moscow in order to discuss "urgent measures for the further development of Soviet agriculture." For several months the only information available about the plenum was the text of a report by Brezhnev and a brief resolution on this report.[1] Not until September 1965 did the party issue a full stenographic account of the proceedings, revealing the debates, exchanges, and speeches that had taken place.[2] Even this document seems in-

A distinguished veteran in the field of Soviet labor and industrial problems whose works, such as Labor in the Soviet Union (*New York, Praeger, 1951*), *are considered classics by students of Soviet affairs, Mr. Schwarz has also been a frequent contributor to* Problems of Communism.

[1] *Pravda,* March 27, 1965.
[2] *Plenum Tsentralnovo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soiuza. 24-26 marta 1965 goda,* Stenograficheskii otchet, Izd. politicheskoi literatury, Moscow, 1965.

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complete; yet it suffices to give us an extraordinary picture of the current state of Soviet agriculture—a picture of failures, disastrous mistakes, and expensive fiascos, suggesting a crisis of near-catastrophic proportions.

The situation was characterized most trenchantly, perhaps, by G. S. Zolotukhin, First Secretary of the Tambov Oblast Party Committee:

Letting matters remain as they are is dangerous and inadmissible. The year 1963 revealed all the evils stemming from the underestimation of agriculture. Had 1964 not been a good year, it is hard to conceive how we could have withstood the enormous difficulties.

Zolotukhin went on to stress the need for financial and technical aid to agriculture:

National economic plans must take into consideration the agricultural need for material-technical resources, yielding priority only to the defense needs of the country. *This is urgent, as otherwise industry itself may be hindered* [*and*] *may reach an impasse as a result of the present lag in the agricultural economy* (*pp. 52-53; emphasis here and hereafter supplied by author*).

Another speaker, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee P. E. Shelest, remarked with feeling on the past massive blunders in agriculture:

Only because of the faith of our people in a better future and their patience could they bear up under the various unreasonable experiments undertaken (*p. 36*).

He was backed up by the First Secretary of the Latvian Central Committee, A. Y. Pelshe:

Literally all farm workers in every republic, in every oblast, in fact the entire Soviet people, have suffered greatly as a result of the errors made (*p. 135*).

"The current state of agriculture is cause for serious anxiety," said the First Secretary of the Kostroma Oblast Party Committee, L. Ya. Florentiev: "Despite vast land resources output is low, and in recent years *the rate of increase in agricultural production has even fallen below the annual population increase*" (p. 175). He stressed the importance of incentives as the basic factor in raising agricultural output, and then offered some significant comments on peasant attitudes. "For centuries the peasants have fought for the land and, when necessary, given their lives for it"; but now:

If one were to speak honestly and truthfully, one would, unfortunately, have to admit that during the time of the cult of personality and in recent years we have done much to reduce the love of the peasant for the land. *It is no secret that in many areas of our country, particularly in the non-black-soil zone, the peasants have ceased to care for the land. They neglect it, ask us to write it off, to reduce quotas, etc. The reason for this abnormal situation is that the land feeds the peasant poorly, and does not provide him the living standard he could easily achieve if he were to leave the land and go to work in the city* (*p. 176*).

The Procurement Problem

One of the main acts of the March plenum was to approve proposals put forward by the Presidium of the Central Committee for substantial changes in the system of procuring agricultural produce. The commentary accompanying these proposals clearly reflected the hope that they would somehow eliminate the obstacles to the healthy development of Soviet agriculture and that their adoption would result in a rapid agricultural upsurge. Yet the situation is far more complex than this, and the reasons for the troubles in Soviet agriculture go far deeper.

Without any doubt, the system of procurement and dispersal of farm products used in the Soviet Union has done great harm to Soviet agriculture. This was made clear, with considerable asperity, at the plenum. Naturally, the system of state procurement *as such* could not be criticized, but dissatisfaction with the way it has operated—and in particular with the excessive demands it has imposed—was expressed by many speakers.

One of the most cogent and original comments in this respect was offered by Florentiev, who urged that the planning and implementation of procurements ought to "guarantee each farm a certain level of profitability, permitting expanded reproduction of livestock and a rise in

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the living standards for the peasants." And even more strongly: "The time has come to put the 'profit concept' into kolkhoz production planning, making profitability the main criterion of accuracy in the purchasing plan" (p. 178). The legitimization of the profit motive, thus far applicable only to industry, seems to have been suggested here for the first time as relevant to kolkhoz production.

In the past, of course, profitability for "each farm" or even for agriculture as a whole simply was not considered in the drafting of procurement plans. A wide gap between not just the real, but often even the planned, quantities of agricultural production and the procurements figures became traditional. "The extent to which grain purchase plans were unrealistic and imperfect," said Brezhnev in his report, "is reflected in the fact that they were fulfilled only three times in ten years—1956, 1958 and 1964" (p. 10). And even in those years the achievement of the plan was no proof of economic viability, given the heavy pressure applied in the procurement process.

Because of the "lack of realism" in procurement plans, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have often been deprived even of the quantities of grain needed for seed, and the shortage has been made up—if at all—out of the general state seed stock. This disorganizes farm operations. "In some cases, kolkhozes and sovkhozes have turned to the government after the procurement program has been completed with requests for seed allocations," Brezhnev noted in his report. "In 1962 the government sold the kolkhozes and sovkhozes 1,373,000 tons of grain for seed. This year again [the farms] petitioned the state for about 2 million tons of seed" (pp. 9-10). Not two million poods, but two million tons! This shows the scope of the disaster euphemistically suggested by Brezhnev's phrase, "in some cases."

The First Secretary of the Oblast Party Committee of the rather poor Pskov oblast, I. S. Gustov, provided a striking example of the "unreality" of the procurement plans. Flax is the main crop in this district. "Flax yields in our oblast in the last 20 years," Gustov said, "have been 169 kilograms per hectare," or one and two-thirds centners. This "has not, however, prevented the planning organs from drafting flax plans calling for deliveries of 3 to 3.8 centners per hectare" (p. 145). Under these circumstances it is hardly astonishing that:

. . . in the last seven years, the able-bodied population of the kolkhozes in the oblast has dropped from approximately 200 thousand to 110 thousand, i.e., by about half. . . If, under the prevailing circumstances, the drop in the able-bodied population of the villages continues at the same rate, there will be no able-bodied workers left in the kolkhozes in 10 years.

Some Apposite Examples

Very few speakers at the plenum failed to mention the backbreaking demands imposed by the procurement plans. Some of the most im-

НА ПОСЕВНОЙ

— Пора начинать?
— Рано. Еще фотограф не приехал.

Рисунок А. ЦВЕТКОВА

2

THE SOWING CAMPAIGN

—"Time to begin?"
—"It's early. The photographer hasn't arrived yet."

—*From* **Krokodil** *(Moscow), May 20, 1965.*

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portant of these statements are worth quoting. Said Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee:

Many will remember how last year the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and various conferences made the unreasonable demand that the Ukraine deliver one billion poods of grain. . . . Had we yielded to such thinking and tried to accomplish this, we would have definitively ruined animal husbandry in the republic and would have completely undermined the already strained production of livestock in the country (p. 38).

Somewhat contradictorily, Shelest added that "we"—*i.e.*, the Ukrainian party leadership—"did try to accomplish" the delivery through compulsory procurements and "voluntary" sales to the state, but were unable to do so, delivering only 703 million poods.

In Belorussia, the disproportion between output and procurements was particularly extreme: during the first six years of the Seven-Year Plan, the meat production plan was only 70 percent fulfilled, while the meat procurement plan was overfulfilled by 8 percent. According to Mazurov, First Secretary of the Belorussian CC:

To meet the plan requirements the kolkhozes had to slaughter young animals. Moreover, lacking fodder for their own livestock, they had to purchase hundreds of thousands of calves from the kolkhoz members every year, and resell them to the state. The kolkhozes suffered continued losses. This contradicts all laws of [livestock] reproduction, yet it went on (p. 74).

Concerning Moldavia, First Secretary of the republican CC, Bodiul, had this to say:

Gross kolkhoz production rose only 21 percent in six years, while procurements increased 70 percent. The produce left to the farms was insufficient to cover expanded livestock reproduction and normal remuneration of labor. The grain issued to the kolkhoz members in kind dropped from 580,000 tons in 1958 to 211,000 tons in 1964. The livestock produce distributed dropped to a fraction of the earlier figures (p. 208).

In Kazakhstan, according to CC First Secretary D. A. Kunaiev, "serious errors in agricultural procurement planning" were such that "for the republic as a whole, over a ten-year period, grain procurements averaged about 5 centners per hectare, while actual yields averaged 7.2 centners"—*i.e.*, procurements, including "voluntary" sales of grain to the state, totaled almost 70 percent of the grain output.

Many farms were left with very little grain for farm use. This retarded the development of animal husbandry. Many kolkhozes and sovkhozes were unable to replenish their insurance and seed funds, and could issue little grain in payment for labor days. . . . The high level of grain procurements forced the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to plan exceptionally high yields. The unrealistic plans gave the rural workers a feeling of insecurity in their work, undermined material incentive . . . and paralyzed initiative (p. 100).

These are the major statements (but not all of them) made on behalf of the various republics. Representatives of many oblasts made similar and even more critical comments.

Having finally recognized impending disaster, the Soviet leaders proposed two sets of measures at the March plenum that were supposed to correct the "unreal" character of the procurement system: one dealt with reduction of procurement quantities and the other with a hike in procurement prices. Can the measures planned rescue Soviet agriculture from its precarious state?

Reduction of Volume

The previously approved 1965 plan called for compulsory grain deliveries totaling 4 billion poods. The plenum decided to reduce this by 15 percent—to 3.4 billion poods, and—what is more—to establish this figure as a "fixed and unalterable [annual quota] for the entire forthcoming five-year plan period, including the year 1970" (Brezhnev, p. 10). At first glance this latter action seemed to be a development of notable significance. Yet, as Brezhnev added:

. . . the planned volume of grain purchases called for will not completely meet the growing needs of the country, nor permit the creation of government reserves. Thus along with planned procurements, we must organize above-plan purchasing of basic comestible crops (p. 12).

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Given the rather limited freedom of the kolkhozes in the matter of "voluntary" sales, this procedure means not so much keeping procurements on a "fixed and unalterable" level, then, as planning gradually to increase the *median level* of procurement prices as the volume of above-plan procurements increases.

Moreover, while any reduction in compulsory deliveries was of course welcome, it was very apparent at the plenum that the revised grain procurement target was still considered high. The overall annual grain plan for the Union, totalling 3.4 billion poods, was broken down to deliveries of 2.1 billion poods for the RSFSR, 617 million for the Ukraine, 586 million for Kazakhstan, etc. (p. 10). Reactions to these figures were anything but enthusiastic. For instance, Shelest declared:

Of a gross grain harvest [in 1965] of 1.8 billion poods for the Ukraine, 617 poods will be sold to the state (we understand that it cannot be otherwise, and therefore accept the plan), 310 million poods must be left for seed, and 324 million for payment of labor days. Five hundred million poods will remain for fodder, though we will need considerably more than that (p. 40).

Speaking for the RSFSR, K. G. Pysin cautiously protested the assigned quota:

Since in the past four years, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the Russian Federation have delivered an average of 1.9 billion poods of grain per year, I would say that the optimum annual grain procurement plan for the Russian Federation would be 2 billion poods (p. 51).

More compliantly, Kunaiev "accepted" the quota assigned to Kazakhstan, calling it "a difficult but realistic assignment" (p. 101). Yet since he had already protested strongly against the distorted grain delivery figures for the past decade, when procurements averaged 582 million poods a year, he could hardly have been happy about a new annual assignment of 586 million poods.

Increase in Prices

The second direction of reform—increasing procurement prices for farm produce—presented less serious problems, though still difficult enough. The most important step taken was a considerable increase in the prices of grain. In his report, Brezhnev quoted new prices for wheat and rye, varying widely for the different economic regions. He noted that for Belorussia and the Baltic republics "grain prices would be raised between 50 and 100 percent," and a supplementary 50 percent paid for above-plan wheat and rye deliveries (pp. 11-12); what he did not add was that these areas were assigned substantially higher price increases than the main grain areas.

By the same process of emphasis and omission, the press has given the impression that the increase in grain prices means a more or less parallel overall increase in procurement prices and thus will lead to a large boost in kolkhoz and sovkhoz income. This is only partially true. The increase in procurement prices for most farm products is considerably less than that for wheat and rye, and the prices for some products seem to have remained unchanged. Thus the rise in kolkhoz income will be far more modest than has been generally implied. Shelest probably gave a truer idea of the general level of increase expected when he revealed—perhaps incautiously—a projection for the Ukraine:

Rough estimates of the planned increases in the prices of wheat, rye, buckwheat, millet and some other crops and supplements to the current meat prices will mean an increase in the annual monetary income of the Ukrainian kolkhozes totaling 470 million rubles, or 10 percent (p. 38).

Innovations planned in the procurement of livestock produce are more limited than the changes in grain procurement. There has been no talk here of establishing a "fixed and unalterable" five- (or rather six-) year plan for 1965-1970. Here again the procurement plans go up to 1970, but the procurement figures, though below previously planned levels, are to rise with every passing year: from 8.5 million tons of meat and poultry (live weight) in 1965 to 11.4 million tons in 1970, with corresponding increases for milk and wool, and an especially large target for eggs—from 9.4 billion units in 1965 to 15 billion in 1970, or almost 60 percent (p. 16). These goals were scaled high probably because the authors of the changes did not feel they could make a large increase in the procurement prices for above-plan "voluntary" deliveries. In this connection, it should be noted

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that despite the high retail prices of livestock products, limiting consumption for the broad strata of the people, livestock procurement prices, even prior to the reform, were costing the state more than it could collect from selling the produce to the population. Therefore the procurement of livestock produce was unprofitable not only for the producers—the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—but for the state as well. Minister of Finance Garbuzov spoke of this at the plenum, providing a rare glimpse into the strange financial mechanics of livestock marketing in the USSR:

It should be noted that even now, purchase prices for livestock produce are considerably higher than retail prices, so that the 1965 budget must provide a subsidy of 1.3 billion rubles to cover this difference. A supplement to the current purchase prices of livestock produce would mean an additional state expenditure of 1.9 billion rubles per year, or a total state subsidy of over 3 billion rubles (pp. 130-31).

Under such circumstances, a large increase in the procurement prices for above-plan delivery of livestock produce was regarded as impossible, and the authors of the reform fell back on the old method of trying to ensure ever-larger deliveries in annual procurement plans, thereby increasing direct pressure on the producers.

One other discouraging factor ought to be mentioned. While the rise in procurement prices (including those for livestock produce) will mean a modest increase in kolkhoz income (judging by the 10 percent figure estimated for the Ukraine), this extra intake will be partly offset by a change in the system of taxing kolkhoz income. Brezhnev spoke briefly of the income tax in his speech, mentioning only that henceforth the tax would be levied "not on the gross but on the net product of farms" (p. 29). That much seemed to be good news. But how high was the tax to be? The subject remained taboo until the plenum was almost over. Then I. G. Kebin, First Secretary of the Estonian Central Committee, made a revealing comment:

I would also like to mention the plans in regard to taxes. The small blue book distributed to all of us contains a draft decree which, it is true, no one has mentioned, but which calls for new taxation of the kolkhozes on a profitability basis. We have calculated the results for two kolkhozes. For example, the Rakhva Vyyt Kolkhoz in Khariuski Raion is a good kolkhoz with an excellent reputation, one which will go on advancing. Under the current system, this kolkhoz would be taxed 17,000 rubles. Under the new system, it will have to pay approximately 41,000 rubles. The [additional] income from higher purchase prices will amount to 28,000 rubles. In the final analysis, after all these measures, the kolkhoz will have four thousand rubles more in income. This is not much! (p. 205).

A great deal was said at the plenum about "subjectivism" in farm management, "subjectivist" solutions to farm problems by all kinds of authorities ("subjectivism" being a euphemistic phrase for arbitrariness), chaotic planning, sundry agronomical mistakes, the disastrous situation with regard to agricultural equipment and transportation facilities, the pitiful achievements in rural electrification, the neglect of irrigation farming, and so on. The speakers stressed particularly the protracted crisis in animal husbandry and, in that connection, the almost catastrophic status of the grazing and pasture economy. All these isues are, of course, directly relevant to the future of Soviet agriculture as a whole, but even more important were two sets of proposals discussed at the plenum: First, measures aimed at raising the priority of agriculture in overall economic planning, and second, freeing agriculture from the bureaucratic and authoritarian shackles that have so conspicuously hindered its progress thus far.

The Question of Priorities

Numerous speakers at the plenum admitted openly that in the process of drafting plans for the development of the Soviet economy, of allocating material resources to its various sectors, agriculture has been grievously disregarded. Again and again its interests have been sacrificed in favor of industry—especially heavy industry. Thus Z. N. Nuryiev, First Secretary of the Bashkir Party Oblast Committee:

It is high time to end the practice of solving all problems at the expense of agriculture. . . . In particular, the Gosplan must cease to underestimate [the importance of] agriculture. We

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often hear that there is no one in the Gosplan to defend agricultural interests.

Apparently stung by this statement, Brezhnev interrupted the speaker, pointing out that "the key positions are still held by the Central Committee and our government." But Nuryiev was undaunted:

Correct, Leonid Ilich. Agriculture is as much a branch of our national economy as industry and should be given equal consideration by these organs. Such major errors as have been committed in [the failure to supply] kolkhozes and sovkhozes with basic farming machinery, transportation facilities, fertilizers and pesticides are intolerable. We understand that at present it is not so easy to cover fully all requirements of agriculture. Yet the Gosplan should not permit unexpected failures. We work, we work, and suddenly it appears that the country has no harrows. No sooner is this problem solved than we are faced with the problem of grain seeders, and so forth ad infinitum. What kind of planning is this! (*pp.* 97-98).

The bitter experiences of recent years, particularly the catastrophic harvest of 1963, have finally brought the seriousness of the situation home to the Communist leaders. No longer do we hear about grandiose vows to "overtake and outstrip" the capitalist countries. On the contrary, these vows are now branded as "adventurist," and subjected to contemptuous barbs. Thus Shelest:

We are all familiar with the slogans—overtake and surpass the United States of America in per capita meat and milk production as soon as possible—complete the Seven-Year Plan in three to four years—today we live well, but tomorrow we will live even better—and yet we have breadlines (*pp.* 37-38).

Minister of Finance V. F. Garbuzov referred to the slogan "catch up and surpass" without quoting it directly:

In 1963, basic production assets per worker in Soviet agriculture, on an annual average, totalled about 2,000 rubles. The figure for the USA was 10,000 rubles, that is, five times our figure. The USA had almost four times as many tractors as we per 1,000 hectares of farmland, and 3.7 as many harvesting combines as the USSR per 1,000 hectares of grain crops (excluding corn). The USA has more than three times as many trucks as the USSR, although as we all know, we have a much larger area under cultivation. When we also note that we use less chemical fertilizer and pesticides than the USA, we can readily see why our farm labor productivity is substantially lower and our production costs higher (*p.* 128).

It follows that the major requirement is for a real increase in the share of state capital investments allocated to farming. This was acknowledged by Brezhnev (p. 21), and was discussed in detail by P. T. Lomako, Chairman of Gosplan:

The draft plan for the next five years calls for the allocation of 41 billion rubles for the development of agriculture from centralized state capital investments alone, or almost as much as in all the preceding five-year plans together, and more than twice the investment in the last five-year period. Together with state capital investments in rural housing construction, in socio-cultural measures, and in the development of industrial branches producing agricultural equipment, fertilizers and other materials, this constitutes more than 26 percent of the total state capital investment in the national economy, as compared with 19 percent in the current five-year period. (*p.* 194)

The Finance Minister, too, spoke of the need to increase capital investment in agriculture (pp. 132-33). He noted that it might even be necessary to reach into state reserves in order to rescue Soviet agriculture from its desperate plight.

With so much plain and forceful talk at the plenum, one might have expected decisive steps to be taken immediately thereafter. Yet this hardly seems to have been the case. Six months later, at the September Plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev returned to the subject again:

I must point out that in some sectors of our state apparatus—the Gosplan, the ministries, and the various administrations—the tendency to improve other matters, to "balance the books" at the expense of agriculture, to infringe on the interests of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, has

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not yet been eliminated. All this in spite of the very clear decisions made at the March Plenum of the Central Committee calling for maximum aid to agriculture. (Pravda, *Sept. 30, 1965*)

The Bureaucratic Question

Brezhnev's statement comes as no surprise, as the "tendency" of which he spoke, and which has caused so much harm to agriculture—*i.e.*, mainly to the peasants—is inherent in the system of bureaucratic rule and is closely linked with the whole practice of "subjectivism" and "administrationism." Many excellent decisions calling for an end to the "administrative" approach have been taken—but in vain. At the March Plenum of the Central Committee, K. G. Pysin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, while referring only to "some areas," presented what amounted to a wholesale indictment of current agricultural practices:

Unfortunately, in some rural areas in the RSFSR, the dubious heritage from the past is still found in kolkhoz and sovkhoz management —administrationism. . . . Pressure and the imposition of standardized plans from above, and disregard for the opinions of specialists, still prevail. The farms are still not allowed to earmark cattle for slaughter, especially cows, independently, without oblast or krai permission. The hands of farm leaders and specialists are tied when it comes to choosing the strains of various farm crops to be planted or breeds of cattle to be raised. They are forbidden to plant unzoned strains or to breed types of cattle not included in the breed zoning plan (established about twenty years ago). Sowing deadlines are imposed and agricultural methods which have not been tested under local conditions are made mandatory. The sovkhozes and kolkhozes are not allowed to sell their produce even after meeting their production quotas [i.e., deliveries to the state]. Sometimes farms, particularly sovkhozes, are forced to purchase unneeded machines or fertilizers. Construction organizations refuse to use local construction materials, for example timber, and bricks. . . . Cattle pens of reinforced concrete have been built in forest areas at five or six times the usual cost. All this is still going on. (*p. 50*)

This, then, is the typical picture—gross violations of the principles of democracy in the organization and management of farming, and the triumph of authoritarianism over autonomy. That these malpractices have disastrous consequences is something that the Communist leaders, too, have finally come to understand. In their attempt to cope with this situation, however, they have adopted a peculiar "compromise" which involves, on the one hand,

ORDERING VS. DIRECTING

—"From now on the practice of ordering people around is strictly forbidden! Dis—missed!"

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), June 30, 1965.*

— Впредь запрещаю применять на службе методы командования! Ра-зойдись!

Рисунок Е. ЩЕГЛОВА

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granting the kolkhozes and their members greater freedom in economic self-management, and, on the other, increasing rather than diminishing the role of the party in agricultural management. This contradictory policy was clearly reflected in Brezhnev's report to the plenum: "Our great national tasks in economic and cultural construction," he said, are to "*increase the leading role of the Communist Party and its cadres immeasurably* in social life." At the same time, he went on, "*we must put an end to the practice of ordering people around, of administrationism*, petty supervision, replacing kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders and specialists. We must root out every sign of showmanship and ballyhoo" (p. 31). Most of this was incorporated verbatim in the plenum resolution.

Even if it were theoretically possible to increase the leading role of the party while at the same time doing away with the "administrative approach," it remains a fact that party leaders are consistently *trained* in the "administrative approaches." To illustrate this point, let us cite the remarks of I. S. Gustov, First Secretary of the Pskov Oblast Party Committee:

The imposition of a crop pattern, which has been viewed as of well-nigh decisive importance to agricultural upsurge, has had extremely harmful consequences. All secretaries of oblast committees will remember being called every year to the agricultural section of the RSFSR Central Committee of the CPSU, where the cropping pattern was being determined, and how we were pressured to endorse it, and how it was then presented as originating from below, from the oblast party and executive committee levels. (*pp. 144-45*)

Will the party succeed in eradicating these deeply ingrained practices? To be sure, it not only has condemned them, but has in fact endeavored to present itself as the true defender of democracy in the countryside. So much so, that Brezhnev even ventured to suggest the early convocation of a Third Congress of Kolkhoz Members[3]—an institution which has lain dormant since 1935, and which in the minds of Brezhnev's listeners probably symbolizes a more democratic approach to collective farming:

We must recognize that in many instances the democratic basis of the kolkhoz regime is being grossly violated. Indeed, the bulk of the members in many kolkhozes are excluded from the discussion and solution of key problems of kolkhoz economy. Moreover, in some kolkhozes, even the statutory requirements have not been observed in recent times. . . . The time has come to begin preparations for the Third All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Members, with a view to convoking it next year. It should be preceded by raion, oblast, krai and republic congresses of collective farmers. (*p. 28*)

Yet all these splendid phrases and high-sounding resolutions are bound to yield few positive results as long as the party remains adamantly wedded to the principle of undiluted control over Soviet agriculture. The realization that authoritarian habits have had a deleterious effect on Soviet farming, the conclusion that "it is no longer possible" to go on this way, and the promises for an end to the malpractices and injustices of the past are all praiseworthy developments—but they are doomed unless followed by a fundamental reevaluation of the role of the party in agricultural administration. The compromise solutions adopted by the Communist leadership do not correspond to the seriousness of the situation. What is mandatory is to democratize the management of Soviet agriculture—and in the first place, the collective farms. Thus far only the first step in this direction has been taken.[4]

[3] The first congress took place in March 1933, and the second in February 1935. It was at the second congress that the Collective Farm Statute was formally ratified and the kolkhozniks were formally granted the right to own small private plots—*Ed.*

[4] As this article went to press, the Soviet Union announced that Brezhnev has been appointed chairman of a commission to draft a new kolkhoz statute, to be adopted later in the year by the Third Congress of Kolkhoz Members—*Ed.*

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New Trends and Old Remedies

By Roy D. Laird

Whether or not one accepts the view that failures in agriculture were the primary reason for the decision to remove Nikita S. Khrushchev from his position of leadership in the fall of 1964, clearly the recognition by his associates of the need for changes on the agricultural front was a factor of enormous importance. Such a conclusion is strongly supported by the imposing list of modifications introduced in agriculture in the months immediately following the leadership change. Besides the removal of Khrushchev himself as the key formulator of agricultural policy, the changes, most of which were widely publicized by the new leadership, included the following:

(1) The removal of T. D. Lysenko from his leading position in agricultural science and experimentation;

(2) the reinstatement of the Ministry of Agriculture as the dominant central agency of production administration;

(3) the reestablishment at the local level of unified *raion* (district) administrative agencies for both industry and agriculture, and the abolition of Khrushchev's "territorial production administrations";

(4) the reinstatement of V. V. Matskevich as Minister of Agriculture and D. A. Kunaiev as First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Party (Khrushchev had previously dismissed both men as scapegoats for the growing failure of his virgin lands scheme);

(5) the establishment of stable purchase plans for agricultural produce, these plans to remain unchanged throughout the new five-year planning period;

(6) significant increases in state prices paid to farms for their output, accompanied by a return to the old two-price system—*i.e.*, base prices for plan fulfillment and higher prices for purchases of produce in excess of the plan;

(7) the announcement of plans for significantly speeding up the reclamation of marshlands and expanding the areas under irrigation;

(8) encouragement of private-plot production, primarily by removing the added restraints placed on such operations during Khrushchev's last years in office;

(9) the promised introduction of a new model charter for agricultural artels, probably by the spring of 1966; and

(10) the decision to halt, for the foreseeable future, the further transformation of kolkhozy into sovkhozy and the amalgamation of farms into even larger units.

This is an imposing list of changes, and it raises the question: Do they—and other moves

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which have received less publicity—portend a significant transformation of the Soviet agricultural system? The answer to this question is not to be found simply by examining the post-Khrushchev innovations alone; indeed, any valid answer must be preceded by another question: In addition to the known—and serious—physical limitations facing Soviet agriculture, what is the political-economic environment that also must inevitably shape and limit any reformation of the Stalinist agricultural order?

The Stalinist Legacy in Agriculture

An evaluation of the current trends must start not only from recognition that the Soviet system is a collectivized system, but also from appreciation of the fact that, while the Soviet Union is not the only modern state experimenting with a large-scale collectivized form of agriculture, both the size of the Soviet farms and the administrative scheme of the system are unique. The kolkhoz-sovkhoz system is, perhaps, the most important of all of Stalin's contributions to the Soviet system of rule; and in spite of many modifications introduced in the 1950's and early 1960's, that system remained essentially intact in the fall of 1964. This being so, it is pertinent to inquire why Stalin, in spite of the impressive revival of agricultural production under the policies of the NEP, chose to impose the tragically heavy cost of forcible agricultural collectivization on the Soviet peasantry in the first place.

The most obvious, though perhaps not the most important, reason was the realization that only agriculture could provide the enormous amounts of capital necessary for the rapid industrialization of the USSR. Some form of agricultural collectivization therefore seemed essential if the required amounts of capital were to be transferred from the farms to industry.

The second reason, less obvious but at least as important, was political in nature. Already prior to the 1917 revolution, Lenin and his followers had clearly perceived that the 1905 revolution had aborted because it lacked the organized support of the peasantry, who constituted the overwhelming bulk of the population. Later, the Bolshevik leadership was equally aware that its success in 1917 as well as in the subsequent civil war was achieved through a merger of the agrarian and urban revolutions, the peasants choosing to side with the Bolsheviks as the least repellent of the forces contending for political power. In view of the tenuous nature of the peasant-Bolshevik alliance, however, the potential of peasant power loomed ominously in Soviet politics after the bloodletting was over. Thus the concessions granted to free peasant enterprise under the NEP reflected the new rulers' recognition that the mood of the countryside demanded a "peasant Brest-Litovsk."[1] Although Stalin terminated the NEP in 1928, no one could have been more aware than he that just as the peasant masses had been the key factor in the Communist victory, so they also constituted the most important potential source of political—even revolutionary—opposition to the regime. Consequently, it seems logical that the most important motivation behind Stalin's agricultural "revolution from above" was the need to emasculate the peasantry politically. The risks involved in forcing the peasants into the collectives were certainly enormous, but once the kolkhozy had been successfully established (and the MTS created and placed firmly in control of agricultural machinery as the major means of production[2]), Communist rule in Russia was assured of a long tenure.

Between the early 1930's and the early 1950's, few if any significant economic or administrative innovations were introduced in Soviet agriculture, while politically the collectives gradually pressed the peasantry into a mold from which effective deviation became more and more impossible. Beginning with the amalgamation of collectives initiated by Khrushchev with Stalin's blessing in 1950, the pace of economic change in agriculture accelerated sharply, especially after 1953, but still there was no really fundamental departure from the established system. True, Khrushchev did away with Stalin's MTS, but this meant no weakening of party control over agriculture; it merely shifted the focal point of this control from the MTS to the kolkhozy themselves. By 1958, when this step was

[1] David Riabanov is credited with originating this description of the NEP. See Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 97.

[2] Under Stalin, the MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) held a monopoly over agricultural machinery. Thus, by placing trusted party cadres in key positions in the MTS, the party was able to utilize them as an effective means of exercising control over the collective farms.

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taken, the party network within the collectives had been so strengthened by the transfer of cadre reinforcements from the cities that virtually every farm had a party-member chairman supported by a party unit, making the MTS superfluous.

Nor did Khrushchev's innovations contribute much in the long run towards advancing agricultural production. The augmentation of the number of specialists on the farms had perhaps the greatest impact,[3] while some short-range advantages also resulted from the expansion of the area sown to corn under the "virgin lands" and corn campaigns. On the other hand, the 1955 decree on decentralized farm planning was almost completely ignored. In sum, although the Khrushchev regime made apparently serious attempts to improve farm output through economic changes, these were overshadowed by political moves designed to strengthen the system of controls—often to the point of nullifying the economic gains that might otherwise have been realized.

Finally, any examination of the rationale behind the Stalinist agricultural system must not ignore the theoretical determinants. From the standpoint of Marxist doctrine, the Bolshevik undertaking to introduce communism into predominantly agricultural and peasant Russia was an anachronism, and it necessitated devising some scheme for bringing the masses of peasant farmers, no less than the urban workers, into a proper Communist relationship to the means of production. The kolkhozy and sovkhozy answered this ideological need. Beyond this, in the more practical realm of administrative theory, Lenin repeatedly argued for the application to agriculture of an organizational pattern similar to that for industry. Closely related to this idea was the conviction—also influenced, no doubt, by the vast expanse of Soviet lands—that hugeness was a criterion of superiority in agricultural as in industrial enterprise. Even Khrushchev, although he occasionally damned the excesses of "gigantomania," became caught up in the momentum of bigness and presided over the amalgamation program which increased the size of farms severalfold.

Khrushchev's Later Initiatives

Although the blind spots of a totalitarian dictator are probably such that Khrushchev was unable to see the roots of many of his own failures in agriculture, he appears to have realized some time before his ouster that radically new courses of action were required. Thus, in response to the drought of 1963, he called for a crash program to expand enormously the production of artificial fertilizers and other chemical aids. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that he had already seen portents of impending agricultural disaster at least a year earlier, in 1962, when he established the Territorial Production Administrations as a new arm of local control over agriculture. In his call for establishing the TPAs,[4] he emphasized that, following the abandonment of the MTS in 1958, too many comrades in posts outside and above the farms had wrongly taken that move to mean a lessening of their responsibilities for satisfactory farm production whereas they should have taken these responsibilities even more seriously.

The attempt to tighten agricultural controls through the TPAs, however, soon proved inadequate. Even though 1962 produced a relatively good harvest, 1963 brought the drought, and the USSR, finding its grain reserves dwindling, had to resort to purchases abroad. Khrushchev then launched his much-publicized campaign to step up fertilizer production. This, however, was not the only important shift in policy. Khrushchev also dusted off his call of several years earlier in favor of adopting the "production principle," instead of plan fulfillment, as the primary criterion of agricultural success. The "production principle"—in effect, a kind of Libermanism for agriculture—involves gauging farm performance primarily on the basis of output per unit of land, rather than the simple fulfillment of planned quotas. Finally, during Khrushchev's last few years in office, an increasing number of articles appeared in the press—seemingly with tacit official en-

[3] As a result of Khrushchev's policies, the number of agricultural specialists working on the farms more than doubled between 1953 and 1963. For further details, see the author's forthcoming article, "The Dilemma of Soviet Agricultural Administration," in *Agricultural History*.

[4] Although the TPA's had no monopoly over farm machinery as had the MTS, they were local party-state administrative agencies responsible for the production performance of the collective farms in their respective districts. Every TPA had a party unit and a staff of inspector-organizers, each of whom was responsible for supervising operations of some three or four farms.

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couragement or approval—advocating a return to the *zveno* (a team made up of some half dozen individuals) as the basic work unit on the kolkhozy in place of the existing huge brigades, sometimes numbering over a hundred individuals.

Full adoption of the "production principle" and the *zveno* would undoubtedly result in profound changes in the collective farm system. The kolkhozy themselves might be preserved in name, but the logic of the "production principle" carries the implication that central planning authorities—indeed, planners at any level above and outside the farms—would be deprived of the power to determine what crops or animals would be produced on the farms. If output were to be made the criterion of farm performance, then such basic production decisions would logically have to be left to the farmers themselves since they would best know what crops and livestock to raise in order to maximize the yield of their particular farm. Even more significantly, perhaps, a return to the *zveno* would, in effect, subdivide each collective farm into what would amount to numerous smaller farms operated by individual teams controlling the segments of land and the livestock under their care. Thus, the combination of these two reforms, had they been carried out, would have simultaneously done away with central controls over agriculture and with the kolkhozy as single, large, and wholly coordinated administrative units. Unfortunately, however, neither proposal received much attention, and what little changes Khrushchev was actually able to effect were, like the Stolypin reforms of over a half century earlier, too little and too late. This failure, more than anything else, may well have sealed the political fate of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Now Khrushchev is out, and the renewed emphasis placed by the present leadership on plan fulfillment suggests that the "production principle" will at best be soft-pedaled and more probably discarded.[5] Consequently, the only

[5] Addressing the March 1965 special Central Committee Plenum on agriculture, it is true, Brezhnev asserted that "the level of profitability must be placed at the base" of measuring the success of farms. However, the new leadership's simultaneous stress on plan fulfillment as the most important factor is incompatible with a shift to the "production principle" and cost-accounting. See "O neotlozhnykh merakh po dalneishemu razvitiiu selskovo khoziaistva SSSR: Doklad. . .L. I. Brezhneva. . .24 Marta 1965 goda," *Selskaia zhizn*, March 27, 1965, pp. 2-4.

— Что у вас за гулянье, престольный праздник, что ли?
— Да нет, дедушка, просто наш колхоз запчасти достал.

Рисунок С. КУЗЬМИНА

—What's going on around here—is it your patron saint's day, or something?
—Why no, grandpa, it's simply that our kolkhoz has just received its spare parts."

From *Krokodil* (Moscow), April 20, 1965.

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current trend in Soviet agricultural policy that appears to offer some promise of leading to vitally needed fundamental changes in the existing system is probably the trend initiated under Khrushchev towards reviving the *zveno* as the basic unit in the organization of kolkhoz production. The importance of this developing trend will be further elaborated upon later in the discussion.

Policies of the New Leadership

The first major action of the post-Khrushchev leadership was to call a special Central Committee plenum on agriculture. There were probably few Soviet citizens who missed the significance of the single added word in the title of Brezhnev's address—delivered at the March 24, 1965, session of the plenum—which otherwise was virtually identical with the title of Khrushchev's speech of September 3, 1953, admitting serious agricultural failures. Whereas Khrushchev's title had been "On Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR," Brezhnev's was "On *Urgent* Measures for the Development of Agriculture in the USSR" (italics added).[6]

Both Brezhnev's speech and the resolution subsequently approved by the plenum heavily stressed matters of agricultural administration, thus falling into line with the long-established idea that if the administrative setup were properly readjusted, the problems of agricultural production would automatically be solved. A reading of these pronouncements might well have given the first impression that at long last the new leadership intended to take serious steps to decentralize agricultural production decision-making, giving the farms greater freedom to respond to local conditions and needs. Unfortunately, however, the long history of advancing centralization in Soviet agricultural administration, plus the stress which key officials have given to certain changes introduced by the new leadership, does not support such optimism.

Already four months before the special March plenum, hopes of a shift towards greater on-the-farm autonomy in production decisions had been spurred by the new leadership's action in November 1964 to rid the Territorial Production Administrations of their party committees. However, the March plenum, in deciding to dismantle the rest of Khrushchev's economic administrative apparatus, also moved to recreate all too familiar control agencies. In fact, the machinery of agricultural administration has been restored to much the same form that existed prior to 1958, although without the MTS.[7]

As outlined by the newly-designated Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, the reorganized structure of agricultural administration is as follows: The USSR Ministry of Agriculture (including some 43 "main administrations," commissions, and associations responsible for almost every conceivable aspect of agricultural activity [8]) has been reinstated as the focal point of production control and direction over counterpart ministries in the various republics. Below the republic ministries, the *oblast* (or *krai*) administrations continue to function as major agencies of administrative control and are specifically charged with responsibility for "operational direction" (*operativnoe rukovodstvo*) of the farms. Finally, although somewhat fewer in number than they were in the late 1950's, the *raion* administrations (reestablished earlier by the new leadership) have again been made potent cogs in the control structure. Operating directly under the supervision of the *oblast* authorities and immediately over the farms, they are responsible for "working out problems of placing orders for production and delivery" of state purchases, "distributing funds for equipment and construction, . . . [and] rendering day-to-day assistance to the farms in solving complex problems." [9]

All this casts doubt on Brezhnev's promise at the March plenum that there would be "a resolute turning away" from the practice of ex-

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] There were even hints of a possible revival of the MTS at the March Plenum. Noting that the "repair base" had been "seriously undermined" when the MTS were dismantled, Brezhnev specifically proposed "the creation of mechanized detachments and machine-rental, mechanized animal husbandry, and meadow-reclamation stations for the fulfillment of various specialized jobs. . . ." See *Pravda,* March 27, 1965.

[8] "V ministerstve seliskovo khoziaistva SSSR," *Kolkhoz-nosovkhoznoie proizvodstvo,* No. 8, 1965 pp. 47-48.

[9] "Na uroven novykh zadach," *Selskaia zhizn,* June 24, 1965, p. 2. As of early 1965, some 1,945 unified urban-rural *raion* administrations had been established in the Ukraine and the RSFSR alone (see *Pravda,* Feb. 6, 1965, p. 2; and *Izvestia,* Jan. 16, 1965, p. 4.), and at the March Plenum, Brezhnev announced that some 2,434 *raion* party committees had been created (*Pravda,* March 27, 1965).

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cessive interference by higher authorities in the management and personnel affairs of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy.[10] Production failures on the farms necessarily result in failures to fulfill planned delivery quotas, and Matskevich himself has unequivocally stated that the assignment to the *raion*, *oblast* (*krai*), and republic administrations of responsibility for "operational direction" of the farms means that the "fulfillment of the [state] plan for purchases . . . will be guaranteed . . . "[11] Perhaps the central authorities will no longer attempt to interfere in the day-to-day production administration of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy as did Khrushchev, but it is surely impossible in practice to separate responsibility for planning, enforcement of delivery quotas, and direction of farm production. Perhaps orders may now emanate from republic or *oblast* offices, but these offices are just as much out of touch with local conditions and needs as are the central agencies in Moscow. Finally, the Minister of Agriculture has made it absolutely clear that the *raion* administrations will be directly responsible for enforcing such higher orders and for seeing not only that planned state delivery quotas are "unquestionably fulfilled," but also that "possibilities for above-plan . . . purchases . . . are fully utilized. . . ."[12] This would hardly seem to augur any diminution of outside controls over farm operations, or any increased autonomy for farm managers.

On the other hand, Soviet commentary has stressed that certain economic measures—principally the establishment of stable, unchanging procurement plans for the 1966-70 planning period and the expansion of state investments in agriculture over this period to a total of 62 billion rubles (nearly equal to total Soviet investments in agriculture during the first nineteen postwar years[13]) will assure a substantial improvement in farm production. The promised increase in investments is indeed impressive and, if carried out, should produce new levels of output. If, however, as this writer believes, at least half the problem lies in deep-rooted administrative defects of the system, the gains to be realized through increased capital expenditures and greater production incentives are bound to be disappointing.

Before Khrushchev ended the old two-price system for state purchases of farm produce, Western observers agreed that it distorted incentives. Yet, one of the new leadership's moves to solve the agricultural problem has been to go back to the old scheme of higher prices for above-plan sales to the state. More than this, there has already been an intimation that the professedly voluntary above-plan sales may increasingly come to be regarded as mandatory.[14]

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] V. V. Matskevich, "Ekonomicheskie problemy dalnaishnevo razvitiia selskovo khoziaistva," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, June 1965, pp. 1-13.

[12] *Ibid.* Further elaborating on the responsibility of the *raion* organizations, Matskevich asserts that they "must carefully examine the plans given to them [by the farms] and, if necessary, make corrections, and only after this, confirm the individual plans for each kolkhoz and sovkhoz, but with the understanding that the state purchases for the *raion* must be fulfilled *unquestionably*" (emphasis added).

[13] Brezhnev speech at March 1965 plenum, *Pravda*, March 27, 1965.

[14] The lead editorial of *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva* (No. 4, April 1965, pp. 1-9) stated that above-plan sales to the state would "initially" be placed on a "voluntary basis," implying a possibility that they might later become obligatory.

—"You know, I still remember you when you were *that* small a boss!"

—From Krokodil (Moscow), May 30, 1965.

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Beyond these key economic changes, restrictions on private-plot production (which apparently were encouraged by Khrushchev in his later years in office) are to be stopped; the hopelessly large debts of many of the more backward collectives, accumulated largely through purchases of MTS equipment, are to be canceled; large new drainage and irrigation projects are to be undertaken; terms of credit extended to farms for improvements are to be eased; and a new, more liberal tax, levied on net rather than gross farm income, is to be adopted.

By and large, these economic reforms appear to reflect a new trend in Soviet policy which—if conscientiously pursued and fully implemented—can bring about a significant improvement in agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, this writer still adheres to the conclusion advanced in an earlier analysis of Soviet agricultural potential for 1980, that the USSR can be expected to remain a net importer of food (or at least of the key commodity, grain) for several years to come.[15] The Brezhnev-Kosygin program of economic reforms in agriculture provides no new reason for altering this conclusion.

Prospects for Fundamental Reform

The long-term outlook for Soviet agriculture is, moreover, beclouded by the fact that there has as yet been no clear indication that the economic improvements described above will be matched by equally necessary reforms on the administrative side. Perhaps the new leadership's promise to write a new kolkhoz charter does imply a resolve to effect far-reaching modifications in the sovkhoz-kolkhoz system; however, as stated earlier, the only hopeful sign pointing in this direction as of the time of writing has been the apparent tendency toward a revival of the *zveno*. Whether this development is connected in any way with the formulation of a new kolkhoz charter is, however, not yet clear.

An important aspect of the administrative problem of Soviet agriculture is the unwieldy size of the farms themselves. In early 1965 there were some 10,000 sovkhozy averaging 28,200 hectares each, including 9,800 hectares in crops and 2,356 devoted to cattle, and 37,600 kolkhozy averaging 6,000 hectares, including 2,900 hectares in crops and 944 devoted to cattle. As of that same time, the long-run trend toward ever larger farms—greatly accelerated by the Khrushchev program of amalgamations inaugurated in 1950—had as yet to be definitely reversed, although the appearance in recent years of Soviet studies of optimum farm size and Brezhnev's statement at the March 1965 plenum that some of the present farms are "so large that they have proved to be unmanageable"[16] suggest the possibility of a reversal. If the findings of American studies on farm size and management can be considered universally applicable, the average Soviet farm today is several times too large for efficient operation.[17]

True, American farms vary considerably in size according to the type of operation, and the size of the average farm (some 300 acres, or 120 hectares, in 1959) is continuing to grow. Nevertheless, as a general proposition, it seems clear that the optimum size of the most efficient farm, regardless of setting, must be closer to the American average than to the Soviet.

Viewed in this light, a reorganization of Soviet farms on the basis of the *zveno* would be at least a step in the right direction. As implied previously, this might be done without fully dismantling the collectives; indeed, continued kolkhoz ownership of at least the most expen-

[15] See the author's "Soviet Agricultural Output in 1980: An Appraisal," *Ost-Europa Wirtschaft,* No. 2, June 1965. Even if Soviet agriculture were to achieve the current average US level of grain output per hectare, the resulting maximum possible output of some 214 million metric tons by 1980 would still fall far short of Khrushchev's goal of 300 million tons, which would be required to meet the needs of Russia's increasing population and provide sufficient animal feed to raise the protein content of the average citizen's diet to a level comparable with that prevailing in the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, if reasonable allowance is made for the lower efficiency of Soviet farm production, the USSR's annual grain output by 1980 seems unlikely to reach more than an estimated 170-180 million tons, indicating that grain imports will be necessary even to maintain the present starch-heavy diet.

[16] *Pravda,* March 27, 1965.

[17] *E.g.*, See John J. Brewster and Gene Wunderlich, "Farm Size, Capital, and Tenure Requirements," in *Adjustments in Agriculture: A National Basebook* (Carlton F. Christian, Ed.), Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1961, pp. 196-228. For comparisons of farm size and management efficiency and their implications for Soviet agriculture, see the author's paper, "Khrushchev's Administrative Reforms in Agriculture: An Appraisal," forthcoming in a collection of papers on Soviet and East European agriculture (Professor Jerzy Karcz, Ed.) to be published by the University of California Press.

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sive farm machinery and continued common marketing and storage of produce might prove advantageous, since changes in these areas would probably entail considerable outlays of capital for machinery, transportation, and buildings. What would be essential in such a reorganization, however, is that for production purposes not only the workers but also the land and animals should be divided into much smaller units, and above all that these units should be vested with the power to make production decisions. In short, although the framework of the kolkhozy might be retained, for all practical purposes of production the existing farms would be broken up into smaller parcels much closer in size to the average American farm.

Stalin, it should be noted, damned his follow member of the Politburo, A. Andreiev, in the late 1940's for championing the *zveno* as the most efficient basis for organizing farm production. The reason for this condemnation undoubtedly was that *zveno* members tended to develop separatist attitudes towards the collectives and to regard the fields and animals under their charge as private property. Andreiev, however, was correct in his observation that these teams, which had grown in importance under the relatively relaxed controls during the war, had proved themselves more efficient producing units than the large brigades.

Soviet agriculture in the late 1940's was in serious trouble, and Stalin found himself facing a choice between Andreiev's recommended course, which on the basis of the record promised more efficient production, though at the cost of weakened controls, and Khrushchev's alternative program of further farm amalgamations, which offered no demonstrable hope of increased farm production but on the other hand assured heightened party and state control over agriculture and hence continued maximization of capital transfers from agriculture to industry. Adoption of the latter alternative had the effect of completing Stalin's "revolution from above," bringing the managements of the kolkhozy fully under the monolithic control hierarchy extending from Moscow down to the local unit.

In the later years of Khrushchev's tenure, a quiet reversal of attitude regarding the *zveno* became apparent. Articles published in various journals, including the important weekly *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, began praising the effectiveness of the *zveno* in sovkhoz and kolkhoz operations.[18] This trend, moreover, does not seem to have abated with Khrushchev's removal from office. Should it continue, and should the new kolkhoz charter promised by the present leadership provide for the displacement of the brigade by the *zveno*, there is little question that the result would be a radical change in the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. The implications of such a move were clearly indicated in a recent article by V. Zhulin, Chief Agronomist of the Krasnoyarskii Sovnarkhoz, Altaiski Krai, who strongly argued for the *zveno* on the basis of highly successful experiments carried out in his region. His remarks included the following:

In order that a team be on the land as an active owner, the land should be a legal assignment, not a conditional one. *A team has to consist of four to six persons . . . A team that enters a kolkhoz or sovkhoz as a primary production unit must have a single will . . . subordinated . . . to the authority of the detachment leader . . .*[19] [*Emphasis added*]

It seems more probable, however, that the *zveno* movement will prove to be a minor countertrend which will be overcome by the major sweep and direction of the post-Khrushchev changes in Soviet agricultural policy. The reestablishment of a centralized administrative hierarchy from the Ministry of Agriculture down to the *raion* administrations and the individual farms, the call for *oblast* and republic offices to exercise close "operational direction" of farm production, and the demand that *raion* authorities continue to give first priority to the fulfillment of centrally-determined production plans—all these moves by the new Soviet leadership militate against the prospect of a Libermanist-type trend in agriculture. While it is still possible that the new kolkhoz charter to be promulgated in 1966 may alter the current picture of unremitting agricultural controls, the new leadership appears unwilling as yet to carry out a fundamental alteration of the existing system at the cost of inviting the evolution of independent peasant interest groups and admitting implicitly that Marxist-Leninist forms are incompatible with efficient agricultural production.

[18] *E.g.*, see "Organizatsiaia truda v kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh," *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 5, Feb. 1, 1964, pp. 1-6 of insert.

[19] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, August 7, 1965, pp. 1-2.

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Economic Reforms in East Germany

By Dorothy Miller and Harry G. Trend

Economic reform is the order of the day in Eastern Europe. With the possible exception of Albania, every country in the area is currently considering a general overhaul of its planning and management system, and some are already experimenting with various phases of the contemplated reforms. In these experiments, East Germany is a trailblazer.[1]

Before turning to the particulars of the reform measures in the GDR (German Democratic Republic), it may be useful to give an account of the economic factors which during the late 1950's and early 1960's characterized all of the economies of the Soviet bloc and which in turn awakened the current "cost consciousness" and desire for reform.

Declining economic growth rates occurred in Eastern Europe soon after the Communist regimes had harnessed their unused resources. As the decline continued, it became apparent that the initial beneficial effects on growth resulting from a release of underemployed rural and in some cases industrial labor, and from improved utilization of existing production facilities, were nonrecurrent. In time, fewer uncommitted reserves could be found to sustain growth rates comparable to those achieved during the early years of Communist rule. For long periods, these countries followed the policy of underinvesting in agriculture, housing, and the consumer economy, permitting these capital-starved sectors to deteriorate. Similarly, they neglected investments in research and development and chose to live on the technological and scientific inheritance of the past. In short, the Communist regimes concentrated their investments in areas with good prospects for success. But since all segments of even Communist-run economies are interrelated, the continued de-

[1] Yugoslavia has of course been the boldest innovator but should be considered as a special case. On the score of presenting a conceptual framework which fuses the market system with socialism, Czechoslovakia has been the leader.

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cline in productivity of the neglected sectors has acted as a brake on the entire economy, forcing the realization that the high rates of industrial growth in the early years were largely gained at the expense of potentially higher long-range growth.

Furthermore, the desire to push growth rates at all cost has encouraged the Communist planners to overtax existing resources. Rarely has provision been made for breakdowns or unforeseen contingencies. Thus production setbacks in one sector have frequently spread, through a domino effect, to other sectors.

In the first decade of Communist rule in Eastern Europe this over-extension was further stimulated by the policy of autarkic development adopted throughout the area. As long as the policy of economic self-sufficiency prevailed, inefficiencies remained obscured because their effects were redistributed within each country. Once, however, the first efforts were made to introduce international specialization within the bloc, comparative costs became an important factor. This is what happened in the early 1960's when the Soviet Union tried to induce Comecon to establish a supranational planning agency for the bloc. In the ensuing arguments about who should specialize in producing what, it was quickly realized that there was no valid basis, supported by economically meaningful comparative prices, for conducting studies on relative efficiency in Eastern Europe. It is indeed reasonable to assume that these discussions gave an early impetus to the economic reforms now in progress. Moreover, the eventual collapse of the attempts to introduce bloc-wide planning and multilateral trade relations in Eastern Europe strengthened the need for expanding trade with the West and thus further contributed to rising cost-consciousness.

But even more important as a stimulus to the new quest for efficiency was the pervasive internal economic deterioration throughout the bloc, marked not only by continuing shortages of key commodities and industrial bottlenecks, necessitating a constant resetting of targets, but by mounting inventories of unsalable goods. As long as the minimum needs of the population remained unsatisfied and an artificially-created demand for investment goods prevailed, almost any product, no matter how shoddy, could be sold. But when, at the end of the 1950's, the consumers had acquired sufficient purchasing power to exercise a degree of choice, the burgeoning warehouses of rejected goods became symbols of the bankruptcy of Stalinist command-planning. The established system of economic management stood exposed as a travesty of reason—and as a political liability to boot.

Factors Peculiar to East Germany

In varying degrees the economic conditions outlined above were typical of all the Comecon countries before the onset of the current reforms. The economy of the GDR, however, evidenced a number of peculiar characteristics which need to be spelled out if East Germany's lead in the reform movement and its particular approach to economic reform are to be properly understood. A brief enumeration of some of these special aspects of the GDR economy follows.

(1) The East German economy is the most industrialized in Eastern Europe. As such it has lacked—since the repair of war damages—some of the systemic conditions that favored protracted rapid growth in the less developed economies of the bloc. This explains in part why next to Czechoslovakia—the other relatively highly developed country of Eastern Europe—the GDR since 1963 has experienced the most serious drop in the rate of economic growth in the area.[2]

(2) East Germany has experienced the most severe labor shortage in the Soviet bloc. Only the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 stopped the massive exodus of skilled labor and highly trained technicians to West Germany, forcibly stabilizing the labor force. Concern with labor efficiency was thus an early phenomenon in the GDR.

(3) Unlike other East European countries, the GDR was required to pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, perhaps, this burden stimulated growth rates in the 1950's and also obviated temporarily the need to pay any serious attention to quality

[2] The official gross industrial production growth rates for the GDR were 12.8 percent in 1959; 8.2 percent in 1960; 5.7 percent in 1961; 6 percent in 1962; and 4.9 percent in 1963. In Czechoslovakia, according to official statistics, total production in 1963 and 1964 remained at the level of 1962 or slightly below; the growth rate was thus zero or slightly negative.

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and assortment in consumer goods production. Eventually, however, the excess purchasing power of the East German workers producing goods for delivery to the USSR, combined with unsatisfied domestic needs, put the East Berlin planners under heavy pressure to pay more heed to consumer preferences—and to problems of economic management.

(4) East Germany's dependence on foreign trade (it is a heavy importer of raw materials and agricultural products, and an exporter of finished goods) along with its exposure to Western markets has encouraged cost consciousness and a desire for more efficient management methods.

(5) Proximity to the German Federal Republic has forced the East Germans to make continuous comparisons of economic accomplishments on the two sides of the border and to reexamine their own system of management.

(6) One of the institutional peculiarities of the GDR, unparalleled elsewhere in Eastern Europe, has been the wide variety of ownership forms both in industry and in agriculture. In the industrial sphere, the GDR has had the standard socialized enterprise, the semistate-owned or state-participating enterprise (prevalent in consumer goods production) and the privately-owned enterprise. The coexistence of these three types of ownership has made it necessary to develop a new coordinating organization, the product group,[3] which could cover all three institutional forms. Similarly in agriculture there have been three forms, or degrees, of collective ownership, and the GDR leaders are using the current reforms as an instrument to further collectivization of the least "socialized" farms, the so-called LPG Type 1.[4]

(7) Successful implementation of the current reforms is predicated on the highly developed labor discipline in East Germany, which is unique in East-Central Europe. This inheritance of the traditional conscientious German attitude to work allows the East German planners to expect uncommon sensitivity to problems of efficiency. There is, in addition, the tradition of good management and high regard for skill, all of which foster respect for a well-run, well-organized enterprise.

(8) The East German Communist Party (SED) has shown little tolerance for dissent within its ranks; it is probably the most authoritarian—or disciplined—of all bloc parties. This characteristic helps to explain the relative lack of opposition to the new economic model and hence the rapidity with which the party has been able to get the economic reform program underway.

(9) Finally, one should mention Walter Ulbricht's unusual sensitivity to developments in the Soviet bloc; in the past this sixth sense often made it possible for him to be the first on any new bandwagon no matter how inconsistent his attitude might appear.[5] When all members of the bloc began considering economic reforms, Ulbricht once again sensed which way the wind was blowing and—seizing the initiative—provided the GDR with an early lead in the economic reform movement.

Substance of the Reforms

Although a small number of experiments in economic management were conducted early in 1963, the general reform blueprint, entitled "Guidelines on the New Economic System of Planning and Managing the Economy," did not appear until July of that year. The report, which had been adopted by the Council of Ministers, gave immediate attention to industrial price reforms. Under its terms, a strict accounting system was to be introduced as a prelude to the establishment of new industrial prices which would cover "costs." Enterprises were to operate without direct state subsidy and become financially self-sufficient.

[3] A legally independent organization established to include all enterprises, regardless of ownership form, producing a specific group of commodities.

[4] *Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften* (LPG) or agricultural production cooperatives—*i.e.*, collective farms—exist in three degrees of socialization in East Germany. In the least collectivized form (LPG I), only the meadow land is socialized; in the LPG II, machinery and draft animals used in cultivation are collectivized; while the LPG III is completely socialized.

[5] For instance, in commenting on Khrushchev's mistakes shortly after his fall, Ulbricht declared self-righteously that "of all the suggestions which Comrade Khrushchev has made, for example, on questions of agriculture, we have not implemented a single one." (*Neues Deutschland*, November 5, 1964). This statement is simply false; East Germany emulated the Soviet Union both in publicizing the corn program for years and in creating an agricultural and industrial council, following the Sixth Party Congress of January 1963.

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The first price modifications, affecting industrial raw material and semi-finished product prices, went into effect in April 1964. Further adjustments were to be completed in a series of stages by January 1966. On the basis of this new price structure, prices of finished goods would then be revised.

The new element in the revised price structure is the inclusion of all "costs." Currently, "costs" are largely influenced by administratively fixed prices of production resources, such as labor. Since these prices as well as the prices of semi-manufactured goods are centrally determined, the market forces of supply and demand have only a slight direct effect on final prices. Therefore, most prices will continue to be rigid. However, a few economic organizations are now experimentally participating in the price-setting process, which may signal the first move toward greater price flexibility.[6]

Since the recent organizational changes, the various Associations of State Enterprises (VVBs) have become the new centers of economic power.[7] This power has devolved to them from the industrial departments of the National Economic Council and the State Planning Commission. At the same time, the VVB has become the master of a large number of state-owned industrial enterprises (VEB).[8] In effect, the VVB has been the beneficiary of a two-directional shift of decision-making power—downward from the central agencies and upward from the VEB. However, some enterprises are still directly responsible to the industrial departments of the National Economic Council, while others are subject to the local control of the Bezirk economic councils.[9]

As a means of coordinating all enterprises along horizontal lines, legally independent product-groups, which include all types of enterprise—socialized, semisocialized and private—have been created. These are also responsible to the VVBs. It appears that the product-groups are becoming a merging device, enhancing the power of the VVBs.

Furthermore, certain limited experiments with indirect economic controls have been undertaken. They include the application of a selective credit policy by banks which follow commercial banking practices; a reduction of the use of state subsidies; the employment of a system of differentiated interest charges on capital funds; a revaluation of assets and the application of a system of differentiated de-

The Most Exact Science in the World

The program of the full-scale building of socialism adopted by the sixth SED congress has stood its test as an excellent guide for the joint action of all social forces of the GDR. The new economic system of planning and managing prepared on the basis of the party program has helped the GDR make considerable progress in shaping the socialist economic system.

The scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism offered us the possibility of calculating the prospects for social, natural, scientific, and technical development to 1979 and 1980. Since 1961 this has enabled us to apply a greater system in the development of socialist economy, the sciences, the integrated socialist national culture. . . .

We have made good progress since the sixth SED congress. Our party has increased its reputation and influence because it is guided by the science of Marxism-Leninism and modern natural sciences in preparation for the problems of social development, and because it uses with determination all powers to fulfill the task a socialist industrial state faces today.

—From an address by Walter Ulbricht at the 11th session of the SED Central Committee, Neues Deutschland *(East Berlin), Dec. 18, 1965.*

[6] The VVB for Iron and Sheet Metal Products and Hardware (EBM) was selected to participate in this experiment. Alfred Neumann, Chairman of the National Economic Council and SED Politburo Member, discussed this question before the Seventh SED Central Committee Plenum in a speech entitled "National Economic Plan for 1965 and Further Implementation of the New Economic System." *Neues Deutschland,* Dec. 8, 1964.

[7] VVB stands for *Vereinigung volkseigener Betriebe,* of which there are approximately 90 in the GDR, each one headed by a Director General. Evidence points to a similar organization pattern in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, where the "trust," "the sector," the "association" and the "union" are to perform like functions.

[8] *Volkseigene Betriebe.*

[9] Since 1952, the GDR has been divided into 14 administrative districts (*Bezirk*), each of which in turn is subdivided into approximately 15 communities (*Kreis*).

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preciation rates; and a revision of the wage and premium systems, tying them to enterprise earnings so as to make possible the use of profit as a measure of economic performance. An expanded use of contracts, based on a new contract law, to facilitate interorganizational economic relations (replacing the directive-oriented system), is also envisaged, as well as the development of closer ties between production and distribution activities and eventually a more flexible price system.

Beginning in the spring of 1965, experiments with a "self-contained" system of economic levers followed earlier tests with only one or two of the economic instruments mentioned above. A broad application of this system is to be introduced in 1966.

Thus far the East Germans still rely heavily on the application of strict direct controls with supporting information from the new financial and accounting systems; they appear likely to continue keeping firm central control of the price mechanism for a long time to come.

The new reforms have largely eliminated direct state budgetary supports. A new system of financial assistance, directed by the VVBs, has replaced the old state subsidies. The VVBs now redistribute pooled profits as well as funds provided by banks through repayable credits. The VEBs and VVBs must also finance a larger part of their investments from their own resources. Investment grants by the state are to be limited largely to those industries which expand more rapidly than they can accumulate funds or obtain bank credits.

To a lesser extent these economic reforms have also been applied to the non-industrial production and the "non-productive" sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, building and construction, and foreign and domestic trade. Agricultural enterprises are being affected only slowly. The main reform features include measures to expand coordination between the less collectivized farms, to increase the employment of commercial contracts, particularly between the state procurement and purchasing enterprises (VEABs)[10] and agricultural collectives, and between banks and agricultural collectives.

Although the building and construction industry was not specifically referred to in the "Guidelines," some reorganization in the industry took place during the latter part of 1964. By 1966, a new system of construction-contracting should be fully implemented. New relations between investing enterprises, the general contractors, and the subcontracting and supplying enterprises are being established. In this field, too, commercial contracts will be the key instruments for defining mutual obligations and responsibilities.

The domestic and foreign trade networks are also being reformed. In both cases, attempts are being made to bring the producer closer to the distributor and the consumer. New marketing methods and commercial contracts are being gradually introduced, particularly in domestic trade. The old production system, based on centrally guaranteed orders, is being relinquished. Wholesalers will place purchase orders with manufacturers on the basis of market research data and information from retail distributors. An element of respect for consumer preference will thus have been introduced.

In the field of international trade, the foreign trade enterprise (AHU)[11] will now be supervised by both the Foreign Trade Ministry and the production enterprise organizations (the VVBs and VEBs) under an arrangement of "co-responsibility." This measure represents the first dilution of the sacred principle of "state trade monopoly."

The new reforms also affect local governments, which will enjoy new powers of taxation and expenditure as well as generally enlarged financial authority.

In addition to the reforms discussed above, a number of other measures have been announced for the future. The schedule is very sketchy, but it does show that the implementation of the reform blueprint is expected to stretch over a period of years.

Impact of the Reforms

It may be permissible, even at this early date, to discuss some of the possible effects of the East German reform program. In so far as economic results are concerned, the Pankow

[10] *Volkseigene Erfassungs- und Aufkauf-Betriebe.*

[11] *Aussenhandel Unternehmung.*

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regime has already pointed out marked improvements in the growth rate.[12] This trend may continue, but little useful speculation about long-term prospects can be undertaken at this stage. Institutionally, the most important change is the new strengthening of the authority of the State Enterprise Associations (VVBs) and the State Owned Enterprises (the VEBs). As a result, a new type of "property right" is emerging, buttressed by new principles in Contract Law.[13] Property may now be viewed as having two major aspects: ownership and management. As far as ownership rights are concerned, little change can be expected. The state will continue to be the owner of the major means of production, actually or nominally. This is an ideological minimum of socialism. The major change is the separation of ownership from management,[14]—a development similar to that long witnessed in the West—which is the result of the abandonment of much managerial authority by the central state organs in favor of local economic organs. The power to manage, of course, remains circumscribed by the regulations laid down by the political authority.

The shift of the spotlight to the managers of the VVBs and the VEBs immediately raises a question about the background and affiliation of these technocrats. Frequently, such a shift of authority is described in terms of a struggle for control between two antagonistic groups: the party functionaries and the technocrat-managers. However, there is no reason to rule out the possibility of a symbiotic relationship between them. As long as political organs can influence the economic environment within which an economic organization must operate, there will be a need for a politically-oriented leader in every economic organization who will be able to bring about favorable changes in the political environment, and thereby help to assure the economic success of the technocrat-managerial group. By the same token, if the success of a political leader depends on economic results, he will require the cooperation of the technocrat-manager. It is therefore conceivable that political-managerial teams may move together up and down the ladder of success. The state, operating through the party, will in any case continue controlling the teams, rewarding the more successful politico-techno-managerial groups by placing them in preferential positions with the concomitant emoluments, and penalizing failures.

The managers, under the new system, will have to adjust their behavior to conform to the new instruments of control rather than to the old central directives. For example, under the old system, bonuses were paid for quantitative overfulfillment of the plan. With this kind of an incentive, the managers usually sought to establish the lowest possible quota in order to assure the largest overfulfillment and, hence, the largest bonus. Under the new system, prices of raw materials are being set below the level that market forces would dictate. This means that some kind of administrative allocation of raw materials is necessary. At the established prices, these raw materials will be in short supply and, as in a war economy, become a sort of currency in barter transactions between enterprises. Similarly, under a system of administered prices, an enterprise might produce goods of different degrees of scarcity relative to demand. Under such circumstances, the enterprise manager would favor the practice of tie-in sales, selling desirable and scarce goods only if the buyer also purchases goods in lesser demand. These are hypothetical examples of how the reformed GDR economy might operate under the new rules.

[12] *Neues Deutschland* of Jan. 13, 1965, featuring the announcement of 1964 plan fulfillment by the State Central Statistics Administration, stated: "The 1964 successes confirm the correctness of the road taken by implementing the new economic system of planning and managing the economy. Through a higher quality of planning and management work, economic laws were utilized more effectively. This fact is expressed not only in the considerable increase in production volume in all fields of the economy but also in greater effectiveness of work done and a higher economic profitability." The industrial growth rate climbed from 4.9 percent in 1963 to 6.7 percent in 1964.

[13] See "Law About the Contract System in the Socialist Economy. (Contract Law) of May 1, 1965." *Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,* Feb. 25, 1965, Part I. No. 7, pp. 107-126.

[14] At a symposium on social property held in Belgrade from Sept. 20 to 22, 1965, Marija Toroman in her paper "Forms of Social Property" presented the legal theoretical basis for accepting the separation of ownership and management functions. According to a resume of her talk, ". . . social property . . . is, in fact, a question of only two rights: the right of utilization and the right of disposal. . . . If we proceed with the analysis of the essence of these rights, we shall see that the right of utilization is a constant component of the rights which the working organizations have on things making up the fund of social property, whereas the right of disposal appears only when it is a question of a determined kind of things and only in some cases with a limited effect." *Summaries of Reports,* Belgrade, Naucno Delo, 1965, pp. 89-90.

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Operational changes will influence many financial relationships within a State Enterprise Association (VVB). Previously, state subsidies were granted from general funds to a particular enterprise. It was thus not very obvious that taxes levied on successful enterprises were used to subsidize the inefficient firms. Under the new arrangement, profits within a particular VVB will be redistributed to the enterprises which suffer losses. The more profitable enterprises will readily see that their gains are being reallocated to inefficient operations, and certainly they will resent it. In the future, this will undoubtedly be one of the major sources of tension between the enterprises of a particular VVB.

Another significant change effected by the new economic reforms concerns the role of central planning and the central planners. The party leaders have traditionally visualized themselves as the architects of a perfectly symmetrical organic economic mechanism. In practice, all planning was reduced to a series of successive improvisations. Even today, the party leadership attempts to maintain the fiction of an omniscient planning system, with only "minor" aspects of the planning function devolving upon the VVBs and VEBs. Actually, however, the leaders have recognized the limitations of the planning process, and they are now moving in effect toward merely indicative planning at the central level. The increasingly rapid technological changes experienced in what is called the "second technological revolution" will underscore the need for flexibility at the levels where operational decisions are made. They will also further illuminate the limitations of total central planning.

There is increasing evidence that the East German regime is moving the current reforms toward further socialization of the only partially socialized sectors of industry and agriculture. Semi-state and privately owned industrial enterprises are being slowly nudged into more socialized units by various organizational and economic strategems. In effect, the horizontal product-group system, which covers enterprises of all types of ownership is bringing about increased socialization. Since it is under the leadership of the VVBs or VEBs, the product-group tends to favor the sponsoring organization and its affiliates. In practice, then, the less socialized enterprises will either tie themselves closely to the sponsoring body or will have to be satisfied to produce less profitable items. In either case, the disappearance of the less socialized organizations as independent entities is assured. Increasing state investment in the semi-state enterprises also dilutes the private element. Similarly bank credit and other financial instruments are being employed to weaken the private sector by systematically discriminating against it.

In agriculture, the same policies are being followed to hasten the conversion of the LPGs I and II into the completely collectivized LPGs III. For example, cooperating LPGs I[15] are entitled to more favorable credit terms usually reserved to LPGs III. Farm equipment and machinery denied to the individual LPG I is made available to cooperating LPGs along with building materials, fodder and fertilizers. All of these measures are designed to raise the level of socialization in successive stages.

The material-incentive aspect of the economic reforms will no doubt modify income distribution and the shares of social and individual consumption. Income differences will widen, and with this, class differences and associated problems could become intensified. Furthermore, with greater emphasis on measuring labor costs more accurately, one might expect that the financing of a major proportion of thus far centrally-financed social consumption will be shifted to specific enterprises and to individual workers. The latter, for example, may be required to pay a larger part of their housing expenditures. This and similar measures would be designed to adjust the enterprise's direct labor costs to their real value and to force each firm to be more economical in the use of labor by making labor costs, now covered by budgetary expenditures, a part of the production costs of the individual enterprise. The shift in the burden of expenditures will mean a reversal of the current tendency toward increasing the socialization of consumption, thereby orienting distribution toward the individual.

The effort to increase the cost consciousness of all economic organizations is likely to lead in

[15] Under the cooperative arrangement, two or more LPGs enter into a contractual agreement for a specific joint purpose, such as the purchase of equipment or machinery, building construction, pooling of cattle, etc.

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time to a re-evaluation of the economic rationality of East Germany's relations to COMECON and the rest of the world. Ulbricht himself has recognized this as a necessary follow-up to the introduction of the new system of economic management.[16] However, the GDR's ability to participate increasingly in the worldwide international division of labor depends not only on East German willingness and political good will abroad but also on the extent to which the country will be able to adjust its production to world requirements.

* * *

Postscript

Since the above article was written, the Eleventh SED Central Committee Plenum was held between December 15 and 18, 1965. In a keynote speech, Walter Ulbricht strongly reinforced the trends in economic reform set in motion in 1963. Some of the major changes produced by the plenum are the following: (1) Organizational—a) dissolution of the National Economic Council; b) creation of nine industrial ministries; c) establishment of a Central Auditing Commission; d) a further expansion of the powers of the VVBs and enterprises. (2) Substantive—a) more flexible prices; b) introduction of interest on capital; c) direct contacts between East German enterprises and firms in both East and West; d) further reinforcement of self-financing of investment by the VVBs and VEBs; e) revision of the method of agricultural price formation to assure self-financing of investments.

The powers of the abolished National Economic Council were redistributed between the new economic ministries, the VVBs and enterprises. The ministries are given minimal control over the operational activities of the VVBs and enterprises; hence the VVB has been the major recipient of additional economic power. The VVBs, however, lost their auditing functions, which were handed to the new Central Auditing Commission. Under this new arrangement, the VVBs will be less able to manipulate funds contrary to the established general rules.

Dissatisfaction with the degree of price flexibility, even after the series of industrial price reforms, was clearly expressed by Ulbricht as well as others at the plenum. These statements were preceded by a series of articles appearing in the economic weekly *Wirtschaft* [17] urging a discussion of alternative theories of price formation. Other inadequacies of the reform program were also discussed. All in all, the plenum and the current discussions by professional economists presage further progress toward economic reform in East Germany.

[16] "Answer to Current Political and Economic Questions" (speech at the 7th SED Plenum), *Neues Deutschland,* Dec. 6, 1964.

[17] No. 48, Dec. 2, 1965.

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The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis

By Uri Ra'anan

The abortive coup of September 30, 1965, and its dramatic aftermath have added materially to the world's already marked interest in the protracted struggle between President Sukarno, the Army, the Communist Party (PKI), and other domestic forces in Indonesia. Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the international ramifications of Indonesia's decade of upheaval, in which the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic have become deeply enmeshed owing to their complex relationships with the PKI and other local elements. This is rather strange since, only four years ago, observers were concerned mainly with the impact on Jakarta of Moscow's massive military and economic assistance, which was then approaching its peak. At that time it was taken for granted that such aid would provide the donor country with real "leverage" in the recipient capital; it was also assumed that Soviet influence would necessarily benefit the Indonesian Communists. Consequently, analysts paid as much heed in 1962 to the Soviet "penetration" of Indonesia as they did to Jakarta's internal woes. In more recent commentaries, however, one looks almost in vain for a reference to the USSR, and the question arises what precisely happened to Soviet "leverage" in the meantime. Therefore, while it is still premature to sum up the effects of the most recent convulsions on the Indonesian scene, it should be useful to study their antecedents within the context of the Jakarta-Moscow-Peking triangle.

A little over three years ago, Indonesia was beginning to play an increasingly active part in the Sino-Soviet dispute. PKI-CPSU relations were seriously deteriorating by the fall of 1962, as reflected in the openly acid remarks of the PKI leader, Aidit, when he "congratulated" Khrushchev upon his (temporary) cancellation

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of "Mig" sales to the Indians, who had hoped to use the Soviet planes against the Chinese.[1] By the spring of 1963, Sukarno was imitating the PKI in adopting increasingly provocative attitudes towards Moscow. At the preliminary Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, and later at the full meeting, the Indonesians led a campaign against participation by the "European" USSR. Yet Jakarta had received almost $2 billion in military and economic credit commitments from the Soviets and East Europeans and, moreover, was defaulting on its repayments. Admittedly, Sukarno's aides had opposed Soviet participation at such gatherings as early as 1959, but that had been before Indonesia enjoyed full Soviet backing in the West Irian and Malaysian "confrontations." Moreover, in 1959, the PKI and Peking were still defending Moscow's right to be considered an Asian power. By the time of the 1963 Journalists' Conference, however, the Soviets were rejected by Sukarno and the PKI alike; the scene of this event was the Jakarta Sports Palace which, as a *Pravda* correspondent bitterly noted, had been built with Russian money and skill.[2]

The Breach Widens

In the summer of 1963, Aidit suddenly assailed the "modern revisionists" for giving modern weapons to the armed forces rather than the people, a clear condemnation of Russia's military aid to the Indonesian Army—the PKI's main antagonist. In August 1963, Aidit arrived in Moscow and confronted Khrushchev with the following demands: to stop pampering Tito and his "nonaligned" friends, to concentrate less on "economic construction" (aid to the national bourgeoisie) and more on the "National Liberation Movement," and to lead a militant anti-US coalition. According to PKI sources, Khrushchev reminded Aidit that "the struggle for national independence cannot succeed without the help of the socialist countries." Aidit said this sounded like a threat that "Communists who are struggling for national independence should not dare to give expression to opinions that differ from those of certain socialist countries because the result would be that their own country would be deprived of assistance." Following this clash, so the PKI claims, the "modern revisionists" retaliated by asking Sukarno not to form a "Nasakom" cabinet, *i.e.*, not to take the PKI into the government, on the excuse that the inclusion of the Communists might provoke the West.

However, Sukarno himself chose to antagonize the Russians by opting for alignment with the PKI and with Peking, in spite of the fact that Moscow had just consented to grant him a moratorium on his debts. By the fall of 1963, the Russians, resenting their exclusion, began to play down "Afro-Asian" gatherings and to support conferences of the "nonaligned," which, by definition, would exclude the CPR no less than the USSR, and which, moreover, would follow a neutralist line more acceptable to Moscow than to Peking. Sukarno immediately denounced "our friends in the socialist countries who attack A(fro)-A(sia)"; ignoring Moscow's preferences, Sukarno pressed for a Second (Afro-Asian) Bandung and worked against a Second (nonaligned) Belgrade. At this point, Aidit told a Chinese audience that he preferred nationalists who oppose imperialism, meaning Sukarno, to revisionists who embrace it, meaning Khrushchev.[3]

The Soviets retaliated by attempting to play upon conflicts within Indonesia. Some months earlier, moderate civilian and military elements had achieved Indonesia's adhesion to the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, in spite of PKI and Chinese opposition. In the fall of 1963, a Soviet trade-union delegation had a heated encounter with the PKI Secretariat and subsequently issued a statement emphasizing that "the Indonesian people" (read "Army") would oppose those who "minimize" the Test-Ban Treaty (*i.e.*, the PKI). Defense Minister Nasution was invited to Moscow and given wholehearted backing in the Malaysian "confrontation."

[1] The present article is based on numerous sources, including radio broadcasts, Soviet, Indonesian, Singapore, and Philippine newspapers, and so on. Because of the volume of references, they have been omitted from this account. Readers interested in obtaining a full bibliography may do so by writing to the author, c/o Research Center on Communist Studies, Columbia University, New York.

[2] In assailing the USSR under the guise of an attack on "modern revisionism" or "Yugoslav modern revisionism," Aidit was following Chinese practice.

[3] Shortly thereafter, Sukarno gave Aidit and Lukman formal ministerial rank.

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Reversing the previous PKI line, Aidit at this time came out with a warning against "adventurism," because "some people" (*i.e.*, the Army) planned to exploit a conflagration along the Malaysian border in order to impose a state of emergency and ban the PKI.

The issue of the relative virtues of "nonaligned" and "Afro-Asian" gatherings, and the conflict over Soviet participation in the latter, came to a head in April 1964, when the Preparatory Second Afro-Asian Conference convened in Indonesia. Sukarno's follower Abdulgani announced that Indonesia should no longer be considered a "nonaligned" state, while the Indonesian delegation, together with CPR Foreign Minister Chen Yi, foiled all attempts to have the USSR accepted as a full member of the conference. In order to "unmask" Russian colonialism, Aidit went so far as to dig up a few sharp words by Lenin concerning a certain Bolshevik who kept calling for self-determination in far-off places "but kept silent about Uzbeks, Bashkirs, etc." Chen Yi stayed over in Indonesia for important discussions cementing the new Peking-Jakarta axis; simultaneously, an Indonesian scientific delegation took off for a little-noted but ominous Peking visit, being received by Liu Shao-ch'i himself and by Wu Heng, who heads a sector of the scientific bureaucracy probably associated with nuclear affairs.

Domestic and Soviet Reaction

The growth of intimacy between Peking and Jakarta, fostered by Sukarno and the PKI working in close harmony, set off major repercussions within Indonesia. In the late spring of 1964, the "Trotskyist" (Tan Malakist) Murba, the Army's IPKI, and some Moslem groups called for the "dissolution of parties," *i.e.*, disbandment of the PKI. Sukarno and his Nationalist followers opposed this demand; Aidit, saying "we will never forgive the revisionists," indicated that it was the Soviets who were trying to destroy the PKI because of its Afro-Asian activities. Aidit's newspaper said outright that the Russians were using the "Trotskyists" (Murba) in order to split the PKI; after all, Adam Malik, Indonesia's Ambassador to Moscow in former periods of intimacy between the two governments, was identified with the Murba. Aidit also called for "self-reliance," *i.e.*, liberation from dependence upon Soviet military and economic aid. He explained that this was the conclusion he had drawn from diligent study of Sino-Soviet polemics in which Peking had shown how Moscow had misused aid for the purpose of political pressure. Aidit's colleague Njoto warned Jakarta not to beg the Russians for a further moratorium on debts since "the modern revisionists . . . like very much to be repaid by others for their benefactions."

At this point, in June 1964, Mikoyan went to Jakarta and hinted that, if irritated long enough, the USSR might yet do Indonesia the favor of letting her rely upon her own resources. Even on his previous visit in 1962, Mikoyan had shown doubt as to the efficacy of pouring aid into Indonesia; he claimed to have found an Oriental proverb which said, "If you take money, you will spend it; if you take wisdom, it will stay with you." In 1964 Mikoyan stressed that no one had helped the USSR when she had to construct her economy, and moreover that the Russian people were now weighed down with their own defense burdens. Taking aim at Sukarno, he said that Russia continued to support Indonesia's "confrontation" with Malaysia, but "with a sense of responsibility." Moreover, he reiterated that the USSR, unlike Sukarno, considered "nonaligned" meetings as important as "Afro-Asian" gatherings. Referring to the PKI boycott of his appearance, Mikoyan noted drily that he was experiencing "both hot and cold weather." He did, however, woo the Indonesian Army, making constant references to Soviet military aid and stressing that Indonesia was now better armed than any power in Asia (including the Chinese). In the end, Mikoyan consented to yet another postponement of Indonesia's repayments and even left the door open for possible further aid, provided Sukarno ceased opposing Soviet participation in international gatherings.

The Army's newspapers immediately responded to Mikoyan's line and urged Sukarno to support Russia's participation in Afro-Asian conferences so that Indonesia might receive additional Soviet assistance. On the other hand, the PKI publicly advised Sukarno to resist Soviet pressure and even called for "vigilance" against possible "sabotage" by the "revisionists." The Army thus clearly opposed Aidit's

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demand for "self-reliance" and for the jettisoning of Soviet aid. Air Force Chief Omar Dani, however, backed by Sukarno, began to call for the application of "self-reliance" to the armed forces. In order that the Air Force might gradually become independent of Soviet supplies, Dani restricted his shopping list in the bloc to repair and maintenance facilities, spare parts, and manufacturing licenses; eventually, he even ceased sending officers to the USSR for training. Later in 1965, as the PKI intensified its pressure for the arming and training of the "masses," it was again to be Dani, supported in the end by Sukarno, who consented—while Army Chief Ahmed Yani and Defense Minister Nasution remained opposed—to arming "civilians" under PKI influence.

In the summer of 1964, Foreign Minister Subandrio and Army Chief Yani followed Mikoyan to Moscow in order to continue discussions, and a slight detente appeared to develop. However, Sukarno personally seemed intent upon "confronting" the USSR, just as he had "confronted" his neighbors and the West. In September 1964 he proceeded to Moscow, where—as the PKI's Njoto revealed months later—he had a "sharp quarrel" with Khrushchev. From Moscow, Sukarno went straight to the Cairo "summit" meeting of "nonaligned" nations, and there, in spite of previous Soviet pleas, he launched an assault upon peaceful coexistence between Washington and Moscow and denounced Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia for wishing to place "peace" before "national independence" on the agenda.

Thrust and Counterthrust

At this point, in October 1964, three important developments occurred almost simultaneously: a report reached Jakarta that Sukarno's health was finally giving way, Khrushchev was ousted, and China exploded a nuclear device. In Sukarno's absence, a strange "reversal of alliances" seemed to be taking place. The PKI, of course, hailed Khrushchev's fall, but certain Jakarta circles expressed regret. What was much more striking, while the PKI rejoiced at Peking's test, saying "we" now have the bomb, Foreign Minister Subandrio condemned the explosion on the grounds that it could contaminate Indonesia's atmosphere and was contrary to the Test-Ban Treaty, which Jakarta had signed. Subandrio reacted coldly to the CPR Ambassador's plea to support Peking's call for a world nuclear summit. When the PKI assailed the non-Communist Indonesian press for condemning the Chinese test, Aidit was told that these newspapers reflected the personal views of Subandrio, who was in charge during Sukarno's absence. At that moment, Subandrio seemed to have aligned himself with the Murba and the Army for the purpose of taking over the succession. (In view of his later reversal, some observers have assumed that Subandrio had always been pro-Peking, whereas, in fact, his prolonged and vehement hostility to the Overseas Chinese minority in Indonesia had created mutual distrust between him and the CPR.) A sharp battle over an ostensibly minor matter—the opposing views of two rival organizations on the boycott of foreign films—illustrated Jakarta's new lineup: the PKI on the one side, and on the other, Murba elements (Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh), Nasution and Subandrio. Soon, Army and Murba leaders were to join in establishing a new "Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism" (BPS), intended to combat the PKI.

Apparently, while still on his way home, Sukarno was tipped off by the Chinese that something was brewing in Jakarta; he received an urgent message via the CPR Ambassador in Paris and soon was whisked off to see Chou En-lai and Chen Yi in China. Chou warmly congratulated Sukarno on his Cairo stand and then, it seems, told him in private what Peking thought of his would-be successors in Jakarta. Within hours "complete unanimity" was announced, and suddenly the situation in Jakarta was reversed. Sukarno returned, and Indonesian officialdom not only dropped its objections to the Chinese test but congratulated Peking on its achievement and supported China's global initiative. Sukarno backed the PKI's organization on the issue of the film boycott and, within weeks, dissolved the PKI's most prominent rivals—first the BPS and then the Murba itself, demoting its leaders.

What was Moscow doing during this period? Immediately after Sukarno's quarrel with Khrushchev, the PKI had charged that Russia was imposing a temporary embargo on arms to Indonesia in order to force a change in Jakarta's policy; apparently, even Soviet military experts

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were gradually withdrawn, since the Military Institute's personnel were suddenly stated to be entirely Indonesian. Perhaps the Army and the Murba interpreted such Soviet pressure as a token of support for any group that could reverse Sukarno's line, and possibly Moscow had given them verbal encouragement. At the decisive moment, however, the USSR was immobilized by Khrushchev's ouster and by the short-lived delusion that the Sino-Soviet dispute could be assuaged. The Soviet Ambassador, Mikhailov, even called on the PKI leaders with a humble "explanation" of the Moscow changes.

Ominous Nuclear Politics

Within days of Sukarno's return from China, Chen Yi dropped in for intensive talks. A joint communique indicated that Jakarta, in spite of promises to Mikoyan, would join Peking in opposing Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian Conference. Among those who met Chen Yi upon his return to China was Wu Heng, the same Vice-Chairman of Peking's Scientific and Technological Commission, who had dealt with the mysterious trip of the Indonesian scientific delegation in April 1964. This seemed to be an indication of the nature of Chen Yi's talks, as was also the fact that the Indonesians on November 21 passed an Atomic Energy Law tightening up regulations in this field. The well-informed Philippine press reported some weeks later that Chen Yi had responded to Sukarno's urgent requests for a share of some of the outward symbols, at least, of China's nuclear might, so as to rescue Sukarno's tarnished prestige.

In December 1964 Subandrio was summoned to Moscow, presumably to explain Jakarta's latest reversal, but his talks ended only in "understanding" and not in "agreement." At the same time, the PKI rubbed in Russia's decline, refusing to have any truck with Moscow's projected conference of selected Communist parties. A little later, Sukarno blithely pulled out of the UN, disregarding Russia's pleas and the public appeals of her East European allies.

In January 1965, shortly after Chen Yi's return from Jakarta, Subandrio was sent to Peking with a high entourage to discuss "military matters" at a "new and still higher phase." Yet no top Army leaders were taken, although the PKI's Njoto, Police Chief Danukusomo, and some Navy chiefs went along. In three days, Subandrio and Chou huddled together for nearly 24 hours; in a pointed reference to the abrupt cessation of Soviet atomic and technical aid to China in 1959-60, Subandrio announced that he had exchanged thoughts with Chou on some bad experiences which the two countries had suffered at the hands of certain great powers, and that, although both felt that "self-reliance" was the best solution, Peking and Jakarta nevertheless wished to demonstrate to the world a mutual-aid relationship based on complete "trust." The two statesmen denounced "manipulation" of the UN by the "US and *other big powers*" and confirmed their opposition to Soviet participation in certain conferences. Mao and Liu also received Subandrio, with Indonesian Police Chief Danukusomo and CPR Vice-Minister of National Security Ling Yun the only others present—perhaps the only top meeting in history attended by police chiefs. In view of subsequent developments, it seems that the meeting outlined security arrangements to safeguard the projected Sino-Indonesian nuclear collaboration.

As Subandrio returned, an Indonesian spokesman announced that a large number of atomic scientists were now working on an "Indonesian" bomb and that there would be a surprise by the fall. Immediately afterwards, a Chinese scientific and technical delegation, led by Wu Heng, came to Jakarta and signed a five-year agreement. At a reception, Aidit told Wu Heng, "We shall smash Western domination in the scientific and technical field." From that time onward, Indonesia supported Peking in strongly opposing all international attempts to limit nuclear proliferation; Sukarno later told the Tokyo Ban-the-Bomb Congress that one must distinguish between bombs in the hands of colonialists and bombs held by revolutionaries. By mid-1965, Indonesia's armed forces had set up a new framework for Atomic, Bacteriological and Chemical Warfare.[4]

[4] The CPR intended merely to "train" a few Indonesian scientists and then stage what would have been billed as a "joint" Sino-Indonesian nuclear test. In fact, this would still have been a purely Chinese bomb, while giving Sukarno the prestige he thirsted for. This step might have provided Peking with a tremendous leverage in Jakarta and elsewhere in Afro-Asia, as the only great power willing to offer nuclear weapons. After the present Indonesian debacle, however, all these nuclear arrangements are undoubtedly off.

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Subandrio's reversal of his stand of October 1964 and his abrupt abandonment of the anti-PKI and anti-Peking front appear to have been due to Sukarno's sudden recovery. The President's tough measures against the BPS and the Murba obviously "convinced" the mercurial Foreign Minister. Another interesting clue was provided by Subandrio himself upon his return from China, when he was quoted as stating that the CPR was a "giant," that one had to get along with her, and that there would be "a bitter reality if, even starting now, we constantly oppose the CPR." Clearly, the Chinese nuclear might had impressed Subandrio in the end.

Ever Closer to Peking

At the same time, Indonesia's pro-Peking course caused military relations with the USSR to wilt. Army purchases from the USSR were increasingly limited to workshops for repairs and maintenance. Receiving the new Soviet Ambassador, Sytenko, in May 1965, Sukarno reviewed all sectors of relations—except the military. About the same date Sukarno, in a speech at the new Defense Institute, said Mao had told him that Chinese officers sent "abroad" (to the USSR) had returned unable to apply their knowledge in Chinese conditions, and that Ho Chi Minh had regaled him with similar experiences; Sukarno indicated that this applied to Indonesia no less. In June Subandrio remarked publicly, "It was sufficient that the USSR was on our side for ten years and protected us from imperialism, but that is not enough [now]." In July the Army paper, *Berita Yudha,* reported that "certain socialist countries" were now unwilling to sell arms to Indonesia, although, significantly, it refrained from apportioning blame for this development.

Just as Sukarno, in mid-1965, was pushing Indonesia into an ever more one-sided relationship with Peking against Moscow, so he was also abandoning his precarious domestic neutrality and finally taking sides with the PKI against the Army leadership. He came out on the side of Aidit and Air Force Chief Dani in agreeing, at least in principle, to the "arming of the masses": On Indonesia's National Day, in August 1965, he publicly told the Army that the people could live without the military but the military could not live without the people; he added that the masses had a constitutional right to be armed. The Army's position was thus growing increasingly precarious.

The Coup and Its Meaning

It was at this point that the September 30 coup occurred. That development has already been sufficiently disected elsewhere; here, only some aspects are of interest. If it is true that, in August 1965, Sukarno's Chinese doctor tipped off PKI leaders that the President's health was again in danger—as it had been in October 1964—the PKI must have rushed to take immediate "precautions." For this purpose it probably resorted to its paramilitary "Youth" group (Pemuda Rakjat), which was currently being armed and trained by the Air Force at Halim Base. The PKI and Peking had learned, in the previous fall, that Sukarno's personality was of decisive importance for their plans. After all, until October 1964, events had favored them consistently; and yet—as the sudden Subandrio-Murba-Army alignment of that time proved—Sukarno's entourage had clearly been paying mere lip-service to his policies and could not be relied upon to maintain his leftist course once he was gone. In addition to the Army and the PKI, there was a third actor waiting on the stage—Sukarno himself. In the fall of 1964 he had himself intervened in the struggle for his succession, returning *"deus ex machina"* via Peking to reverse the train of events. In the fall of 1965, he certainly did not intend to remain inactive as the Army and the PKI stood poised for an immediate clash.

On September 30, units of Sukarno's Palace Guard, led by one Untung (heretofore unknown), and aided by the PKI's Pemuda Rakjat from Halim Base, attempted to exterminate the regular Army's top leadership, murdering Yani and other generals. Failing, however, to kill Nasution, they were defeated by loyal Army regiments under Suharto and fled, apparently via Halim Base, where the bodies of the generals were dumped in a well. At precisely that time, Sukarno himself went to Halim, by his own admission voluntarily, accompanied by a Palace Guard unit. There and afterwards he played a part of such ambiguous "neutrality" between rebels and loyalists that the Army, after its victory, could not permit him to rule alone.

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Of particular interest here is the impotence displayed by both Peking and Moscow during the decisive stage of a struggle which was bound to shape Indonesia's future alignment. Peking was relatively slow in reacting to the coup, and belated Chinese vilifications of the victorious Army could not rescue the PKI from the smashing blows rained down upon it by the military. Moscow for long confined itself to quotations from Western news agency reports; its first major reaction, by *Izvestia* in mid-October, gleefully took the PKI to task for the stupidity of its organ, *Harian Rakjat,* in supporting the coup on October 2—24 hours after the attempt had clearly failed. Moscow also deliberately stressed that adventurous coups must be regarded as alien to Marxism. Subsequently, the USSR dutifully paid lip-service to Communist solidarity, deploring the suppression of the PKI, but its protests did not carry much conviction.

If the Russians now appear to be just a little better off in Indonesia than Peking, this is, ironically, not of their doing. For nearly a decade the USSR has spent huge sums, as well as technical manpower and arms, trying to build "leverage" in Indonesia; yet, at decisive moments, Soviet influence upon events there has been practically nil. For over three years, the Russians have been constantly swallowing humiliations and insults, without any serious possibility of asserting themselves. They have gone on looking pathetic and appeasing Jakarta, dutifully casting vetoes in the Security Council on Indonesia's behalf, foregoing debt payments, and even accepting Sukarno's whims in the field of sport. Truly, in the "Third World" the weak lead the strong: Moscow might well have achieved just as much (or as little) with a policy of masterful inactivity in Indonesia, as it did with its feverish commitments, which never sufficed to sway the moods of one erratic man—Sukarno.

Of course, while Moscow's hectic activities have merely been unrewarding, Peking's may definitely be regarded as counterproductive. The Russians failed to influence Sukarno; the Chinese let themselves become too dependent upon him and, moreover, vastly overrated the basic strength of the PKI in a showdown. In making this error, they were in the company of a good many non-Communist experts. The Chinese setback at the moment appears all the more striking in contrast to the trend of affairs prior to October 1965, although one can never be certain that this is the end of the matter. So far at any rate, it does seem correct to say that no great power has been able to dominate Indonesia. The "Third World" is both intractable and fiercely independent.

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The Beginning of the End?

By Michel Tatu

*EDITORS' NOTE: Mr. Tatu's commentary on the recently published—and already controversial—*L'Agonie du régime en Russie soviétique *carries on the debate on the evolution of the Soviet political system initiated in our last issue by Professor Brzezinski's essay, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" Comments by other scholars from various countries will appear in forthcoming issues.*

Michel Garder's *L'Agonie du régime en Russie soviétique* [1] is a change from the scholarly treatises to which the Sovietologists have accustomed us; it is a study, to be sure, but also much more—a manifesto. The author, a French officer who has long specialized in Eastern affairs, decided this time not to worry about nuances and details. His conclusions—not unlike those of Valery Tarsis [2]—are radical: the Soviet regime is doomed to collapse. He even foresees the date of this collapse: about 1970—or, to be more precise, *before* 1970. And he sets out to prove it in a little more than 200 pages.

The apocalyptic character of the author's conclusions naturally dictates the style of the book, which is written in anything but academic language; certain excesses will seem shocking, others quaint. Thus, for example, M. Garder insistently pictures the party as a clergy, discussing the role of the "Pope-Emperor" (Stalin) and referring to Khrushchev as the "self-styled vicar." Or, on post-Stalin Russia, he writes: "Rid of the terror, the huge country rapidly adopted a spirit of free-for-all"—obviously, somewhat of an exaggeration of the relaxation that has taken place. Or, a striking thumbnail sketch of Khrushchev in late 1963 and early 1964: "The Pope-Emperor, who had beamed with self-assurance in the preceding years, gave way to a worried old man seeking to square the circle." On a few occasions, the book shows how dangerous narrow convictions can become.

[1] Paris, La Table Ronde, 1965.

[2] See this Soviet writer's *Ward No. 7,* (London, Collins & Harvill Press, 1965) and the discussion in Laszlo M. Tikos' "In Russia's Insane Asylums," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1965, pp. 66-71.

Mr. Tatu, a journalist for the Paris newspaper Le Monde, *was until recently its correspondent in Moscow.*

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Completing his book early in 1965, M. Garder deemed it necessary to add a footnote reporting as a fact the completely unverified rumor that First Deputy-Premier D. F. Ustinov had been arrested. Clearly the rumor fitted in too well with the notion of the regime's "death throes" for the author to resist the temptation of using it. He would have done better had he waited until 1970, since that is precisely what he advises us to do.

Yet all this being said, it is not a bad idea occasionally to leave the beaten path and, even at the risk of oversimplification, to unfold a fearless vision of the future. By the very radicalism of its conclusions, a work of this kind may force useful reactions. It may stimulate some to reexamine a few pat ideas; to others it may offer a "working hypothesis." In any case, no one can remain indifferent to the prospects the author holds out. In fact, any study of Soviet society written without a general idea about the Soviet future, whether short or long-term, is likely to be sterile. Hypotheses such as those put forward by M. Garder—or equally well-defined hypotheses expressing an opposite view—have the advantage of introducing a dynamic element into an analysis.

Now a few remarks on M. Garder's thesis. It is, of course, perfectly true that conservatism is the main ill from which the Soviet system suffers at the present time. As the author puts it in his customary "shock" terms, "the most conservative Western bourgeois is a revolutionary next to the *apparatchik*." Before M. Garder, the Yugoslav writer Mihajlo Mihajlov had already come to a similar conclusion, and so have many others, including Soviet writers, though the latter prefer to speak of "dogmatism" or "clinging to the old ways." But it is really necessary to go one step further and conclude with Garder that the "Leninist-Marxist clergy" and its ideology cannot change; at best, it can only perpetuate itself.

It is also true that the best formula for preserving the system would have been to maintain absolute power in the Stalinist manner. "Only the formula 'God is dead, long live God!,' could have saved the theocracy," remarks Garder with respect to the year 1953. It is indeed difficult to conceive of a religion without a pope; Khrushchev had hoped to be a "Pope-Emperor," but he failed because he did not have at his disposal his predecessor's Draconian means. And if a conclusion can be drawn from Khrushchev's ill-fated reign, it is that one man cannot rule alone without resorting to police power. Not only must the leader in power gain obedience from his subjects, but he must, above all, eliminate recalcitrant "cardinals."

M. Garder attributes Khrushchev's fall, a little hastily perhaps, to a mere accumulation of problems and failures for which a "scapegoat" had to be found. It would seem that a more convincing explanation of the event lies in the institutional changes introduced by the first post-Stalin reforms: the termination of the political terror and its corollary—the right, claimed more and more openly by the "cardinals," to share in the exercise of supreme power. In any event, this development seems to rule out absolute one-man rule for the foreseeable future, and it consequently further weakens the cohesion and effectiveness of the "clergy."

In contrast to the immediate advantages seen in the present course by the incumbent leaders —the return to "reason" and "scientific leadership," confirmed by certain efforts at a rationalization of economic management—a major drawback stands out in the longer-range perspective: the loss of political impetus. For what more can be expected from a collective leadership than the lukewarm breath of a bureaucracy propping up its power? Tendencies toward rationalization may be in evidence, to be sure, but they are weakened by the need for negotiation, compromise, and respect for vested interests. Despite certain appearances, conservatism is thus very likely to become more pronounced rather than weaker as a result of Khrushchev's fall. In the beginning, at least, the former First Secretary deserved credit for having given new impetus to the regime through destalinization and a dynamic foreign policy.

This brings us to the most crucial of M. Garder's premises. "The mounting conflict," he writes, "between a decaying regime that no longer has any other justification than the personal interests of those who profit by it and the population of a young, healthy country awakening after a long period of torpor cannot end in a compromise." In brief, M. Garder dismisses the possibility of a peaceful transformation of

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the regime. But here a distinction must be made.

If it comes to a direct confrontation between the regime and its *apparatchiki* on the one hand, and the "young and healthy" population on the other, the author is quite likely right. The known aspirations for individual freedom in the USSR, particularly among the young people, the "radicalization" found among their conservative opponents, the general lassitude, to say the least, toward worn-out slogans, and the dissatisfaction with the prevailing standard of living—all this is abundant evidence to lead one to conclude that the day everybody is left to himself in the Soviet Union the situation will soon be out of control. The fact that accounts have not yet been settled for the "excesses" committed during the Stalinist era only adds to the uncertainty. And the party leaders now know that the grant of partial freedom only whets the appetite of those to whom it is given, and that it cannot therefore solve their problem. (Those in the West who continue to foresee a progressive "convergence" of the Soviet and Western systems disregard this fact. Aside from the economic questions involved, which deserve to be discussed separately, the major flaw in this theory is that it ignores the Russian people, their reactions and frustrations.)

On the other hand, insofar as the confrontation between the party apparatus and the other organized forces of the regime is concerned, there is no reason why a compromise should be impossible; or, to be more precise, a series of compromises solving all the more or less serious but not necessarily violent crises that may arise in this contest. Unquestionably, the party machine—the "clergy"—is today the most conservative element in the system and the principal curb on progress. Opposing it is the slightly more "progressive" state economic bureaucracy, which, impelled by the need to resolve serious technical problems, seeks to free itself from party tutelage. M. Garder foresees this conflict between the *apparatchiki* and the technicians, especially at the lower echelon, and it is imaginable that the former may be bribed into making certain concessions. The party, of course, loudly proclaims its determination to resist even the slightest transfer of power, but the day may come when it will find a compromise preferable to more serious upheavals. Some more "enlightened" *apparatchiki* may help in this direction.

Above all, however, there remains the possibility of a transfer of power to the military and the police, the principal organized forces outside the party apparatus. M. Garder rules out this possibility, alleging that the military are too divided and infiltrated by the party. He believes that the role of the KGB will be much more important, while at the same time admitting that this is the great unknown of the equation, which indeed it is.

While it is true that traditionally the army has been strictly subservient to the party, this does not mean that this relationship can never change, especially in the face of a divided and uncertain political leadership. There have been many indications in the past year that Khrushchev's fall has widened the autonomy and authority of the marshals, and this seems true also of the police. Assuming, as M. Garder does, that the gravity of the problems facing the USSR, coupled with the impossibility of defining collectively a valid policy, dooms the members of the party Presidium to a struggle for power—a power which is becoming increasingly elusive—is it really so absurd to think that one or more marshals might decide, in a day of crisis, to "take charge" of the government to save the country? A regime of this kind, rid of the ideological chaff (of which it would retain only the patriotic content), would have a fair chance of staying in power. Since it would be inclined to leave the economy in the care of the technicians, even of the producers themselves, it would probably prove much more effective in economic administration than its predecessors. Politically, it would maintain a strong government, and it would find in the *apparatchiki* the perfect scapegoats for all the mistakes of the past. But with or without such army intervention, freedom would not be likely to arrive by 1970.

There are still other possible hypotheses. For instance, a member of the collective leadership might strengthen his authority step by step as Khrushchev did between 1953 and 1957; but, unlike the latter, he might want to use the police apparatus for his own ends. Unquestionably, the obstacles to such a course would be enormous in view of the determination of the party cadres to protect themselves against a repetition of Stalinist terror. Resistance at all

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levels would thus be considerable; but then, what is the aim of terror if not precisely to break down all resistance? M. Garder rules out this theory on the ground that going back to police pressures would be detrimental to the interests of the economy. This is undeniable, but it is equally true that there are times when economic considerations carry little weight compared to political interests, particularly when the preservation of the system is at stake. It must be granted—and above all ardently hoped—that the probability of a return to police terror is slight. Besides, many gradations in this respect are possible, as the history of the 1930's attests. But the "law of irreversibility" of political changes in the Soviet Union remains to be proven.

In brief, then, there are three main approaches for projecting the present Soviet situation into the future. The first rests on the conclusion that the USSR finds itself in a typically pre-revolutionary situation; that its ruling regime is in conflict with the dynamic social forces of the country and must inevitably be swept away. This is M. Garder's view—and also, incidentally, the belief of many authentic Marxists, including members of reputedly orthodox Communist parties. Another, less "linear" approach takes into account various accidents of history and leads to the conclusion that the conservatism of the regime and its leadership has not yet come to full fruition, that it can still mature and harden. Lastly, one can envisage a gradual transfer of authority from the party to other centers of power—the army, the economic cadres, the police—a transfer half-negotiated and half-conquered, which under conditions of "controlled violence" would transform the regime into a more effective, if still dictatorial, system of government. Let us leave to M. Garder the responsibility for his "wager," and let us wait for his 1970 rendezvous.

A THOUGHT FOR THE DAY

The immaturity of the feelings of individuals can acquire a character which is ideologically dangerous, since feelings deprived of ideological contents—diffused and indefinite—can lead the one who nourishes them to false positions and to a spiritual alliance with false ideas. "Good" and "magnanimous" feelings which have no ideological basis are capable of merely confusing one spiritually and of giving rise, for example, to pacifist sentiments which are incompatible with the Communist principle of humanism.

Red Star (Moscow), Dec. 24, 1965.

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Communism in Indonesia

RUTH T. MCVEY: *The Rise of Indonesian Communism.*
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965.
DONALD HINDLEY: *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963.*
Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964.
JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF: *The Communist Party of Indonesia.*
Vancouver, University of British Columbia Publications Center, 1965.

Reviewed by Guy J. Pauker

ON MAY 23, 1965, the 45th anniversary of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), President Sukarno delivered a speech in which he paid homage to party chairman D. N. Aidit as the "fortress of Indonesia," stated that he himself "embraced the PKI," and urged it to "go onward, onward, onward; never retreat!" Sukarno also declared that the party had three million members, three million youths, and 20 million sympathizers, thus publicizing and endorsing larger membership figures than the Communists had ever claimed before. With the President's backing, the PKI seemed to be in a position of unassailable strength and moving slowly but surely toward an eventual takeover of power.

Just six months later, Aidit was presumed dead; Communist activities were banned by the military authorities in a majority of the country's provinces; many Communists had been killed and larger numbers were under arrest. (We now have it on Sukarno's own authority that at least 87,000 Communists have been killed.—Reuter's dispatch in *The Washington Post,* Jan. 16, 1966.) This extraordinary turn of the wheel resulted from a sequence of events which started during the night of September 30-October 1 with the abduction and assassination of six senior generals in the course of an attempted *coup d'etat.*

We may never know the whole truth about the "September 30 Affair," which has complex domestic and international ramifications, but it seems established that members of the Communist People's Youth and the feminine front organization Gerwani were involved in the murders, that arms had been smuggled into Indonesia from Communist China under the cover of building materials imported for a top-priority project, that Aidit disappeared from Jakarta on September 29, and that the PKI official newspaper, *Harian Rakjat,* endorsed the *coup* editorially in its last issue, on the morning of October 2.

The accumulating evidence has given increasing weight to the insistent demands of the Army and of various political groups that President Sukarno outlaw the PKI and its affiliates.

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Whatever the outcome of these pressures, communism has suffered a major setback in Indonesia, and the political spectrum has shifted drastically. Many perplexing questions remain: Why did Aidit, who had advised his party for years to be patient, to avoid provocations, and to resist rash impulses, get involved in an ill-conceived and badly implemented plot? Why did the PKI cadres, who had been lectured for years on the errors of the premature Communist rebellions of 1926-27 and 1948, which twice almost destroyed the party, support a third suicidal move? And why did the huge body of PKI supporters show so little militancy in defending the coup after the "September 30 Affair" was started?

Students of communism and of Indonesian politics will find it interesting to look for answers to these questions in the three recent books reviewed in these pages. All were completed before the dramatic reversal of trends of recent months. But can they help us to understand what happened?

RUTH T. McVEY's *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* is rightly described on its dust jacket as a "definitive study." It covers the period from the appearance of Marxism in Indonesia shortly before World War I to the destruction of the Communist Party by the Dutch colonial authorities following the inept rebellions in Java and Sumatra in 1926-27. Miss McVey is a scholar of considerable talent, and her 132 pages of footnotes, drawn from sources in five languages, are a rare and surprising intellectual delight. The main body of her text (355 pages) is not only well written but permeated throughout with a subtle touch of humor—altogether an unusual combination of qualities for a study which started as a Ph.D. dissertation.

Although Miss McVey's book does not touch on current affairs, the careful reader will find interesting clues to what may have happened to the PKI in 1965. The rebellions of 1926-27, which resulted in 13,000 arrests and other harsh measures to destroy the Communists' mass following, had their roots in the nature of the party in its early years. As early as 1923-24, the author writes, "the Communist appeal aroused messianic expectations that were not amenable to urgings of patience and discipline" (p. 186). At the same time, the leaders of the PKI in 1924 were concerned about the dangers created by the growth of the Communist-controlled mass movement, the Sarekat Rakjat:

That organization possessed imposing proportions but little revolutionary value, for its peasant members held the petty-bourgeois values of their class: they only considered their immediate economic interests, had no concept of the Communist purpose, endangered the party's proletarian character, and were all too inclined to give up in despair or go over into terrorism. (*p. 263*)

It may well be that in 1965 the PKI was still suffering from the same weaknesses. Since Miss McVey's volume was conceived as the first part of a general history of the PKI, one can hope that she will trace recent events with the same perspicacity that characterizes her present work.

MEANWHILE, DR. HINDLEY'S *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* helps to fill the gap in our knowledge on the more recent history of the PKI. His book is based on eleven months of field work in Java in 1959-60 gathering material for a doctoral dissertation at the Australian National University.

Reviewers in This Issue

GUY PAUKER—Senior Staff Member of the RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, California); has written extensively on politics in South East Asia.

ABRAHAM ASCHER—Associate Professor of History at Brooklyn College, New York; contributes to *Survey* (London), *Problems of Communism* and other journals.

LOREN GRAHAM—Presently Senior Fellow of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, and Assistant Professor of History at Indiana University.

DAVID L. MORISON—Editor of the *Mizan Newsletter*, a monthly review of Soviet writings on the Middle East and Africa published in London, and a frequent contributor to *Problems of Communism*.

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Dr. Hindley's study offers considerable insight into the growth of the Communist movement in Indonesia. It is particularly useful in documenting the development of the mass organizations, which are traced from their modest beginnings in the period before Aidit and his associates took charge of the party in 1951, to the present. Students of Indonesian politics will welcome the data made available in English by Dr. Hindley. He has industriously sifted most Indonesian primary sources and has supplemented his library research through interviews with PKI members and other Indonesians, thus making a valuable contribution to the political history of contemporary Indonesia.

On the basis of his research, Dr. Hindley undertook "to ascertain the political value of the mass support so painstakingly and so successfully garnered by the Aidit leadership" (p. viii). He predicted that the PKI's chances of coming to power were poor because, despite its large following, the movement lacked militancy. His conversations with "non-Communist politicians and government officials" in 1959-60 convinced him that

. . . the workers, organized in SOBSI and PKI, are still far from the acceptance of militant action against "the authorities." The peasants who support the PKI and BTI are even less inclined to militancy. (*p. 179*)

In the light of recent developments, Dr. Hindley's conclusions, written in mid-1963, are interesting. He believed that the leaders of the PKI, "still young, and having amply demonstrated their patience over the preceding twelve years . . . were prepared to work for many years more before the right moment arrived" (p. 304). On the basis of this assessment, Dr. Hindley ruled out the possibility of a PKI coup:

A Communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future. The character of the Communist mass support won under the national united front policy is such that few Indonesian Communists would support insurrection against the authorities. The few who might come forward would be readily decimated by the modernized armed forces and police acting in conjunction with the anti-Communists and the large body of present non-Communists who would be expected to become anti-Communist in such a situation. (*pp. 301-02*)

SURELY THE PKI leadership must have been aware of this danger. What, then, went wrong? In searching for an answer, the reader may want to turn to Professor Justus M. van der Kroef's *The Communist Party of Indonesia,* a lucid, extremely well-informed and carefully documented study of the history, program and tactics of the PKI until early 1964. While agreeing with those who believed that around 1960-61 the PKI was in danger of being contained by the Army, he felt that the Communists then found an ingenious way to recover:

[From] . . . the middle of 1960 [on], the party frequently found it increasingly difficult to maintain itself, until the Malaysia issue in the course of 1962 provided it with a new momentum. (*p. 125*)

By exploiting an issue on which radical nationalists, such as the military, and the Communists had to be in agreement, the party was able to avoid "slow atrophy" (p. 268), and by early 1964, when Professor van der Kroef was writing his study,

. . . the center of political gravity had, for the time being, notably drifted in the PKI's direction, and no forces or factors were in sight that might be able to reverse the process. (*p. 294*)

But, like the rest of us, Professor van der Kroef did not anticipate a Communist *coup:* "Rather, the strategic emphasis is upon slow and steady advances and the progressive undermining of the opposition." (p. 303)

Could it be that, goaded by their Chinese friends, the leaders of the PKI in September 1965 forgot the simple maxim: "Politics is the art of the possible"?

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Reviews in Brief

Historical Surveys

BASIL DMYTRYSHYN: *USSR: A Concise History*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965.

MR. DMYTRYSHYN'S volume is a useful addition to a growing list of textbooks on modern Russia. After an introductory chapter on the geography of the country and the major developments since the French Revolution of 1789, the author begins the main part of his narrative with the collapse of the monarchy in February 1917. In a mere three hundred pages, he manages to present a lucid, concise and well-organized account of the most significant trends in Soviet history up to the 1960's. There is no attempt to reinterpret or to offer new information. As Mr. Dmytryshyn acknowledges in the preface, his aim has been to summarize the findings of scholars working in specialized areas. Although there are occasional slips, such as the suggestion that the Menshevik leader Martov joined forces with Lenin in July 1917, it is evident that the author read widely and carefully in preparation for this book. The bibliographies at the end of each chapter are up-to-date and will be of help to the student interested in examining any particular question in greater depth than is possible in a textbook.

A singular feature of *USSR: A Concise History*, is that forty percent of it consists of appendices. Among other items, there are ten pages of "Biographical Notes on Important Soviet Officials," unabridged versions of the Soviet Constitution and the Communist Party Statute adopted in 1961, Khrushchev's destalinization speech of 1956, and, finally, some sixty pages on "Soviet Views of the Sino-Soviet Dispute." The idea of exposing students in an introductory course to primary sources is certainly a good one, but unfortunately the overwhelming bulk of the selections deals with the very recent past. Thus there is very little material, for instance, on the 1917-1939 period, which in many ways is far more engrossing than the last twenty-five years. At the very least, a more extensive coverage of the first two decades of Soviet rule would have given this section of the volume a better balance than it now has—an important consideration for any work intended to be used primarily as a textbook. Still, Mr. Dmytryshyn has made a start in the right direction, and one should be grateful for that.

MALCOLM E. CARROLL: *Soviet Communism and Western Opinion 1919-1921*. (Edited by Frederick B. M. Hollyday.) Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1965.

UNFORTUNATELY, a disappointing book. To begin with, its title is misleading inasmuch as Mr. Carroll does not deal essentially with Western opinion on Soviet communism during the 1919-1921 period, but rather with diplomatic relations between Western states and Russia, with internal developments in Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States, and with the various military conflicts in which Russia was engaged during those two years. The ostensible theme of the book result of this misguided and obvi- receives only sporadic attention. The ously overambitious undertaking is that the reader is overwhelmed by an array of details which do not add up to a very meaningful historical account. In any case, most of the subjects on which the author touches have been adequately and often excellently treated in other studies on which Carroll leans heavily.

Secondly, the writing is rather wooden, frequently awkward, and at times not even correct. Two examples will suffice: "Karl Radek developed the thesis that coexistence was the policy of the Soviet government in the *Manchester Guardian* (January 8, 1920)" (p. 29). "Persuaded that the White Russian cause was irretrievably lost and anxious to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the British tried to restrain him [Wrangel] from aggressive action, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople warning, June 3, that an offensive would result in the loss of British interest in the fate of his army" (p. 82). Slipshod writing might be overlooked in a volume

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that otherwise makes a significant contribution to scholarship. But in this case the author's difficulty with the English language is yet another obstacle for the prospective reader.

Abraham Ascher

The Land and Its People

GEORGE B. CRESSEY: *Soviet Potentials: A Geographic Appraisal.* Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1962.

THE SCHOLAR who proposes to answer one of the perennial questions concerning competition between the Soviet Union and the West frequently finds himself in a rather awkward position. On the one hand, he must be loyal to the methods and standards of his discipline; on the other, the very posing of the question of competition places a value judgment upon the results of his research which constantly intrudes.

Thus, Professor George B. Cressey, Maxwell Professor of Geography at Syracuse University, attempts to answer the question, "Does the USSR have the environmental potentials with which to become the world's greatest state?" (The dust jacket simply states that this book "provides up-to-date background on our opponent in the struggle for world leadership.") When we find, then, that the northern tundra and certain desert areas in the USSR offer possibilities for only a pitiful kind of human existence, are we to consider this "fortunate" or "unfortunate"? Professor Cressey himself takes the most generous, although somewhat contradictory, path out of this dilemma by considering unfortunate what his original question implies to be fortunate.

Soviet Potentials is most valuable as a source of geographic information about the Soviet Union for persons previously unacquainted with the area. The volume contains enlightening discussions of the specific characteristics of the continentality of the Soviet climate, and of the demographic, geographic, geologic, and economic features of the country. The assessment which emerges is that of a nation both blessed and condemned by nature. Although the Soviet Union derives much of its strength from its size, its very dimensions form an obstacle to efficient administration. While its resources in minerals are perhaps the greatest in the world, a considerable portion of that reserve is inaccessible. The great spaces which protect the Soviet Union from invasion multiply the problems of internal transportation. The fertility of the Ukraine is concentrated in the most vulnerable section of the nation and offers a temptation to invaders. The magnificent river and canal system is enormously limited in its usefulness by long periods of frigid weather. The multinational character of the USSR simultaneously increases the appeal of the state for its admirers and raises questions of ethnic divisions and irredentism across international borders. The occupation of Mackinder's strategic heartland coincidentally means entrapment within a land mass without access to oceans.

All these conflicting factors are carefully weighed by the author in his assessment of Soviet potentials. His conclusion is, "The United States of America enjoys assets of climate, soil, resources and location which seem to outweigh those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If the two people have equal technical ability, patriotism, and determination, the United States should keep in the lead. The only way in which the Soviet Union can overtake America is by more sacrifice and harder work than the latter cares to invest."

Prof. Cressey's survey is marred by a number of minor but bothersome defects. Many observations are either trite or quite inexact in meaning. At the beginning, we learn that "in all the world there is no other country quite like the Soviet Union." Further on, we read that "Soviet planning finds its basis in the supposed logic of dialectical materialism." And in yet another spot, we are told that "just as all roads led to Rome, so many roads and railways center on the [Soviet] capital." The discussions of economic growth and international relations are already rather outdated in view of the author's failure to mention either the recent slowdown in Soviet industrial growth or the Sino-Soviet conflict. And, finally, though the book makes no claim to original scholarship, it is disturbing to find publications of US Congressional Committees cited for basic geographic data more frequently than either Western or Soviet primary sources.

Loren R. Graham

Turmoil in Africa

MICHAEL LOFCHIE: *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution.* Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.

THE PRO-COMMUNIST aura surrounding the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964 and its aftermath tended, for many, to obscure the underlying causes of the explosion itself. The pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and even pro-Cuban leanings of some of the actors in the drama were represented by some commentators as the most significant aspect of the upheaval, and even as evidence of Communist authorship of the revolution. Others, on the other hand, saw the roots of the revolt as lying in a purely local history of social unrest and racial violence and felt that Communist attributions were irrelevant to the real issues. Nor was this just a difference of opinion between

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armchair commentators and those on the spot; many eyewitness observers of events attributed them to Communists, while many who only read of them preferred to regard the revolt as fundamentally a local conflagration.

Mr. Lofchie's timely book is above all a study of events leading up to the revolution. He spent 18 months in Zanzibar in 1962-63 doing field research for the study—and consequently did not know at the time that he was, in effect, studying the "background to a revolution." He learned Swahili, which is indispensable to an understanding of the coastal peoples and their way of life. "Leaders of all political parties," he says, "cooperated with this study." His compendious bibliography includes much out-of-the-way material. The recent history of Zanzibar is, in general, well documented so far as official reports and the local press are concerned (over 20 newspapers or periodicals were circulating in the island before the revolution), but there was also much party literature that could only be obtained by a researcher on the spot.

Mr. Lofchie tells the story of how a multiracial society, which was nevertheless in many respects a harmonious society, became divided by bitter racial antagonisms. Political strife, the struggle for control of a future independent Zanzibar, became racial strife between Africans and Arabs. In this situation, those who regarded themselves above all as Zanzibaris might perhaps have merited recognition that they were putting national interests first. But the exponents of multiracialism were to be found primarily in the Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist Party. "Arab nationalists," Mr. Lofchie calls them, and he dismisses their patriotic pretensions. "Arab nationalism," he says, "despite its liberal multiracial ethos, was basically a conservative if not altogether reactionary phenomenon": it wanted "to return Zanzibar to . . . oligarchic rule by a small landowning minority" (p. 157). In contrast to Arab ambitions, Mr. Lofchie sees the nationalism of the African community as a defensive reaction to the above—"a movement of fear rather than hope."

The tragedy of the situation was that even up to a late stage in the long drawn-out pre-independence turmoil, so many of the Shirazis, the real sons of the soil of Zanzibar and Pemba, were still setting their faces against the racial appeal. Then, when the ZNP leaders had the chance to show their own multiracialism by agreeing to a coalition government after the 1963 election with its disastrously anomalous result, they rejected it and thereby sealed their fate. "Force," says the author, "had become the only method by which African leaders could oust the Arab ruling caste from its historic position of political and economic supremacy and create an African-ruled state" (p. 12). Yet the new regime now has its own multiracial ethos. One hopes, with Mr. Lofchie, that racial harmony will be "far greater" in the future.

Those interested in the "leftist" trend in Zanzibar politics will find the author's account of the origins and ideology of the Umma Party interesting but tantalizingly brief. Whatever the cause of the revolution, this trend has come in on its back. But this would require another book on its own. For the prerevolutionary phase, no one could want a more informed and readable guide than the present work.

David Morison

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HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

General Maleter: A Memoir

By Peter I. Gosztony

The place was Budapest; the time, between 7:00 and 8:00 A.M., October 24, 1956. A tall, spare, still rather young-looking officer wearing the uniform and insignia of a colonel in the Hungarian People's Army strode hurriedly through the streets of the old Buda section of the capital, skirting the west bank of the Danube, on the way to his headquarters on Castle Hill. He was Pal Maleter, formerly a Panzer officer and now—as one of more than 2,000 army colonels—the little known commander of the Army's Technical Auxiliary Forces. Yet, the turbulent events of the next ten days were to thrust him suddenly from obscurity into the limelight of history as one of the heroic figures of Hungary's 1956 revolution.

Although the streets of Buda remained deceptively quiet, the capital was in fact already in a state of mounting chaos by the morning of October 24th. What had started out the preceding afternoon as a massive but peaceful demonstration by students and workers demanding greater political freedom and an end of Rakosist police repression had suddenly been transformed into revolutionary carnage by the action of the hated security police (AVH) in firing upon the unarmed crowds. The demonstrators had then procured or seized what weapons they could lay their hands on and had begun fighting back in a sudden outburst of pent-up fury. Early on the 24th Soviet tanks had moved into the fray at the regime's request, and insurrectionary violence was rapidly spreading.

Colonel Maleter reached his headquarters in Uri Street to find it the scene of frantic activity and confusion. Telephones were ringing, couriers were coming and going, and all sorts of conflicting reports were flooding in from Pest, the eastern section of the city across the Danube, telling of armed clashes at various points. Maleter was particularly concerned over the situation of the Kilian Barracks, a massive 200-year-old masonry structure in the heart of Pest, which housed about 1,000 technical troops, mainly new recruits, directly under the command of Maleter's headquarters. Communications with the barracks had been cut off since the preceding evening, when a crowd of demonstrators had forced the barrack gates and, without bloodshed, taken possession of most of the garrison's weapons and

During the 1956 revolt in Hungary, Dr. Gosztony was an officer in the Hungarian Army and served under General Maleter at the Kilian Barracks in Budapest. He now lives in Switzerland, where he is Director of the Swiss East European Library in Bern.

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ammunition. In the absence of orders, the barracks commandant, Captain Csiba, had chosen not to resist the demonstrators by armed force, but to remain "neutral."

Soon after the Colonel's arrival, Captain Csiba at last managed to contact the headquarters by telephone and reported not only these events but also the fact that Soviet tanks had appeared on the scene after dawn and opened fire on the barracks, evidently believing it to be in insurgent hands. (Actually the tanks had been fired upon by insurgents stationed in the nearby Korvin Passage but thought that the fire came from the barracks.) In answer to Csiba's request for instructions, Colonel Maleter promised to seek a clarification of the situation as speedily as possible.

At 10 A.M., however, Maleter received telephone orders from the Ministry of Defense to report there at noon for watch duty in the operations section of the Army General Staff. Although the Ministry was situated across the river in Pest, some distance from the headquarters, Maleter and a few fellow officers decided to go there on foot in view of the uncertain conditions in the streets. Along the way they were struck by the sight of armed bands of students, workers and ordinary civilians, some of them carrying the tricolored Hungarian flag with the Soviet hammer and sickle (added to the flag by Rakosi) torn out of the center. Soviet tanks were also in evidence in some districts. Nevertheless, the group safely made its way to the Defense Ministry.

At the Ministry the atmosphere was one of confusion and tense anxiety. Even the Soviet "advisers" who were on hand, Maleter and his accompanying officers noted, appeared on the verge of panic. Maleter then went on duty in the operations section, and as the hours passed, incoming reports indicated not only that the situation in Budapest was rapidly deteriorating, but that the insurrection was spreading to the provinces. The whole country appeared to be gripped by revolutionary fever.

During the night of October 24-25, Colonel Maleter received telephone reports of new and alarming developments at the Kilian Barracks. Some political officers stationed there, acting in defiance of Captain Csiba's orders to preserve neutrality, organized a small armed party which made surprise sorties from the barracks in an attempt to round up and disarm insurgents holed up in the adjacent Korvin Passage. Some ten insurgents were taken prisoner and locked up inside the barracks before the raiding party was fired upon and one of the officers wounded. Hitherto the insurgents had regarded the Kilian garrison as "friendly," but now word quickly spread through the neighborhood that AVH troops had taken up positions in the barracks and were holding insurgent prisoners. As a result, the barracks came under violent insurgent attacks on the morning of the 25th. Captain Csiba reported these circumstances to Colonel Maleter at the Defense Ministry and asked for speedy assistance.

By this time Maleter's watch duty was completed, and he obtained authorization to proceed personally to Kilian with an armored unit to investigate the situation and relieve the garrison. The relief force, consisting of five tanks of the Hungarian 33rd Armored Regiment, set out for the barracks at full speed, reaching its destination at about 11 A.M. on the 25th. The insurgents in the Korvin Passage, seeing that the tanks flew the Hungarian flag, held their fire.

Once inside, Maleter conferred briefly with Captain Csiba and then ordered the garrison to cease all hostilities. Learning that some insurgents were being held prisoner, he had them brought into the barracks infirmary where he proceeded to interrogate them. The author of the present article, who at that time was stationed at the Kilian barracks as a service officer, recorded in his diary what then took place:

. . . Maleter's gaze fell upon one of the prisoners, a young man with a frank and intelligent-looking face. He asked him his name and occupation, how he had obtained arms, and what reasons had led him to participate in the uprising. The young man replied courageously, without appearing in the least overawed. He spoke of the miserable standard of living, of the freedoms which existed only on paper, and of the nationalist aspirations of the people, which in recent years had been completely frustrated and deprived of meaning. He also spoke of the list of sixteen demands which the students had disseminated in the streets during the demonstrations of October 23. Unable to remember one of the points, he felt in his pocket and produced his Communist Party membership card, inside which—paradoxically—was a typewritten copy of the sixteen demands.

There was a moment of silence. Maleter then rose and ordered everyone out of the infirmary. From the hallway outside, we could hear him telephoning. Shortly afterward, he called us in again and addressed himself to the young insurgent:

"Listen to me. I am setting you free, you and your companions. Go back to the insurgents. Tell them that I am proposing a cease-fire. We are all Hungarians. I am not firing on you and I shall not do so; but this means that you must not fire either. Do you understand?"

"Perfectly," replied the young man in a firm voice.

"Neither we nor you," Maleter repeated, and then held out his hand to the young man. This handshake between a colonel of the Hungarian People's Army and one of the insurgents, who were still being described by the government-controlled radio as

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Part of the huge procession of students and civilians which marched through the streets of Budapest on October 23, 1956, to demonstrate for greater freedom and an end of Soviet domination. The demonstrators carry traditional Hungarian flags without the Communist hammer and sickle added by Rakosi.

"counterrevolutionary bandits," was warmly applauded.

As a result of the truce agreement, all fighting ceased in the vicinity of the barracks by three o'clock that afternoon. The insurgents came out from their positions in the Korvin Passage, and a jubilant crowd gathered outside the barracks. Colonel Maleter's appearance at the entrance to receive the report of a patrol, which had gone out under a flag of truce, evoked a spontaneous demonstration of enthusiasm. The author's diary records the scene:

A young man succeeded in making his way through the crowd and approached the Colonel. He was carrying a Kossuth emblem [in commemoration of the hero of the revolution of 1848] which he had no doubt fashioned himself. He asked the Colonel's permission to substitute it for the Soviet red star over the barracks gateway. Maleter smilingly agreed, and some of his own soldiers straightaway began demolishing the plaster star which had been an eyesore to patriotic Hungarians for years. Within minutes the Kossuth emblem had taken its place. . . .

The crowd, which included both freedom fighters and unarmed civilians, then began firing questions at Maleter, who answered straightforwardly without trying to sidestep even the most "delicate" issue. His replies quickly convinced the crowd that he was not their enemy. When he was asked what he thought about the intervention of Soviet forces, the Colonel's features hardened and his obviously sincere answer left no doubt that he shared the insurgents' view that foreign troops had no business being on Hungarian soil, much less interfering in affairs which ought to be settled by the Hungarians alone. The discussion led to a curious conclusion: there was scarcely any difference between the Colonel's ideas and those of the insurgents. At most they differed in matters of form, but not on essential principles.

A middle-aged man with the look of a worker then asked Maleter outright: "Tell us, comrade Colonel, what is it that you want?"

After a split second of surprise, Maleter replied firmly: "What I want, what we all want, I hope, is a free, independent and socialist Hungary. But to achieve that we need the support of every patriot."

Maleter's response was greeted with wholehearted enthusiasm. Everyone wanted to shake his hand and to embrace him. Maleter tried to calm the fervor of the crowd, but he seemed heartened by the reassurance it provided that the insurgents were indeed not "fascist counterrevolutionaries," but courageous patriots motivated by genuine concern for the country.

The man acclaimed by the crowd was hitherto unknown to them. Even today, it is no easy matter to retrace all the stages of his career.

Pal Maleter was born in 1917 at Eperjes, a town in that part of Upper Hungary which was ceded to Czechoslovakia following World War I. His father, a professor of law, was a democrat imbued with the traditions of 1848, and he instilled in his only son these same ideas as well as a deep loyalty to the Hungarian motherland. Although the young Pal dreamed from boyhood of a military career, he did not wish to serve in the Czechoslovak army and consequently decided to study medicine, enrolling in 1935 at the University of Prague. After about three years, however, the 1938 partition of Czechoslovakia resulted in the return of his native region to Hungary, and young Maleter, now able to realize his boyhood ambition, abandoned medicine and entered the Ludovica Military Academy in Budapest to prepare for an army career. Graduating first in his class, he received his commission as a lieutenant in the Hungarian Army in December 1942. By then, Hungary—under the rule of Admiral Nicolas Horthy—was an ally of Germany in World War II, and Maleter was eventually assigned to combat duty on

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the eastern front in the spring of 1944. Some months later, he was taken prisoner by the Soviet forces in the southern Ukraine and sent to a prison camp.

Soon afterwards, Maleter was visited at the camp by Zoltan Vas, a Hungarian Communist exile, then serving as a colonel in the Red Army. As a result of Vas' persuasion, Maleter agreed to attend the Red Army's Anti-Fascist Ideological School (Antifa) at Kiev, whose task was to reindoctrinate captured military personnel to serve as partisan fighters in the "liberation" of their countries from the Germans. The indoctrination evidently had a profound influence on Maleter's thinking, for he decided to accept duty with the partisans. He distinguished himself as commander of a partisan force fighting the Germans in northern Transylvania and was decorated by Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinovski.

After the liberation, Maleter took part in the reorganization of the Hungarian Army and became commander of the personal guard of the first President of the new Hungarian Republic, Zoltan Tildy. He joined the Communist Party and, after the Communist assumption of full political power in 1949, was assigned to a post in the Ministry of Defense, then headed by Mihaly Farkas, a trusted follower of the Stalinist party leader, Matyas Rakosi. Maleter soon found, however, that Rakosi and Farkas looked upon him as politically "unreliable." He remained a colonel while Soviet-trained officers who were his contemporaries became generals, and he was assigned to minor bureaucratic tasks such as drafting army regulations. At the same time, he became more and more disillusioned with the Stalinist policies of the Rakosi leadership.

During the first government of Imre Nagy, from 1953 to 1955, Maleter's personal fortunes took a slight turn for the better. Major General Istvan Bata, who replaced Farkas as Defense Minister, assigned Maleter to reorganize the technical auxiliary branch of the Army, which was placed under his command. Nagy's overthrow in 1955, however, marked a revival of Stalinist political dominance, which persisted until October 1956 in the face of mounting popular discontent.

It is not known whether or not Maleter took any part in politics at this time, or how he felt about the increasingly vocal demands of the students, writers and intellectuals for greater democratic freedoms and national independence. What is certain is that, on that afternoon of October 25th, 1956, Pal Maleter felt impelled to embrace the cause of the insurgent workers and students.

Days of feverish activity followed. While the government-controlled radio repeatedly called upon the insurgents to lay down their arms, promising them an amnesty, Soviet tanks continued to pound away at rebel-held buildings on the main boulevards and in the workers' districts. The insurgents resisted fiercely, using "Molotov cocktails" and whatever weapons they could muster. The Russians fell victim to panic and fired recklessly on dwellings, hospitals and historic buildings.

Witnessing this wanton destruction, Colonel Maleter appealed by telephone to the Ministry of Defense and even to the Soviet military command. He received a promise that shooting would be halted, but a few hours later still more Soviet T-34 and Stalin tanks were thrown into the fighting. When this occurred, Maleter was in the barracks infirmary. One of his wounded soldiers remarked bitterly, "You see, comrade Colonel, how the Soviets keep their word!"

Maleter, making no reply, hurried to a wing of the barracks facing on Ferenc Boulevard and, with a grim face, watched the Soviet tanks moving by. Then he strode rapidly back to the infirmary and telephoned the Defense Ministry, asking to speak with the Minister in person. Having been put through, he demanded that the Minister personally

Hungarian Army soldiers joyfully breaking up a pair of Soviet red star emblems which have been torn down from entrances to a military installation in Budapest.

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intervene with the Soviet military authorities to get them to order the withdrawal of the tanks from the capital. Those who were standing at Maleter's side overheard the Minister's reply as it filtered from the telephone apparatus: "I regret, comrade Colonel, but there is unfortunately no possibility of my exerting any influence whatever on the Soviet operations."

Maleter's features hardened. Speaking deliberately and weighing every syllable, he said: "In that case, I must inform you that I shall open fire on the next Soviet tank that approaches the Kilian barracks!"

The die was now cast. Maleter ordered his men to make Molotov cocktails, sent out patrols in search of arms, and placed the barracks in a state of defense readiness. He also established contact with Gergely Pongracz, the commander of the insurgents in the Korvin Passage, and organized systematic collaboration for the maintenance of order and defense against Soviet attack.

At this juncture, the formation on October 27th of a new government headed by Imre Nagy and including several non-Communist ministers aroused hopes for the early restoration of peace. On the 28th the new government announced its acceptance of several major insurgent demands, among them the abolition of the AVH, a democratization of national political life, and negotiations for a readjustment of Soviet-Hungarian relations on the basis of equality and independence. It also proclaimed an immediate and general cease-fire and announced that the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their forces from Budapest. The insurrection that had begun on October 23rd appeared on the verge of victory.

This turn of events was to have far-reaching consequences for Colonel Maleter. On the evening of October 30th, Free Radio Kossuth broadcast a personal message for Maleter directing him to contact Zoltan Vas, now serving as Supply Commissar for Budapest and probably the only man in Prime Minister Nagy's entourage who knew Maleter personally. Succeeding in reaching Vas by telephone, Maleter was informed that a car would be dispatched to the Kilian Barracks to pick him up and bring him to the Parliament building. There Vas and Maleter, who had first met when Maleter was a prisoner-of-war in the Soviet Union in 1944, greeted each other as old friends. Vas then introduced Maleter to Prime Minister Nagy, who told Maleter that his services were urgently needed in organizing a new temporary security force incorporating Hungarian army troops, police, and insurgent armed formations. Maleter promptly placed himself at the government's disposal.

The next day, October 31st, representatives of the "Revolutionary Committee of Armed Insurgents" met at the Kilian Barracks with representatives of the government, the army and police. At the conclusion of the three-hour meeting, a resolution was adopted announcing the amalgamation of regular army and police units and various insurgent armed groups into a national guard force which would assume the task of maintaining order with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Budapest. This force was to continue in existence until such time as the Soviet forces were entirely withdrawn from Hungary.

That same evening, Maleter learned that the Council of Ministers had elevated him to the rank of Major-General and appointed him Deputy Minister of Defense in the Nagy government. From then on, his new and heavy responsibilities kept him almost constantly at the Parliament building. Although the Soviet forces in Budapest began pulling out of the capital and its environs as agreed upon, subsequent reports of the arrival of fresh Soviet units in Hungary caused the government grave concern. Maleter was quick to grasp the ominous implications of this new development, yet he hoped that the threat of a new and more powerful Soviet intervention might still be averted if domestic order could be speedily reestablished, the workers persuaded to go back to their jobs, and normal life restored. It was with these objectives in mind that he personally appealed to the workers, in a radio broadcast, to end the general stoppage of work, and paid a visit to Cardinal Mindszenty at his Buda palace to urge him to lend his support to the Nagy government.

Despite the reports of menacing new Soviet troop movements, there was a moment when General Maleter seemed to feel that the Russians might keep their word. On the evening of November 2nd, he returned to the Kilian Barracks accompanied by Major-General Istvan Kovacs, the new Chief of Army General Staff, and Colonel Szucs, of the Defense Ministry. In high spirits, he told Captain Csiba and other officers of the Kilian garrison: "Peace is very near. The Russians have agreed in principle to the permanent withdrawal of their forces from Hungary."

In the course of the evening, Maleter spoke at length about the future of Hungary. "We want a socialist Hungary," he said, "there can be no question about that. We are not going to return the land, the factories or banks to their former owners: we want no more of that sort of exploitation. Our first task is to reestablish order. We must set to work and ensure calm; that is the only way we can exert any influence on the Soviets."

Captain Csiba broached the threat posed by the reported entry of fresh Soviet reinforcements into Hungary.

Maleter, however, shook his head and replied: "The Soviet Union already has military forces in Hungary far in excess of what would be needed for

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

Major-General Pal Maleter (left) discussing plans for the defense of Budapest with Lt.-General Karoly Janza (center), then Minister of Defense, and Major-General Istvan Kovacs, Chief of Army General Staff. Maleter replaced Janza as Defense Minister on November 3.

possible action against us. In my view, the concentration is directed against the West; the Soviets probably want to put on a show of force. For us, it is essential not to break the cease-fire, even by a single shot. Such a mistake could have incalculable consequences. Let's watch our nerves. We need to keep calm and careful."

Here, I believe, lies the only true answer to the question which has so often been asked since: Why didn't General Maleter mobilize and concentrate his forces in preparation for a possible second Soviet attack on Budapest? It was, I think, because he recognized realistically that if the Soviet Union did indeed intend to crush the revolution by force of arms, Hungary had no hope of offering successful resistance.

On Saturday, November 3rd, Maleter went early to the Parliament building to resume negotiations with the Soviet military delegation headed by General Malinin. The conversations took place in an outwardly friendly atmosphere, and certain agreements in principle were reached concerning the withdrawal of Soviet garrison forces from Hungary, including Soviet acceptance of a deadline of January 15, 1957, for completion of the withdrawal. Returning to the Kilian Barracks in the late afternoon, Maleter showed the record of the meeting to several of his officers, including Captain Csiba. He was in an optimistic mood and told his subordinates that he would be going to the Soviet general headquarters at Tokol that same evening to work out detailed arrangements for the Soviet withdrawal. Besides Maleter[1] as its head, the Hungarian delegation was to be composed of Minister of State Ferenc Erdei, Chief of Army General Staff Major-General Istvan Kovacs, and Colonel Szucs, of the Defense Ministry.

Maleter's subordinates at Kilian, who had been closely following the reports of Soviet troop movements towards the capital, were far from happy over his decision to go to Tokol. Captain Csiba even protested, "But, comrade General, suppose the meeting were to conceal a trap. They might be planning to arrest you, or simply hold you there."

"I cannot imagine that they would do such a thing," Maleter replied, then paused for an instant, ". . . although who knows? Such things have happened before in the course of history—even rather frequently in Soviet history. But even if it were to be so, it is still my duty to attend this meeting. You will remain here and keep watch for me!"

These were to be the last words Maleter spoke to the officers of Kilian. At eight o'clock that evening, he and his personal aides left the barracks in a Russian Pobeda staff car, which took them to the Parliament building. From there the full Hungarian government delegation set out for Tokol, some 15 miles south of Budapest.

The delegation arrived at the Soviet headquarters at 10 P.M. and was formally received by a Russian

[1] On this same day (November 3rd), Maleter replaced Lt.-General Karoly Janza as Defense Minister in the Nagy government.

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general officer while a guard of Red Army soldiers stood at "present arms." The negotiations, conducted for the Russians by Generals Malinin, Cherbanin and Stepanov, got under way in an atmosphere of seeming cordiality and understanding. As agreement had already been reached on basic questions, only matters of detail remained to be resolved. Periodically during the discussions, the Hungarian delegation reported the progress being made to Prime Minister Nagy by telephone. After midnight, however, communications between Tokol and the Parliament building in Budapest were suddenly cut off. Powerless to act, the government leaders in the capital could only wonder what was taking place.

Six years later, Sandor Horvath, a former Hungarian army private who accompanied Maleter to Tokol as a bodyguard, gave this eyewitness account of the events that followed:

Everything seemed to be going ahead smoothly in the office where the negotiations were taking place. At least that was the impression we had in the anteroom, judging from what we could hear of the discussions going on inside. . . . Then, towards midnight, twenty Soviet militiamen wearing green caps suddenly burst into the room. . . . They shouted a password and pointed their submachine guns at our delegation. . . . I was watching the boss [General Maleter] through the door, which had been torn down. . . . The others were pale . . . but his features remained immobile. "So that was it!" he said to the Russians, as he calmly rose to his feet. I grasped my submachine gun with the thought that I might be able to fire a few rounds at the men in green caps before they could get me, but it was too late. Two militiamen seized hold of me, and there was a scuffle. I managed to shake them off momentarily and again grabbed my submachine gun, when the boss shouted to me: "Stop! It's no use resisting. . . ." What else could I do? His words were always orders for me, and I let them take away my gun.

Subsequently, there were some persons who claimed knowledge that General Ivan Serov himself, chief of Soviet State Security, had headed the MVD militiamen who carried out the arrest of the Hungarian delegation, and that the Soviet generals present had even manifested some opposition. These are ridiculous assertions! As was established afterwards, the Russians were already making preparations for the second Soviet intervention as early as November 2nd, in both the military and political fields. It was quite simply to reduce to a minimum the resistance they could expect to encounter that they lured the key leaders of the Hungarian armed forces into a trap. That was why Malinin and his colleagues were so friendly in their dealings with the Hungarian representatives at the Parliament building in Budapest, and why they proposed to pursue the negotiations at Tokol on the evening of November 3rd. The Soviet Union wanted to run no risks in its war on tiny Hungary—and showed no qualms of conscience about its choice of methods.

Immediately after their arrest, the members of the Hungarian delegation were placed under guard in a room of the headquarters building. A short while later, armed guards led one prisoner after another into the courtyard. As soon as the door had

The shell-shattered walls of the Kilian Barracks after the stubborn resistance of its defenders had finally been overcome by the massive second Soviet attack which began on November 4, 1956.

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closed behind each one, a burst of machine-gun fire was heard, leading those still in the room to believe that their colleagues had been executed and that they were about to meet the same fate. Actually the Russians were firing into the air, and the whole thing was a carefully-staged and macabre trick designed to reduce the members of the delegation to a state of terrified submission. It had the desired effect. One by one, the prisoners let themselves be led, without resistance, to another building where they were locked up in separate basement cells.

General Maleter and his fellow prisoners were kept at Tokol until November 9th. Just before sunrise on that date, they were taken to the small airfield at Csepel and put aboard a plane which flew them only as far as the Matyasfold airport, a few miles east of Budapest. From there, under heavy military escort, Maleter was driven by car to the residential district in Pest reserved for Soviet diplomats and officials, where he was locked up in the cellar of a villa converted by the Russians into a temporary prison.

From then on, General Maleter's fate was enshrouded in a silence broken only by occasional unconfirmed rumors. Some reports claimed that he had been spirited out of Hungary and was being held prisoner in the Soviet Union. The West German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* was the first to publish a report (January 18, 1957) to the effect that preparations were being made for Maleter's eventual trial.

Early in February 1957, an Austrian businessman named Hans Petrakovitz, who had been imprisoned for a short time in Budapest following the revolution, managed to get out of Hungary and back to Vienna. Petrakovitz reported that Maleter had been in detention at the same prison in Budapest where he (Petrakovitz) had been held, and that he had seen the General only a few days before obtaining his release. Maleter, he said, appeared to be much thinner, but his faith seemed to remain unshaken.

The official silence continued until June 1957, when it was at last broken at a press conference for foreign journalists in Budapest. The correspondent of the American Associated Press asked pointblank what had happened to General Maleter. The Hungarian government spokesman, Istvan Szirmai, gave the following laconic reply:

Pal Maleter, who played a leading role in the counterrevolutionary events [of last October] is in preventive detention. Once the inquiry is over, his case will come before the courts. As far as I know, Maleter is not ill.

Months went by without any further reports on Maleter's fate. Various groups and organizations abroad, including the special investigating commission of the United Nations, intervened in an attempt to obtain clarification, but the Hungarian government, which was already preparing to try Nagy, Maleter and others for "counterrevolutionary conspiracy" against the state, remained silent.

Except for the officially published indictment and judgment of the court, little is known about the actual trial, which was held entirely *in camera*. With Nagy, Maleter, and the other defendants in the dock, the Supreme Court opened its proceedings in Budapest on January 20, 1958. Thanks to the intervention of his second wife, Judith Gyenes, Maleter was defended by Janos Kardos, a Budapest attorney. The trial dragged on for months and was interrupted and resumed several times, apparently as a result of seesawing political relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In April and May, at the time of a visit to Budapest by Polish Premier Gomulka, it was even thought to have been abandoned.

The concluding sessions of the Supreme Court took place between June 9 and 15, 1958. General Maleter, exercising his right to make a final statement in his own defense, denied *en bloc* the accusations against him, and it was with his head held high that he listened to the verdict handed down by the court on June 15th. Maleter was sentenced to death, as were Imre Nagy, Jozsef Szilagyi and Miklos Gimes. The sentences were carried out the next day in Budapest. Maleter was not granted the right to say farewell to his wife.

The official communique announcing the executions did not reveal how they were carried out. According to some reports, General Maleter was shot by a firing squad.

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NOTES & VIEWS

The "Essential Love" of Simone de Beauvoir

By Adam Ulam

Unkind critics (particularly those of her own sex) have not ceased to belabor Mlle. de Beauvoir for her sin—cardinal in the eyes of the reviewers—of disagreeing with the critics' values and judgments. Also, with her monumental indiscretion, Simone de Beauvoir has not resorted to those gestures which in the eyes of the Western literary establishment go far in palliating a pro-Soviet and anti-American attitude: she refuses to shed a tear for Russia's artists and intellectuals. *Dr. Zhivago* bored her, she admits. Even Bertrand Russell would not go that far. Yet this very frankness, or, if one prefers, exhibitionism makes her memoirs a superb and enlightening document.[1]

"I wanted to be widely read in my lifetime, to be esteemed, to be loved." It is the pursuit of these quite normal and laudable ambitions that accounts largely for de Beauvoir's and Sartre's commitment to the Left. An uncommitted writer in the France of the 1930's and 1940's might perhaps be widely read (though it did help the author of a first book to be known as a member of a specific ideological milieu), but he would hardly be esteemed. The road to recognition and success, the road which left behind the horrors of the existence of a provincial high school teacher, led through an identification with a cause, with a philosophy. Simone's baptism as a Marxist is described with a Boswellian simplicity. She had always felt herself a believer, she writes, but had no need to read the gospels: "I made no distinction between Marxism and any other philosophy to which I had become accustomed."

But finally (one suspects at the urging of some of her more intellectual friends) she *had* to read *Das Kapital:* "A new day dawned upon my world at the instant that I saw labor as the source and substance of all values." Endowed with this dazzling truth, which she makes plain she would defend against the whole world, Mlle. de Beauvoir felt she could be a Marxist with a clean conscience.

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[1] S. de Beauvoir, *Prime of Life,* Cleveland, World Publishing Company, 1962; *Force of Circumstances,* translated by R. Howard, New York, Putnam, 1965.

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To be sure, her own and her friends' devotion to Marxism was never to be slavish or unaccompanied by reservations. In defining their own relationship, Sartre also gave an unwitting description of the couple's attitude toward communism: "What *we* have is an essential love; but it is a good idea for us also to experience contingent love affairs." [2] Yet the trouble with this position is that communism frowns upon such eclecticism, that it demands full, all-absorbing loyalty and devotion. The French Communists have valued Sartre as an ally, and most of all as a critic of America, but in their eyes he could never be an Aragon with his poems in praise of communism and his membership in the Central Committee. At times the thought, the most horrible suspicion that can cross the mind of the Communist, would strike them: *They* were being used by Sartre and his companion instead of vice versa. Hence the occasional Communist vituperations which descend on the heads of the famous couple and which de Beauvoir rather roguishly reproduces, following immediately, however, with the assertion that "even with the orthodox Communists, even with the Soviet Union, our bridges were not burned." Thus the "essential love" still remains, though Sartre did not see eye to eye with the Soviet leaders on the suppression of the Hungarian uprising.

The Russians on their part show tolerance and decide—as Mlle. de Beauvoir oddly puts it—"not to alienate the sympathizers who had refused to accept Budapest." One of the latter is invited to Russia in 1957, when one of Sartre's plays is being performed in Moscow. The author's breathless conclusion: "it was a new and important development, the discovery that one could attack the USSR on a specific point without being considered a traitor." She forgets to add: unless one happened to live in Hungary.

What lies behind this "essential love" which no Budapests, no encounters with the admittedly bleak reality of Chinese and Soviet life, can dispel? Mlle. de Beauvoir warns us off those psychoanalytic explanations so beloved by the non-Communist intellectuals when it comes to analyzing the motivations of their Communist or fellow-traveling brethren. Yet one would do her and Sartre an injustice in attributing their behavior and opinions solely to self-interest or naiveté. However trite it may sound, an intellectual often finds a certain morbid fascination in the puritanic and repressive aspects of the Soviet regime, and also in its enormous outward self-assurance, which contrasts so saliently with the apologetic, hesitant self-image of the democratic world. When this facade of self-assurance began to collapse, first after the revelations about Stalin in 1956, and then as a consequence of the split in the Communist camp, many Western intellectuals began to shed their loyalty to the one-time idol, now certainly more humane than it had been under Stalin.

On the side of puritanism, Mlle. de Beauvoir's triumphant exhibitionism is proof enough that she has never been able to shake off the effects of her early upbringing and indoctrination. The most shocking of her admissions concerns her gluttony for American movies. With priceless candor she records her fascination with trials featuring the more unusual forms of perversion. There are visits to bordellos both in France and abroad. Throughout all those recitals there is an undercurrent of revulsion and censoriousness. It may well flow into the longing for a society where American movies would be severely rationed, no public accounts of trials involving sexual perversion allowed, and no brothels tolerated. The writer would be required to exhibit the joy of living and a positive attitude—in brief, socialist realism. As it is, the author is compelled to write for her own middle class which she hates, and to receive the congratulations of the philistines for the boldness and optimism of her autobiography —concerning a life which, as she says pitifully, disgusted her at times so much that "I would have rather been dead than alive." The last chapter with its pathetic evocation of the dread of old age would please a religious moralist and would persuade him that the author is not immune to the call of the religion of her childhood.

We are, however, more interested in the more mundane and less personal aspects of de Beauvoir's memoirs. To return to the attraction of communism for an intellectual, it is the fact that it is a *system* of thought and not just a way of life and a body of institutions which makes it seductive. That is, of course, a fairly commonplace statement, yet both *Prime of Life* and *Force of Circumstance* serve to fill it out with meaning. If so-called Americanism had as its basis an abstruse philosophical theory rather than a set of plain assertions written in the unmystifying language of 18th-century rationalism, it would undoubtedly sit better with some intellectuals. Certainly with Sartre and de Beauvoir. The latter relates a charming story testifying to one of the decisive moments in the formulation of Existentialism. Raymond Aron, fresh from a year in Berlin and German philosophy, informs our couple that for a phenomenologist an apricot cocktail may become the foundation of a philosophy. This information makes Sartre "pale with emotion." It sets him to the study of the appropriate German philosophers, with whose help he elaborates his own philosophy.

Now Marxism clearly *is* a philosophy; Soviet Russia is not just a

[2] Mlle. de Beauvoir failed to recognize a more down-to-earth version of this dialectic when, as she relates later, she was being propositioned by a butcher. When she rather snobbishly refused, giving as grounds that she already had a boy friend, the man of the people professed to wave away the difficulty: a person may like beef and yet once in a while would enjoy the variety of eating a slice of ham.

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state and society but also a philosophy-in-being. As a result, the negative aspects of Soviet society are in the nature of an optical illusion, the consequence of the viewer's inability to see the logic of history. Murder of countless innocent people during the Great Purge? Mlle. de Beauvoir quotes approvingly Merleau-Ponty's analysis: "In 1936, in a Soviet Russia isolated, threatened and unable to preserve the Revolution except at the price of monolithic severity, all opposition assumed the objective aspect of treason." Racial discrimination in America is a palpable and an irremediable evil, and no argument that things are being improved can be recognized.

But the purges in the Soviet Union, quite apart from the fact that "objectively" they did not exist, prove in retrospect the superiority of the Soviet regime: What other political system has been so generous as to acknowledge its holocaust of mass murders of innocent people, when in fact no such acknowledgement and apology were necessary? Ehrenburg's opinion about the forced labor camps and their inmates is blandly reproduced in *Force of Circumstance:* a few years before he had told de Beauvoir and Sartre at a Peace Congress that "nobody" would write about the camps since only inveterate anti-Communists believed in their existence; however, now that everybody knew such things *had* existed, why talk about it? In the author's words: "The return of those who had been deported was even creating difficult problems; which meant that the reading public would not easily tolerate having a knife turned in the wound."

Poor America, on the other hand, has no such philosophical or dialectical justifications. All that counts here is the present: racial discrimination, exploitation. The last volume of the autobiography was being written when some American sociologists were discovering that the enemy was not really just Wall Street, but the huge impersonal forces in American life whose impact has rendered the individual isolated and alienated. This insight is eagerly snatched by our author. "Eve Merriam in an article published in 1960 in *The Nation* has demonstrated that the American male is crushed, not by the female, but by the organization." How can the multi-million-dollar efforts of the United States Information Agency prevail against such a demonstration? Eve Merriam and *The Nation* have spoken, and from St. Germain des Prés to New Delhi the intellectuals will nod sadly and approvingly over this new insight into the American tragedy.

As a mirror of an age of an intellectual milieu, de Beauvoir's autobiography is thus unsurpassed. In the face of so much candor, richness and revelation it would be pointless to become indignant, to argue, to try to refute this or that palpable absurdity. It would be unfair also not to mention that occasionally anti-American feelings of an intellectual of Sartre's generation are combined with a strange attraction for this incomprehensible society. "But there was something about life over there, something vast and unencumbered, which fascinated us at a deeper level, beyond all question of right and wrong."

Nor should one lapse into cheap anti-intellectualism. Nikita Khrushchev's public fits of passion in that vein (and perhaps they helped persuade his colleagues that he needed a rest) served to remind us that the disgruntled and discontented artist or writer is a part of the social scene not only in the West. If a final word is needed, it is just that the artist's craving for excitement should not, without a careful scrutiny, become identified as social conscience or a political philosophy.

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Writers in Prison

EDITORS' NOTE: On September 13, 1965, Andrei Siniavski, a literary critic, and Yuli Daniel, a poet-translator, were arrested in Moscow. Although Soviet citizens were not informed about the arrests, the news soon reached the outside world, setting off a series of protests from leading writers and intellectuals in Western Europe, the US and Latin America. As this issue goes to press, the trial—held exactly five months after the arrest of the two authors—has just been concluded. The first of the articles below, which appeared under the title of "Writers & the Police" in the January 1966 issue of Encounter *and which is reprinted with the Editors' permission* (© Encounter, *London*), *deals principally with the works of the two writers. The second examines the treatment accorded Siniavski and Daniel before and during their trial.*

The Arrests

"In the course of the interrogation it was established that everything I had written was pure invention, the product of a morbid and ill-intentioned mind. . . ."

—Tertz, *The Trial Begins* (1960).

"The investigation continues. Any moment there will be a new wave of arrests. If they search the house and find this manuscript under the floorboards, they'll pick up every single one of us. . . ."

—Tertz, *The Makepeace Experiment* (1965).

"Man becomes a truly sincere and valuable being once he loses his official attributes—his profession, his name, his age. . . ."

—Tertz, *Thoughts Unaware* (1965).

How ironic it is that at the moment when a Soviet writer has been awarded a Nobel Prize for literature, other Soviet writers should go to prison for exercising their profession in the light of their own conscience.

When the people of Veshenskaia village in the Don Cossack country learnt about Sholokhov's award, they began dancing around the writer's house. The Soviet press was delighted and featured the event for weeks. Gone were the abusive words about the Swedish Academy, considered at the time of the Pasternak affair to be "an instrument of imperialist intrigues." Sholokhov, who had been so sarcastic about it, clearly had no intention of renouncing the award, and of course nobody made the effort to compel him to do so. Nor was Jean-Paul Sartre heard to suggest that Sholokhov should follow his own example. The Western "bourgeois" press applauded the decision: although Sholokhov has not written any major work for the last 25 years, all critics seemed to agree that he fully deserved the Prize for his early masterpiece—even if there was some doubt as to which edition was to serve as the authorized version of *The Quiet Don* (it had been rewritten more than once to suit the party line).

Yet there was a jarring note in the jubilation. *Le Monde* suggested that now that the author of *The Fate of a Man* has joined "the community of great writers," he was under an obligation to intervene with the Soviet authorities on behalf of Siniavski: were he to do so, he would show not only esthetically, but also morally, that he deserved the international honor.

In the West, Mr. David Carver, the general secretary of the international association of writers, PEN, sent on November 11, 1965, a telegram of protest to Alexei Surkov, of the Soviet Writers' Union. Tertz' British publishers, Collins, declared:

A writer has the right to try to make his work known to the reading public. It is not a crime under Soviet law to send manuscripts abroad. The dilemma of a writer such as Tertz is one created by Soviet literary policy, which faces him with the choice of either being silent or compromising his artistic integrity. The only way out for a writer of Tertz' uncompromising honesty was to publish his manu-

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scripts abroad. For this he should be admired and not condemned.

It should be noted that Pasternak was not arrested for sending the manuscript of Dr. Zhivago *to Italy, and that Valery Tarsis suffered no penal consequences for sending the manuscript of* Ward 7 *abroad.*[1]

Many prominent literary personalities have now joined in the protest, including the French Nobel Prize-winner François Mauriac, Alberto Moravia, Arthur Miller, and others.

The case is not only full of dramatic irony, but it may well be one of the most extraordinary cases in recent literary history. It is more than a sensational instance of literary clandestinity. If Siniavski is indeed Tertz, this is a case of a man who not only lived two parallel literary existences, but who achieved distinction in one of them as a literary scholar and critic and in the other as a writer of fiction, and who in each case employed a very different "individual style."

Abram Tertz is well known and appreciated in the West; his books have been published in twenty languages. His essay "On Socialist Realism," which appeared in 1959, was a sharp dissent from the official Soviet esthetic doctrine, boldly proclaiming faith in a "phantasmagoric style" and "an art in which the grotesque will replace realistic descriptions of life." According to Tertz,

such an art would correspond best to the spirit of our time. May the fantastic imagery of Hoffmann and Dostoevski, of Goya, Chagall and Mayakovski . . . and of many other realists and non-realists teach us how to be truthful with the aid of the absurd and the fantastic.[2]

This promise was made good. In his novels and stories—*The Trial Begins, The Icicle,* and *The Makepeace Experiment* [3]—Tertz gave artistic expression to his theoretical propositions and was widely acclaimed for style, humor, and inventiveness. Apart from Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Tertz is undoubtedly the most outstanding talent to emerge in Russia since the pre-Stalinist 1920's. His imagination has been compared to that of Leskov, his satire to that of Gogol, his fantasy to that of Kafka; certainly his preoccupation with the question "how to restore love to the human heart" reminds one of Dostoevski. A writer in the *New York Times* observed that "in a more rational and freer world, any Russian writer might well be proud of having written the fiction, essays, and aphorisms of 'Abram Tertz'. . . ."

Has he already reached his maturity? Perhaps not. Still, both the accomplishment and the originality are there. More than that, he appears to be firmly rooted in the realities of his own country, drawing on his specific experience of Soviet life for his extraordinary fantasies and allegories. He has registered his disenchantment clearly enough:

To our new God we sacrificed not only our lives, our blood and our bodies. We also sacrificed our snow-white soul after staining it with all the filth of the world. . . . So that prisons should vanish forever, we built new prisons. So that all frontiers should fall, we surrounded ourselves with a Chinese Wall. So that work should become rest and a pleasure, we introduced forced labor. So that not one drop of blood be shed anymore, we killed and killed and killed.

In the name of the Purpose, we turned to the means that our enemies used: we glorified Imperial Russia, we wrote lies in Pravda, *we set a new Tsar on the now empty throne, we introduced officers, epaulettes and tortures. . . .*

Thus he differs from some other of the younger writers who have emerged since Stalin's death (*e.g.* Tendriakov, Kazakov). They have been able to get their works published and even officially accepted; perhaps the main difference is between their more straightforward realism and his almost surrealist style which owes more to Gogol and Dostoevski than to Tolstoy and Chekhov.

To accuse him of being "anti-Soviet" is irrelevant and superficial. Was Dostoevski anti-Russian? or Faulkner anti-American? His attitude to the environment in which he has grown up and been formed, as surely as Mirgorod and Petersburg formed Gogol, or Oxford, Mississippi, formed Faulkner, is certainly satirical. But his contemplation of human folly in its specifically Soviet setting has not led him to a Swiftian contempt for mankind.

The work of "Tertz" would be outstanding enough in itself as literary achievement, but his double, Andrei Siniavski, a literary historian and critic, has also achieved remarkable success despite the fact that in this role his artistic exuberance had of necessity to be subdued and cautious. His writings under his own byline were almost unknown in the West.

[1] On this novel, see "In Russia's Insane Asylums," by Laszlo Tikos, *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1965—*Ed.*

[2] Abram Tertz, *On Socialist Realism,* New York, Pantheon Books, 1960, pp. 94-95.

[3] "The Trial Begins" was first published in *Encounter,* January 1960, and "The Icicle" in February 1962. [*The Makepeace Experiment* was published by Pantheon Books in 1965—Ed.] In his essay on Socialist Realism, incidentially, Tertz praised Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows The Don* but remarked that as a model for "Socialist Realist" writing it had, curiously enough, found no imitators. In a recent interview, Sholokhov remarked (*Daily Telegraph,* December 1st): "I am for writers who write honestly, looking into the eyes of the authorities, and who write for publishers here and not abroad. . . ."

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Andrei Siniavski and Yuli Daniel both belong to the Russian generation which went through the war and came back to their university studies in those early postwar years when the intellectual life of the country was dominated by an atmosphere of total terror. The creative forces among the intelligentsia could do nothing but lie low. They seemed cowed and submissive to the eyes of the outside observer, but often the struggle to maintain intellectual and moral integrity in such conditions was invisible and heroic. In the past their only mode of expression was silence; their symbol was Boris Pasternak. In more recent years people like Siniavski have played an important public role in articulating humanist values, in defending them against the "dogmatists." The effort was being made, on the one hand, to restore the broken continuity with the past of Russian literature, and, on the other, to elaborate the rationale for "new writing" free from the socialist-realist dogmas of *partiinost* and *narodnost*. Many of these writers and critics have been associated with the Gorky Institute of World Literature; their ideas have increasingly found open expression in the pages of a journal like *Novyi mir*, the main forum of "the liberals." It was here that Siniavski published most of his articles and book reviews and Daniel has published his translations of non-Russian poets.

Daniel is a comparatively inconspicuous figure whose published work consists of skillful rendering of verse from Slav, Yiddish, and Caucasian languages. His Arzhak story, "This is Moscow Speaking," is a fantasy of what would happen if a dictatorial government suddenly announced a "Day of Permitted Murders." His story "The Man from MINAP" is about a student of a Moscow Scientific Institute whose special ability to determine the sex of a child at conception is based on an extraordinary effort of concentration (he thinks of Karl Marx).

Siniavski, who after the war studied at Moscow University (Stalin's daughter Svetlana was his fellow student there), obtained his doctorate in the early 1950's at the age of 27. His dissertation was on Maxim Gorky's long, unfinished novel *Klim Samgin*. He seems to have combined a career of research and teaching at Moscow University with the writing of essays and reviews. He has recently become one of the most articulate and effective spokesmen for the Moscow literary intelligentsia, among whom there was deep and widespread shock at his arrest.

For many Russians his name has been linked with that of Pasternak, whose disciple he was. It was Siniavski who wrote the long, scholarly introduction to a new edition of Pasternak's poetry, finally published in Moscow after many quarrel-filled delays over what could, or could not, be included. This volume is a significant step forward—even though it does not include such a key poem as "Hamlet" from the *Zhivago* cycle—after the meager selection which appeared in 1961. Siniavski made his mark by reviewing this older anthology for *Novyi mir* (March 1962). For him the selection was biased and unrepresentative; individual poems had been censored; "a number of memorable verses are missing, others have been changed, in some poems the ending is missing." In the recent edition— in large measure due to Siniavski's efforts—much of this damage has been repaired. For example, the first stanzas of Pasternak's famous poem about Alexander Blok—discreetly replaced by asterisks in the 1961 edition!—have now been made available to Russian readers. The first of these stanzas is:

Only the influential yes-men
know
Whom critics are to propagate
With praise, or criticize
And liquidate.

Who can doubt that Siniavski has landed in his present predicament because he has run afoul of "the influential yes-men"? They prevented Boris Pasternak from accepting the Nobel Prize (and they now rejoice in the award of it to a more acceptable laureate).

Siniavski's interpretation of Pasternak, as expounded first in his 1962 article and at greater length in his introduction to the 1965 edition, is probably the most sophisticated to have appeared so far in any language. Both essays illuminate Pasternak's difficult poetry for the reader with scholarship and critical sensitivity. His central problem is how Pasternak sought profound, though unobtrusive, poetic sermons in humble everyday activity, the humdrum and the commonplace, in nature and in all other things taken for granted by man in the heat of his "historical" pursuits. In this respect Siniavski found that Pasternak was in many ways a kindred spirit to the late Robert Frost (about whom he wrote a perceptive essay in *Novyi mir* for January 1964).

Siniavski has outraged Russia's literary establishment not only by his subtle advocacy of Pasternakian values, but also by several frontal attacks on the "dogmatists." The most notable appeared in the December issue of *Novyi mir* in 1964. It is a review of a scurrilous novel, *The Blight*, by Ivan Shevtsov, lampooning Soviet artists in the spirit of Khrushchev's notorious attack on them during his visit to the Manège art exhibition in 1962. The novel appeared somewhat belatedly (in time for Khrushchev's fall) in an edition of a hundred thousand. Like Kochetov's novel, *The Brothers Yershov*, it was intended to whip up popular feeling against Soviet artists who had deviated from "socialist realism," and to represent them as degenerates and criminals; they were bent on subverting the established order by such well coordinated, conspiratorial methods that the defenders of the faith are almost powerless. At first sight Siniavski's review of this particularly grotesque neo-Stalinist fantasy

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might appear to be just another blow in the running fight that has now been going on for several years between the "liberals" and "conservatives" (or whatever one chooses to call them) in the Soviet press. This polemic has been legitimized by the "cultural" powers-that-be. Apart from brief interludes (at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, when Khrushchev temporarily upset the balance between the two sides), the polemic has gone on as rhythmically as a ping-pong match. In his review Siniavski begs off polemic in a way which characterizes his cultivated mind. "Perhaps, rather than attack Ivan Shevtsov, it would be better to pity him, to sympathize with him. . . ." One can imagine how this appeal for calm must have infuriated the dogmatists. Siniavski's attempt to raise the level of Soviet literary criticism to that of civilized discourse as it is universally understood is no doubt part of his "estrangement."

There were several earlier skirmishes in print with the dogmatists. He was attacked by them for his article on the prerevolutionary poetic school of *Acmeism* (which he

Tertz: Siniavski

One of the more frequent accusations against Siniavski before and during his trial was that he was "doublefaced"—i.e., that he attacked the "Soviet way of life" while writing under a pseudonym, and defended it against similar attacks when writing under his own name.

The fact, however, is that there is a striking similarity in tone and content between the various works of "Abram Tertz" on the one hand, and the literary scholar Andrei Siniavski on the other. In both roles he emerges as the social critic par excellence, *and while he is understandably more circumspect in his "legal" than in his "illegal" works, the objects of his colorful and satirical pen are basically the same. Here, for instance, is the concluding section of a critical essay on a scurrilous novel about "enemies" of "socialist realism" in Moscow artistic circles, written by I. Shevtsov, and entitled* The Plant Louse:

. . . I shall . . . permit myself to use a quotation, one that in my opinion gives a good explanation of the misfortune that befell Ivan Shevtsov. This quotation is borrowed from a certain ancient book in which various wonders of nature and human nature are discussed. Among other interesting subjects, one finds here a scientific explanation of the hail that falls to earth in the form of "hard and icy stones." I will beg you in advance to forgive the length of the excerpt: The style of the old book, immeasurably beautiful, at the same time is somewhat in harmony with the human passions that rage in Shevtsov's novel, and the text cited may serve as a postscript to his work, which descended on us all of a sudden, like hail.

"These stones, being sometimes angular and sometimes round insofar as they are more or less smoothed by the air and the winds, rush upon the cities and fields with a horrible shriek of raging winds . . . Creatures struck by this astonishing blow which they have been unable to escape howl and roar, overcome by dejection and fear. People in the fields and ricks who are overtaken by the hail cover their faces and expose to it their tough and not-so-sensitive backs, but they are frequently dashed down by its fury and hug the ground to escape the pounding stones, like soldiers in battle dodging the deadly lead. . . .

"Such is the Detractor. An envious and consuming fire glares from his eyes, and from his fierce jaws hailstones of abuse and bad language spew onto enemies and friends. These strike and hit cruelly, torment and sting, and it is impossible to hide from them anywhere. But to our good fortune, through this the Detractor destroys his own success; and on being scorned he disappears, like the hail melting on the hot earth.

"It brings fear, strikes and frequently kills;
"But hardly does it appear than it quickly disappears." *

* From *The Light Visible in Faces: or, the grandeur and diversity in the creative intentions which are revealed in nature and customs, explained by physical and moral images and adorned by a word worthy of these subjects for the benefit of all estates of men, and particularly of young orators, poets, painters and other artists,"* St. Petersburg, 1789.

—Exerpt from A. Siniavski, "Tract or Libel?," *Novyi mir*, Moscow, No. 12, Dec. 1964; translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, New York, March 31, 1965.

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praised in the *Concise Literary Encyclopedia*) and for his contribution to the third volume of the history of *Soviet Russian Literature: 1941-1957* (in which he was critical of false war heroics). According to the diehard literary journals, the former provided "evidence of serious shortcomings" (*Literatura i zhizn,* Moscow, July 19, 1962), and the latter was particularly "pernicious":

Here an attempt is made to interpret the character of the Great Patriotic War hero portrayed in the works of Soviet writers. According to Siniavski, it appears that there was really nothing heroic about him; he was just an ordinary small man. . . (Oktiabr, *No. 1, 1961*)

Siniavski, who is himself a war veteran, replied by attacking the dogmatists for "embellishing" reality. He also took up the defense of the young poets, praising Voznesenski, Yevtushenko, and Akhmadulina. In an article, "For Poetic Activity" (written in collaboration with another liberal critic, A. Menshutin), he voiced an individualistic poetic credo which is anathema to the party overseers of literature:

In the poetry of today one feels a need for a deeper involvement in life. . . . to relate poetry to one's own experience . . . to find out one's own standpoint on reality. . . . (Novyi mir, *No. 1, 1961*)

This, needless to say, was qualified by the literary functionaries as a distortion which overemphasizes "the subjective at the expense of the objective" and "the literary form at the expense of vital content" (V. Bushin, "Violets Smell Differently," *Literatura i zhizn,* Feb. 17, 1961).

In 1964 Siniavski published (with Menshutin) a major work on *Poetry of the Early Revolutionary Days: 1917-1920,* which appeared under the sponsorship of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This volume of almost 450 pages has been listed by *The Times Literary Supplement* (September 30, 1965) as one of "the more important books published in languages other than English since the end of 1959."

Siniavski's literary position is reflected in this book as clearly as in his introduction to the Pasternak poems. He stresses that "new poetry" emerges as a result not only of new content but also of new artistic form, or revitalized use of the traditional forms. He was most explicit in the March 1965 issue of *Novyi mir,* where he puts his hope in the emergence of a literary "movement breaking down dogmas and cliches, not tolerating compromises, striving to live in a new way, in its own way. . . ."

His many-sided interests include science-fiction, on which he has written two critical essays, and painting. Siniavski (together with I. Golomshtok) has published a popular booklet on Pablo Picasso (printed in 1960 in an edition of 100,000 copies), presenting him for the first time to the Soviet public, explaining his works and his role in the development of modern painting and modern art in general. He has thus broken the "socialist-realist" taboos in several fields of artistic endeavor and carried on the many-faceted struggle for intellectual and artistic emancipation and for access to modern culture.

His arrest is a blow to the whole milieu of the Soviet liberal intelligentsia and more particularly to that of the magazine *Novyi mir,* whose editor, Alexander Tvardovski, had praised him in its fortieth anniversary edition (January 1965).

Novyi mir has been under fire for a long time. A particularly vicious attack on it came in early August, when the critic Yuri Lukin published an article in *Pravda* called "Only a Semblance of the Truth," in which he was especially incensed about the novelette by Vasili Semin which appeared in the June issue of *Novyi mir.* Lukin argued that by portraying only "small truths," Semin had arrived at "the big untruth."

Given his connection with *Novyi mir,* Siniavski's arrest a month later must have looked ominous to the nonconformist writers. Yet the editors of the magazine have reacted in such a way as to show that they have by no means given up the struggle. As one of them once said (in a conversation with the Yugoslav, Mihajlo Mihajlov): "If we are attacked, we won't limit ourselves to a defensive posture. . . ."

And indeed, the new issue of *Novyi mir* which went to press three weeks late (after Siniavski's arrest) took up the challenge by reasserting its policy of publishing works which provide "a sober understanding of life as it is," rather than a picture of "illusory well-being." The editorial, which seems to have been hastily added at the end of the magazine, referred to its programmatic anniversary article and declared that in the controversy about it "the old problem of truth in the arts has occupied the center of attention." It condemned the concept of dividing truth into "great truths" and "small truths":

There cannot be any truth, provided it is really truth, which would be unnecessary, dangerous, or insignificant to our literature, just as there is no lie that could be in any way useful to it. . . . [To those who say] "Not all kinds of truth are needed," we reply: "No, our art needs the whole truth."

Thus the battle continues. In this battle the fate of Siniavski is not just "the fate of a man," but it clearly has a bearing on the course of Russian literature as a whole. This situation is not a new one in Russian history. When Pushkin had written his poem "André Chénier in Prison," the censors excised several stanzas; it circulated nevertheless in its original form in manuscript. The story of the illegal manuscripts of Chaadaiev

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and Belinski and their troubles with the censors are too well known to need recounting. The attitude of Russian officialdom to writers appears, unfortunately, to have changed little since the days when the Tsarist police chief, Benckendorff, made the inglorious and unforgettable comment on Pushkin's death: "Why do you make such a fuss about an individual who did not even hold any important post?" Surely many Soviet officials do nothing but echo his complacent words: "Le passé de la Russie était magnifique, son présent est magnifique, et son futur sera encore plus magnifique."

Tertz satirized the continuity of the police mentality down the ages in his portrait of a Soviet police official, the worthy Colonel Tarasov, in "The Icicle":

The dialectic was not Colonel Tarasov's strong point, but he had a great and insatiable soul. Perhaps the soul of Tamerlane, Peter the Great, or Friedrich Nietzsche—I turned over the various possibilities in my mind. . . .

But on closer inspection, things turned out to be rather different. When I looked a little more carefully into the recesses of his large, heavyweight body, I saw drawn up behind him policemen of various ranks, guards, and overseers.

They went back to the most ancient civilizations and they emerged from the darkness in such strict order that at first I thought they all had the same face, but then I saw what it was: each was of a higher rank than his predecessor, as though they had been born especially for the purpose of rising by one degree during their lives. The last had been a lieutenant-colonel in the reign of Alexander the Second. This was the closest rank to Colonel Tarasov, who thus stood at the apex of the whole evolution.

We can only hope that Tertz' "Colonel Tarasov" will be mindful of the fact that his Tsarist predecessors allowed Russian writers to publish abroad with impunity. If and when the successors of Benckendorff, Arakcheev, and Zhdanov commence proceedings against Andrei Siniavski and his friend, this would not be the first time that the Soviet authorities have put themselves in the dock before the outside world. When "the trial begins," it is also their own.

Leopold Labedz and Max Hayward

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"Traitors in the Dock"

When it comes to unbridled cynicism, the Soviet press has probably no equal. Ten days after a Moscow court sent Siniavski and Daniel to labor camps for seven and five-year terms respectively, *Pravda* proclaimed in an editorial:

In our country, art and literature live in a free and pure atmosphere of the universal interest of the whole people.

Completely free in their creative activities, in the choice of subject and form of their works, the men of Soviet art and letters tell the truth about our life, our lofty ideals and the feelings and aspirations of the builders of communism.

The Soviet leaders, of course, were on the spot. Curiously enough, it seems as if they had not been prepared for the universal storm of protest and indignation which the farcical trial and barbaric sentencing of the two writers aroused even among left-wing, pro-Communist, and bona-fide Communist circles throughout the entire world. "We are back to the times of Hungary," declared the Italian pro-Communist writer Vasco Pratolini (*Paese Sera,* Rome, February 18); "it is dreadful that at this time the works of Siniavski and Daniel can produce fear, and that a book, through its author, can be imprisoned rather than contested, criticized, rejected or fought." Even Louis Aragon, whose dedication to the Communist cause has survived the purges of the 1930's, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign of the late 1940's, and the suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, came out with a stinging condemnation of his comrades in Moscow for having resurrected the concept of "criminality of opinion." And so the trial has to be "explained," the sentences justified, and the "legality" of the proceedings upheld.

"Apparently," said an English-language Moscow broadcast of February 17, there are people in the world "who sincerely want to understand the essence of the matter. Fully aware of the insignificance of Siniavski and Daniel, they ask: Was it worthwhile for the Soviet Union to provoke anti-Communist hysteria because of these two double-dealers? The reply to these people is, Yes. It was worthwhile because the law in a state is the law, and it must be observed." The curious nature of this law was elaborated in a statement dutifully supplied by the Secretariat of the Board of Soviet Writers:

[Siniavski and Daniel] were tried not for a particular creative manner—as some bourgeois newspapers seek to prove—but for deliberately

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slandering the Soviet state, the multinational Soviet people, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government . . . Every state safeguards itself from slanderers and those who abuse its order. The Soviet socialist state is no exception in this respect. (Literaturnaia gazeta, *February 19.*)

Indeed, it appears that the "foul fabrications by Tertz and Arzhak" slandered not only the Soviet Union, but "the very nature of man" (Dmitri Morozov, Moscow Radio in Serbo-Croatian, February 16).

Along with the law under which the two writers were tried, the legal procedure as such has been staunchly defended by Soviet spokesmen. "The trial," said the aforementioned statement by the Writers' Union, "as not only writers but also other representatives of the Soviet public can testify, was held with strict and scrupulous observance of all standards of Soviet legislation."

How any great reliance can be placed on the reports of those who attended the trial, from which even the non-Soviet Communist press was excluded, is something which the Secretariat of the Writers' Union did not bother to explain. In fact, as of the day this article goes to press, not a single Soviet intellectual of stature has yet approved the action against the two writers —although, if one is to judge by the events of 1962-63, the pressure exerted upon them must have been very strong indeed.[1]

The truth about the trial is quite the reverse of Soviet claims. In one swoop, all the "achievements" of "socialist legality" over the past decade seem to have been forgotten. Due process? Rights of the accused? Right to counsel? Presumption of innocence? All these hallowed principles, incorporated in the legal reforms of 1957-1960, have now been jettisoned, with the Soviet leaders demonstrating again that, in the words of an eminent authority on Soviet law, "there is still nothing to prevent them from flagrantly flouting their own laws."[2]

The argument that "after all" things were much worse under Stalin, when writers (among others . . .) could be seized in the middle of the night and disappear in the cellars of Lubianka prison or the vast stretches of Siberia without as much as a semblance of judicial procedure, is true but quite beside the point. Arbitrary terror was the hallmark of the 1930's. With the monstrous exception of the arrest and execution of the most eminent representatives of Yiddish arts and letters (1948-52), nonconformist writers were not treated even under Stalin with the same brutality and vindictiveness as were Daniel and Siniavski. The parallel was perhaps most aptly drawn by a Communist weekly—*Ny Dag* (Stockholm, January 21):

The late Soviet author Mikhail Zoshchenko, during the time of Stalin and Zhranov, wrote a seemingly harmless, humorous story about the adventures of a monkey . . . Zhdanov declared before a large meeting in Leningrad that the story was proof of its author's "flaming hatred against the Soviet system" . . . Zoshchenko was excommunicated from the Writers' Union and for some time was unable to publish anything, but there were no legal consequences for him. Twenty years have passed since then. And thirteen years have passed since Stalin's death.

The issue, then, is not whether things are generally better now than twenty years ago (what schoolboy doesn't know *that?*), but how to assess the treatment of Siniavski and Daniel within the context of political (*and* legal) developments in the Soviet Union over the past decade or so. This assessment must, of course, take into account the very real gains made by the Soviet political and judicial system since Stalin's death —and especially since the inception of the "destalinization" drive in 1956. These gains—and the general political climate resulting from them—have made it necessary for the Soviet authorities to provide *some* sort of trial for the two writers, and to cloak it with at least the minimum trappings of orderly procedure. They have also created the bizarre spectacle of thoroughly disaffected writers, officially declared "insane," speaking out against the leaders of Russia and against the system under which they live (or did live—as in the case of Valery Tarsis).[3] The new political climate in Russia also enabled both Siniavski and Daniel not only to resist the pressure upon them to confess (on which more below), but also to behave in court (as far as we can judge) with extraordinary courage and dignity.

Yet it cannot be overemphasized that the liberalization of the Soviet legal system took place seven or eight years ago. Since then, the pressure for more legal reforms on the one hand and greater intellectual freedom on the other has steadily mounted. The "liberals" suffered a setback in early 1963, only to find themselves slowly recouping their losses two years later. The demands for stricter observance of the rule of law had, by 1964, extended to the highest judicial circles of the country (see p. 76). Measured against *these* trends, the trial of Siniavski and Daniel represents not only a violation of what has come to be known as "socialist legality," but, in certain salient respects, a return to some of the most detestable features of the Stalin era.

[1] See Priscilla Johnson, "The Regime and the Intellectuals: A Window on Party Politics," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1963.

[2] Leonard Schapiro, "Prospects for the Rule of Law," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1965, p. 3.

[3] See the report on Tarsis' press conference in London in, among others, the (London) *Daily Telegraph,* Feb. 11, 1966.

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For, in clear contradiction to the judicial principles proclaimed in 1958, there is every indication that the "guilt" of the two writers was established from the very first day of their arrest in September 1965; that the preliminary investigation was merely to confirm their guilt; and that the purpose of the trial itself was simply to invest it with a cloak of "legality." Prior to the trial, the defendants were subjected to a public campaign of slander and calumny for which there is no parallel since Stalin's death in 1953. The trial was ostensibly "open," but —as noted before—the audience in the courtroom was carefully selected, and the building (according to all press accounts) was surrounded by tough Komsomol members who did their best to discourage manifestations of sympathy for the accused and to prevent any contact between newspapermen and the wives of Siniavski and Daniel. The reports of the trial were so severely doctored and so unbelievably tendentious that it is difficult to get a clear picture of the actual proceedings. Finally, the defense attorneys were so inconspicuous that it is perfectly safe to conclude that their role had been predetermined in advance, and that their influence was nil. Which is precisely the way it was under Stalin.

Let us first glance at the campaign that preceded the trial. The first salvo was fired by Radio Moscow on January 3. Apparently the party still felt diffident about disclosing the news of the arrest to its own subjects. But in England the voices of protest were mounting—Edward Crankshaw wrote a blistering piece in the *London Observer* (Dec. 26, 1965)—so *something* had to be done. The English-language radio broadcast, which was beamed at the United Kingdom, consisted of a commentary by one Boris Belitski. Mr. Belitski, of course, had "no intention of anticipating what judgment would be pronounced," but he felt "certain that the two men will have to answer for publishing vile fabrications and conducting propaganda abroad against their own country." No literary critic himself, he had it on good authority that "neither [Siniavski nor Daniel] is regarded as a writer in this country and neither has much of a literary reputation." After delivering this barefaced lie, he went on to say that "as for the lampoons they have been producing for export, very eminent and erudite critics and philologists [who?] are agreed that these are libelous, malicious, and very often almost illiterate." Not himself, presumably, a member of the police (or are we being unfair?), Mr. Belitski nevertheless seemed to have a thorough knowledge of how Siniavski and Daniel "shipped their literary output abroad." As for their motives, the commentator was similarly well informed: "The two men have clearly been tempted by the possibility of making easy money and building up a reputation of sorts." Mr. Belitski did not explain, of course, how you go about achieving a reputation through the use of a pseudonym and under conditions of complete and doubtless nerve-shattering secrecy. Still not wishing to prejudge the outcome of the investigation, he nevertheless predicted, at the end, that "their punishment will undoubtedly have the backing of the Soviet public."

Thus the die has been cast. Since neither the opinion of the anonymous "critics and philologists" nor Mr. Belitski's primitive adumbrations seemed to cut much ice with Western public opinion (unaccustomed as it is to expressions of unanimous approval), and since in Russia, too, the news had in the meantime leaked out—with somewhat unsettling consequences at that[4]—the authorities apparently decided that there was no longer any point in being even selectively reticent about the matter. And so, on January 13, *Izvestia* came out with an article that would have made Zhdanov beam with delight. The title: "Turncoats." The author: Dmitri Yeremin. (A note on the author's political physiognomy: in 1957, one of the principal critics of Dudintsev's *Not By Bread Alone;* in 1963, publicly defended Kochetov and Sofronov against charges of antisemitism; and in 1964 he was one of those who bitterly opposed the award of a Lenin Prize to Solzhenitsyn for the latter's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.*) The style? A few choice phrases will suffice: "A. Siniavski . . . had wormed his way into the Union of Writers . . ."; ". . . hatred of our system, vile mockery of everything that is most dear to the fatherland and the people"; "disgust," "vulgarities," "morbid sensuality," "moral perverts," "renegades," "rabid and unbridled enemies of communism." And so on. As for Siniavski's and Daniel's guilt, Mr. Yeremin was anything but equivocal:

They continued their downward course. In the end they descended to crimes against Soviet authority. In so doing, they placed themselves outside our literature and outside the community of Soviet people. From petty nastiness to grand treason—this was the course they ran.[5]

With the two writers guilty of nothing less than "grand treason" (punishable, according to Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, by sentences ranging from "deprivation of freedom for a term of

[4] On December 11, several hundred students of the Gorki Institute of World Literature, in Moscow, where Siniavski had been teaching, staged a demonstration in behalf of the two arrested writers. They were forcibly dispersed by the security police, and a few of the organizers, including Yesenin-Volpin (who, like Tarsis, had served a sentence in a Soviet prison-asylum), were detained and subsequently released.

[5] An abridged translation of this article, with a brief introduction by Victor Zorza, appeared in the January 29 issue of *The Guardian* (London).

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ten to 15 years" to "death with confiscation of property"), is it any wonder that "ordinary Soviet men and women" were bemused, angered, aroused? Five days later, *Izvestia* published three of the "numerous responses" to Yeremin's *oeuvre:* One from Suleiman Rustam, People's (read: Court) Poet of Azerbaijan. Mr. Rustam indulged his professional license:

Our path is luminous and sunny. In marching upon this path, we can uproot the weeds which have sprouted in the midst of our garden—the garden of our great people's friendship. Pens which are capable of presenting black as white and white as black must be broken. The place of both traitors is in the dock.

(Mr. Rustam's luminous path through Soviet literature has earned him a Stalin Prize [1950], an Order of Lenin, and several other awards. And no wonder, what with his capacity to produce lines such as "To give Man his warmth/ The sun of Stalin has arisen over the world"; and "Glory be to Thee, Russian Man!—again and again/ . . . Glory be to Thee, our dear friend, the best of us all!," etc.[6] Or again—to cite the first in his *Selected Poems,* entitled "Stalin": "However many lines about you I were to compose/My voice shall not die in my throat./ Never will my ardor be extinguished/As long as I shall march upon your luminous path!" I cite these lines merely to forestall any charges of being unnecessarily beastly to Mr. Rustam by referring to him as a "Court Poet.")

The second letter was signed by an orchestra conductor, a writer, and a theatrical director, all from the town of Voronezh. These three gentlemen, without reading any of Tertz's or Arzhak's works, were similarly convinced that the writers were "renegades and traitors" de-

[6] Suleiman Rustam, *Selected Poems,* Moscow, 1948, pp. 176-77.

THE USES OF LIES

On January 20 The Guardian (*London*) *published a translated and slightly abridged version of D. Yeremin's* Izvestia *article attacking Siniavski and Daniel* (*see p. of this issue*), *with a short introduction by Victor Zorza. The following is a letter of reaction from Max Hayward, published in* The Guardian *January 25.*

The "misuse of quotations, torn out of the context of their books," to which Mr. Zorza refers in his introduction to the *Izvestia* article on Siniavski-Tertz and Daniel-Arzhak, is unbelievably mendacious and reminiscent indeed of the worst Stalinist polemical methods. To take just one example, *Izvestia* says: ". . . They are ready to curse and run down everything dear to Soviet men, both past and present. Can you imagine what they wrote about Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, the outstanding Russian humanist who arouses men's better feelings by his mastery? Only the utmost shamelessness can move the pen which writes lines like, 'Just to take that Chekhov by his tubercular beard and push him nose-first into his own consumptive spittle.' And the Russian classics—the pride of world literature—what is said of them? 'The classics—they are the ones I hate most of all!' "

These "incriminating" quotations are taken from the *Graphomaniacs* (published by Collins and Harvill Press, 1963). They are taken from an "internal monologue" of a graphomaniac who despairs that he would ever get into print and expresses his annoyance with the "classics" which are always held up to him as models. By attributing the thoughts of his personages to the author one can easily make Shakespeare out to be a murderer, Dante an incendiary, and T. S. Eliot a nihilist.

As a matter of fact, Tertz expressed in his essay on "Socialist Realism" his highest admiration for Chekhov, a writer who, in his words, "feared pretentiousness like the plague."

The purpose of *Izvestia*'s malevolent exercise is to deprive Sinivavski and Daniel of the sympathy of Soviet intellectuals. Many of them would hardly disapprove of the publication abroad of books that could not get through the censorship in Russia, but they might well be disturbed by the sentiments attributed to the two writers by *Izvestia* through the misuse of quotations.

People in the Soviet Union cannot, alas, compare them with the actual text of the writings of Tertz and Arzhak.

Max Hayward

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serving "severe punishment." Finally there was a letter from Citizeness Z. Gulbis, an agronomist from Latvia, which reached the heights of traditional Soviet bathos:

What could be dearer than Motherland? It is as necessary to man as the sun, as the air, as a clear spring which, no sooner than you've touched it with your lips, fills your chest with life-giving strength.

Mme. Gulbis was especially exercised about a passage from one of Daniel's works about women, cited by Yeremin:

With what cynicism does Daniel-Arzhak write about our women. After all, he owes his life to a woman, his mother. I do not know whether or not she is alive, but if she is, with what eyes will her son now gaze upon her, he who spat upon and denigrated all Soviet women—would it not include her, too? To betray one's mother, to betray one's motherland—it's all one and the same thing.

With the official organ of the Soviet Government having spoken, and with *vox populi* out of the way, it remained for the literary Establishment to pronounce its judgment on the two imprisoned writers. This came in a long article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* of January 22, entitled "The Heirs of Smerdiakov" (a reference, of course, to the unsavory character in Dostoevski's *Brothers Karamazov*), written by one Z. Kedrina. It is characteristic of the peculiar (in)sensitivity of official Soviet spokesmen to Western conceptions of judicial niceties that in an English-language summary of her article, broadcast over Radio Moscow on the same day, the announcer began with words that appear only later in the text. " 'Naturally, I do not take it upon myself to give a legal definition of the guilt of Arzhak-Daniel or Tertz-Siniavski. This is a matter for the legal authorities,' critic Zoia Kedrina writes in *Literary Gazette* today. 'I want to take up another aspect of the matter.' "

This aspect is, of course, the literary value of the works of the two writers. In other words, "Smerdiakov's Heirs" is supposed to be an exercise in literary criticism, rather than yet another political feuilleton. Yet as an essay in literary criticism "Smerdiakov's Heirs" merely serves to demonstrate the squalid depths to which this genre can sink in the hands of a Stalinist hack. It is not simply a matter of the usual string of revolting invectives or expressions of pained horror, but the attempt, all under the guise of *bona fide* literary scholarship, to distort, discredit, and—in the end—utterly demolish literary works in the eyes of those who, of course, will be unable to read them themselves.

It would be tedious to cite all the invective in which this ostensible essay in literary criticism abounds, so let me point out the two principal accusations: First, that Siniavski's borrowing of literary techniques and devices from other authors proves that he is "an unscrupulous thief"(!), and—equally outrageous—that "Tertz cannot be separated from the vileness in which his literary characters are enveloped."

This absurd assertion provides Mme. Kedrina with an excuse to equate the author with his creations, to cite—out of context and without so much as indicating the sources—the views and opinions of characters in Tertz's stories (frequently caricatures satirized by the author) and ascribe these views and opinions to Siniavski. One example of this repellent device is discussed by Mr. Hayward in his letter to *The Guardian* (see box on page 73). Other examples could be cited to show that Tertz-Siniavski does *not* hate the ideal of communism, but only its perversion into a "Purpose," a "God," to which he and millions of others have "sacrificed . . . our lives, our blood, and our bodies" (*On Socialist Realism,* p. 37); that, far from besmirching the "sacred name of Lenin," he spoke of him, in fact, with a respect almost bordering on tenderness (". . . too much like an ordinary man . . . small, bald, dressed in civilian clothes"—*ibid,* p. 92). It would be pointless to go on. But one example must be singled out: Kedrina's accusation that Siniavski's writings emit "a steady aroma of antisemitism"—surely one of the most preposterous allegations made against the author of *The Trial Begins* and *On Socialist Realism.*

That a Jewish *motif* pervades the works of Siniavski-Tertz and, to a lesser degree, of Daniel-Arzhak is unquestionable—and perhaps deserving of special attention. The very name chosen by Siniavski—Abram Tertz—is suggestive of the author's preoccupation with this subject. Yet perhaps there is little to wonder at: the almost explicit antisemitic policies of Stalin and the thinly disguised prejudices of some of his successors have combined to make the "Jewish problem" a political issue of the highest importance to those forces in Russia who wish to eradicate the baneful heritage of Stalinism from all areas of public life. Siniavski's true feelings on this subject may be gauged from his portrayal of Rabinovich in *The Trial Begins*—that prototype of the Jewish doctors arrested by Stalin in January 1953 on grounds of plotting the assassination of a number of high Communist officials—and from his reference, in *On Socialist Realism,* to one of Khrushchev's openly antisemitic outbursts. As the campaign against the two writers unfolded, Tertz was accused (this in the words of Yeremin) of trying, through the use of his pseudonym, to "create the impression that antisemitism exists in our country." It was left to the authoress of "Smerdiakov's Heirs," however, to turn this allegation on its head by maintaining that Siniavski himself was an antisemite! How?

Everywhere, and not without design, his "works" are strewn with

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remarks such as: "You can always tell a Jew by that desert expression in his eyes" . . . "Anyway, how could a Solomon Moiseievich understand the soul of a Russian?"

The first quotation comes from Tertz's *The Makepeace Experiment,* the second from his short story "At the Circus" (in *Fantastic Stories*). Soviet citizens are prevented by their government from reading "trash" (bad for socialist morale), so they will not know that both these quotations are taken from the mouths of characters, creatures of Tertz's literary imagination—the second from that of a marvelous rascal who only a few minutes earlier asks Solomon Moiseievich: "Come on, tell me, why are Russians always trying to steal something? Stealing or drinking? What's the origin of this spiritual need in the Russian?"

Suffice it to say that at the trial (at which Mme. Kedrina and another writer, Arkadi N. Vassilev, acted in the capacity of "public prosecutors" representing the Union of Soviet Writers), this charge was forgotten, and Siniavski was accused, instead, of slandering the "Soviet people" as a whole. There is no limit, apparently, to Siniavski's misanthropic instincts. . .

Thus it was perfectly clear, by the time the trial opened, that whatever the two defendants might say in their defense, whatever their attorneys might add (which turned out to be nothing), Siniavski and Daniel would be found guilty (to cite Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (The vagueness of this incredible law may be judged from the fact that the accused may be imprisoned seven years and exiled five more merely for "circulating or preparing or keeping" any literature found to contain "slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system"—*e.g.,* this particular article.) The Soviet press and radio had found the defendants guilty—and when the writers were finally in the dock, the organs of "public opinion" continued *their* job of defamation: "Laughter in court, for instance, met Siniavski's hypocritical assertions of his love for the Russian people" (Tass). "The court patiently listened to the defendant's long replies to the simple, concrete questions" (ibid). "Those present were at times indignant at the extreme cynicism of the accused and at other times openly laughed at their, to put it mildly, naive replies" (*Izvestia*). But the choicest morsels came from Radio Moscow (in Russian, Feb. 10):

Daniel, tall, thin, with black, insolent eyes . . . behaves in a casual manner at the beginning of the interrogation, impudently denying the obvious. But then, when the prosecution presents to the court a number of proofs, fright and confusion appear ever more often on the slanderer's face. Yes, he is pressed against the wall, and he begins to feel that in spite of all subterfuges he will not succeed in evading responsibility. From time to time he glances with a confused expression at the courtroom—at the public—as if seeking support. . . Under the pressure of the evidence, he is forced to admit all the facts of his criminal activity. Hatred toward our system, toward our people, sounds in his answer. It is in vain he tries to mask it.

In an article published on the eve of the trial, Professor Harold Berman, an eminent authority on Soviet law, declared that "the critical issues in the charges against Siniavski and Daniel, from the standpoint of Soviet law, are whether they themselves actually believed that their writings were anti-Soviet and whether they actually wanted to weaken Soviet authority."[7] Nothing in the published record, distorted as it is, would indicate that these were the intentions of the two writers; on the contrary, they steadfastly denied, again and again, that their intention was political rather than artistic. But their attempts to assert the principle of artistic freedom were doomed—as illustrated, for instance, by the following exchange between Prosecutor Oleg Temushkin, Judge Smirnov, and Yuli Daniel:

Temushkin: *Tell us, Defendant Daniel, what ideas were you trying to express in "Moscow Speaking"?*
Daniel: *I was interested in analyzing the psychology of people placed in an unusual situation. There were no political motives. It was pure psychology. You see, I wanted to draw a fantastic situation, to put the characters into unusual conditions. It is, properly speaking, fantasy.*
Temushkin: *Why did you not then choose another locale for the action—ancient Babylon, for example? Why portray vile fantasies among your own people?*
Daniel: *This is an artistic method.*
Judge Smirnov: *Who can seriously believe that the Soviet government could declare a "Day of Permissible Murder?"*
Daniel: *If it is clear that no one could believe it, how can you suggest any slander is involved?*
Judge Smirnov: *Slander is the deliberate circulation of false inventions. This means that what you wrote is slander.*
Daniel: *No, it is artistic hyperbole.*[8]

According to the Tass correspondent, Siniavski and Daniel admitted that they had not realized the use to which their works would be put by "anti-Soviet forces," and that they now "regretted" their actions. This alleged admission is so much at variance with the general tenor of the defendants' behavior that one may safely conclude that it was fabricated by the zealous Tass reporter. Yet, if true, surely the de-

[7] *The New Leader* (New York), Feb. 14, 1966.

[8] Reproduced in *The New York Times,* Feb. 15, 1966.

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fendants' expression of regret should have been considered an extenuating circumstance! Not in the least, according to the "writers' representative," Arkadi Vasilev:

The entire course of the preliminary investigation, court examination, expert assessment, and material proof convince one that in the dock are two men with anti-Soviet sentiments who knew beforehand what they were letting themselves in for and understood the measure of responsibility for what they did. (Izvestia, *Feb. 11, 1966.*)

There is another point that merits some attention: the assumption, expressed in some quarters during and after the trial, that the defendants were not forced to plead guilty. To be sure, it is hard to believe that, after all the repudiations and disclosures of the evils of Stalinism, the police would still resort to the methods that had been used in the past to extort confessions and to force the accused into abject *mea culpas*. But why, one wonders, were the defendants kept incommunicado for five months, if not to break their will and force them into admissions of guilt? That this is not a matter of sheer speculation is illustrated by the following passage from *Pravda's* report of February 11:

When asked by the chairman [of the court] whether they plead guilty, Siniavski and Daniel reply in the negative, although during the preliminary investigation both of them had pleaded guilty. To be sure, they had denied their intention to engage in anti-Soviet propaganda, but at the same time they had admitted that their works could be used and utilized for the purpose of inflicting harm on our country. Now they deny everything. (*Emphasis added.*)

Why admit something to the police and deny everything in court? The answer, it would seem, is obvious.

The trial of Siniavski and Daniel, then, was not only a flagrant miscarriage of justice in Western terms, but a violation of the very principles of *Soviet* law. As recently as in December 1964,, A. Gorkin, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, came out with a spirited defense of the rule of law: "None of the conclusions of the preliminary investigation," he asserted, "are binding on the court." As for the egregious practice of the Soviet press of condemning and defaming a defendant even before the trial takes place, Mr. Gorkin's comments are worth citing in full:

The press plays a great positive role in eliminating shortcomings in the work of the courts. At the same time, it should be noted that the press sometimes publishes articles which, before the hearing of a case in court, pronounce various persons guilty and prejudge the question of punishment, mostly in favor of the maximum penalty. The press can and must criticize shortcomings in the work of the court and express views on the correctness or incorrectness of its decisions, but to prejudge the sentence of the court and thereby exert pressure on the court means, instead of combating mistakes in the work of the courts, contributing to the commission of these mistakes.[9]

Similarly, the specious practice of publishing "letters from readers" in support of any given "line" or policy has by now been exposed to public ridicule not only abroad but

After the Trial: Some Reactions

". . . That [Siniavski and Daniel] should be deprived of their liberty for the contents of a novel or a short story is to make a crime of opinion out of a misdemeanor of opinion, and to create a precedent more harmful to the interests of socialism than the works of Siniavski and Daniel could ever be. It is to be feared, indeed, that it can be thought that this sort of procedure is inherent in the nature of communism. . . ." —*Louis Aragon,* L'Humanité (*Paris*), *Feb. 16, 1966.*

"I maintain that ideas must be fought with ideas and not by the police and the courts."—*H. C. Hermansson, head of Swedish CP,* The Washington Post, *Feb. 17.*

"The sentences cannot have our support."—L'Unità (*Rome*), *Feb. 16.*

"Justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Unfortunately this cannot be said in the case of this trial."—*John Gollan, Gen. Secretary of British CP,* Daily Worker *(London), Feb. 16.*

"We have fought for a free world, and among the first freedoms there is cultural freedom. . . . We want you to bring to the attention of appropriate persons our concern that in a great country like the USSR free men can be sentenced to imprisonment for crime of thought."—*From letter of ANPI, Italian Partisan Association, to Soviet Veterans' Committee,* L'Unità *(Rome), Feb. 18.*

[9] *Izvestia,* Dec. 2, 1964.

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in the Soviet Union itself. On August 14, 1965, *Izvestia* attacked the young writer Vasili Aksionov for a short story in which he ostensibly "slandered" the taxi drivers of the city of Yalta. This was done through the medium of an indignant letter signed, "at the behest of the collective Yalta Taxi Pool," by a number of "Communist Labor Shock Workers." In September the monthly journal *Yunost* (Youth) came back with a slashing parody of the letter, which ended with the following editorial note:

. . . Well, to be serious, isn't it time to terminate the attempts of certain critics to disguise their lack of ideas and meaningful critical arguments behind the signatures of good and respected people, who have no relationship to the compositions?

Indeed, isn't it time? And isn't it perhaps time, too, to learn from the errors of the past? One wonders, for instance, why the Soviets are incapable of following the example of the Yugoslavs, whose treatment of nonconformist writers has hardly been a model of decency and justice (Djilas, of course, is still languishing in prison), but who at least learned from their recent disastrous experience with Mihajlo Mihajlov to tolerate a certain measure of outspoken criticism. The treatment of the writer Miodrag Bucanovic, whose caustic references to Yugoslavia's leaders have appeared in leading newspapers throughout Western Europe, is a case in point.[10]

Why the Russians are incapable of taking a leaf from the Yugoslav book; why they have decided to make fools of themselves by reverting to discredited Stalinist methods; why they have decided to flout public opinion—including that of pro-Soviet circles abroad; why, on the other hand, they permitted the rebel-poet Yesenin-Volpin to denounce the trial of Siniavski in Moscow and countenanced the departure of Valery Tarsis to London—these are all questions that cannot be easily answered. (In the case of Tarsis, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the Soviet authorities banked on his discrediting himself in the eyes of the West as nothing more than a "madman"—an assumption which, as it turned out, was patently wrong. Then, too, the authorities may have thought that it would be better to have Tarsis out of the country, where—again presumably—he would eventually be forgotten, than to incarcerate him again in a Soviet asylum.) Perhaps at least a partial answer to these questions is to be sought in the increased power of certain sections of the ruling elite, and perhaps even in a competition between them.

Whatever the validity of these speculations, it would seem, nevertheless, that the answer might be simply that emotions are stronger than reason, and ingrained habits not easily broken. The Soviet authorities are clearly baffled and frightened by the phenomenon of mounting internal dissent. How was it possible, asked the *Izvestia* correspondent Yu. Feofanov (Feb. 13), for two people, born and raised in the Soviet Union, "educated in Soviet schools, living side by side with us, suddenly to become our enemies?" The term "enemies" is a deliberate misnomer, of course, for it is perfectly clear that neither Daniel nor Siniavski has ever come out against the Soviet system as such, and that their role, as they saw it, was that of social critics—surely a role common to artists all over the world. Yet, if properly rephrased, the question is still valid—and Mr. Feofanov was clearly unable to answer it. (His only explanation: Siniavski and Daniel had "lost all semblance of civic and patriotic feelings" and were "filled with hatred toward our political system, toward the ideas of communism.") The bafflement of Mr. Feofanov and his superiors no doubt grew at the spectacle of numerous witnesses who, while testifying ostensibly for the prosecution, made it clear that they were fully acquainted with the writers' "subversive" works and were nevertheless sympathetic to them. (Thus one witness, when asked what he did when Daniel showed him his "anti-Soviet" manuscripts: "I called Daniel's attention to several stylistic errors in his works." The judge persisted: "Didn't you know that you were dealing with a slanderous libel on our people, on our government?" "But this question," reported the *Izvestia* correspondent, "remained unanswered.") The defiance of Siniavski and Daniel, the support given them by their friends, the evident increase in the ranks of those engaged in the same form of "criminal" activity—writing books and stories for publication in countries which are not ruled by the guardians of "socialist realism"—all this is obviously viewed by the ruling elite as a profound threat to the very foundations of the Soviet system. And in reacting to this threat, the authorities automatically, ineluctably adopt the methods of the past—vilification, intimidation, and "public" opprobrium.[11]

Yet, if the bloodhounds will have their revenge, the victims, in a way, have had theirs already. It may be of *some* solace to Siniavski and Daniel to know, after all, that in their works they anticipated the nature and "aroma" of the steps to be taken against them. How peculiar, says

[10] See *Abendzeitung* (Munich), Oct. 7, 1965; *Messagero* (Rome), Oct. 13, 1965; and *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt), Oct. 7, 1965.

[11] After the demonstration of students in Moscow in December, and immediately after the trial of Siniavski and Daniel, the Western press reported that other writers were arrested by the police. See *Russkaia mysl* (Paris), Dec. 24, 1965, *Le Figaro* (Paris), Jan. 4, 1966, and *The New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1966.

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Kedrina in her article in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, that Tertz's works are marked by the recurrent motif of "fear of arrest and the presentiment of its inevitability." Peculiar indeed! One senses that what bothers our literary critic is that Tertz's "presentiment" is just too uncomfortably close to the truth:

. . . Our position couldn't be worse. We have been discovered. An investigation is being made. Anchutker has stopped saying good morning to me since yesterday. I know they want to put me on trial for betraying their secrets. Tomorrow at midnight a soviet will assemble in the kitchen. That wouldn't matter, but Shestopalov is dissatisfied with me. He's issued an order. "We trusted him," he says, "so now he's striking up another friendship where he shouldn't. And his new friend's a writer—copies down all his words on paper. There may be unpleasant consequences. We must punish this chatterbox as a warning to others."

Thus Tertz in his story "Tenants."[12] Or is Mme. Kedrina perhaps uneasy about the end of this story?

Well, this is it. The whole gang of them is trooping along, stamping along the corridor. Now they'll break in. It's me they've come for. And for you too, Sergei Sergeievich. You too. You too.

And what about those venal, oily, perfidious foreigners who have enlisted the "active help" of the two writers in their relentless effort to "stoke up the furnace of international tension, who would like to turn the cold war into a hot war, and who have still not relinquished the delirious dream of raising their hand against the Soviet Union" (Yeremin)? Here is a relevant passage from Tertz's *The Makepeace Experiment:*

. . . Arms akimbo, there stood before him a typical Western tourist—such as we had never yet set eyes on in our backward town, though we had heard plenty about their ways and methods—a tourist in a leather jacket, crumpled shorts, and yellow shoes with rubber soles, a camera dangling on his stomach, his legs shamelessly exposed and his teeth bared in a hypocritical American smile.

"Allow me to introduce myself, Herr Makepeace," he godlessly mispronounced our beautiful language. "Ich bin *Harry Jackson, correspondent of the bourgeois paper* Perdit Intriguer Och Aus America. *My transatlantic masters have sent me to ask you for an interview."*

Sprawling in the best armchair like a colt in a stable, he lit a fat black cigar like a dry stick of manure and proceeded to ask one provocative question after another. How soon would the corrupt regime of capitalist bosses be established in Liubimov, he was anxious to know.

"When the lobsters have learned to whistle," was the brief and unequivocal reply. (pp. 108-09)

The woman agronomist Z. Gulbis, whose bosom begins to heave with "life-giving strength" at the very mention of the word "Motherland" (capital M, printer!), might be interested in the following passage from Arzhak's "This Is Moscow Speaking":

. . . . Someone pushed me over. I fell, and before I could get up again a man had thrown himself on top of me. He gripped me by the throat, but I jerked back my head and freed my neck. We rolled about, hitting our heads against the cobblestones, clinging to each other and vainly trying to get a hold on the slippery, recently washed stone with our feet. I glimpsed the blue sky, the vivid colors of St. Basil's Cathedral, the red marble of the tomb, and two motionless statues with rifles, guarding the corpses. We rolled over to the feet of the sentries, where I was finally able to push him away by thrusting my knee in his stomach. He let go and I jumped. . . .

I picked up my jacket lying on the parapet and said, breathing hard:

"You son of a bitch . . ."

He replied: "It was for the Motherland . . ."[13]

Indeed, the grandiose pomposity, the specious indignation, the ritualistic threats employed by all the Yeremins, Kedrinas, and Temushkins have been satirized again and again in the words of Arzhak and Siniavski.

"Beginning with the 1930's, the passion for solemnity finally imposes itself," writes Tertz in *On Socialist Realism,* "and a pompous simplicity of style, the hallmark of classicism, becomes fashionable. We call our state 'the Power'; the muzhik, 'cultivator of the bread'; the soldier, 'the warrior'; the sword, 'saber.' We capitalize a great number of words. Allegorical figures and personified abstractions invade our literature, and we speak with slow solemnity and grandiose gestures" (pp. 83-84).

"We took up our spades as one man," reads the final sentence in Tertz's *The Trial Begins,* its heroes finding themselves in a labor camp "near the bank of River Kolyma." The power of words is no match for the power of a gun. Yet, as Siniavski and Daniel take up their spades, they may derive *some* satisfaction from the knowledge that the ranks of their friends and supporters are growing, and that those who wield the guns are in fear of those whose only weapon is the pen.

[12] In *Fantastic Tales,* New York, Pantheon Press, 1963.

[13] In Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature,* p. 297.

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(Editor of this magazine, Mr. Brumberg has published commentaries on Soviet developments in numerous journals and periodicals.)

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC, 20547. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

Marxism and Geography

TO THE EDITORS: I should like to offer a correction and two amplifications to my article on "Marxism and Geography" (November-December 1965).

First, in the last paragraph on page 14, I never intended to say, as the printed wording may imply, that those Western geographers who have written about the Anuchin controversy have not seriously grappled with the issues Anuchin raises. I did write in my original manuscript that *most* Western geographers, unlike Anuchin, have not been seriously examining problems of environmental influences and man-land relationships in recent years. In fact, one reason this is so is that we have too few such perceptive minds as the "probabilist" O. H. K. Spate, whose article on Anuchin is among those I cite.

Second, I had originally said about 20th-century man (second paragraph, page 15): *"His whole mode of existence and the man-made comforts that surround him seem to draw him away from awareness of the surface of the earth, and of the elemental truths of man's confrontation with his natural environment and with his God."* Granted that it is somewhat controversial to try to establish a relationship between theology and the metaphysics of man-land relationships, as my longer original manuscript attempted to do, I hardly think it either necessary or appropriate in a discussion of communism to eliminate, as the editors have done, a phrase (in italics above) which in itself shows little more than that the writer believes in God. This is after all the principal advantage of our presumed way of thinking over an ideology built on the writings of Karl Marx.

Third, I was very sorry to find that the editors found it necessary to delete my discussion of Soviet physics, which among other things served to tie together some of the ideas introduced in the opening paragraphs of my article. In particular, I was anxious to point out that, despite obvious differences, there are many parallels between the intellectual development of Lenin and that of Einstein. Both men were nourished by the healthy skepticism of Mach and other 19th-century positivists and skeptics who believed that scientific thought must be based only on sense impressions of physical objects and events. It is possible to depart from this healthy skeptical attitude towards an excessive emphasis either on sense impressions or on physical objects and events. The first departure leads to a kind of subjective idealism which the Soviets identify with Berkeleyism. The second departure leads to materialism, which the Soviets identify with their own Marxism-Leninism. Having dispensed with the inspiration of Machism or its equivalent, which had enabled them to do away with all previous forms of idealism and other theoretical speculation on the ultimate nature of reality (*i.e.*, metaphysics), Lenin and his followers proceeded to castigate Machism itself and also any form of idealism arising from it, such as Einsteinian relativity.

Yet it is somewhat appropriate that Einsteinian relativity should, since 1955, be judged harmonious with dialectical materialism, since, although it is indeed a departure into subjective idealism, it also shares with Marxism-Leninism the weaknesses which accompany rejection of all previous metaphysical speculation. I congratulate the editors of *Problems of Communism* for retaining my statements on pages 13-14 which clearly imply that both Mach and Einstein were mistaken in rejecting the traditional-intuitive definitions of space and time. Such statements have great difficulty getting into print these days, as a growing number of neo-Newtonian scientists and philosophers will attest.

My concluding section offered the opinion that recent Soviet commentary on Einsteinian relativity, such as that of V. A. Fok, represents not so much an abandonment of the antagonism to Einstein which was so widespread in the Stalin era,

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as a limitation of the criticism to its most sophisticated forms. Fok's conversion of general relativity into a non-relativistic theory of gravitation is actually a powerful criticism, but it appears that most Soviet physicists, including Fok himself, regard it as a minor modification within the general structure built by Einstein. Perhaps Soviet physicists did not want to attack that structure violently because they felt that they could not develop nuclear weaponry and power plants successfully if they did, and that such developments were incontrovertible proof of the validity of Einsteinian relativity anyway. This is suggested by such statements as that of Piotr Kapitsa, which is quoted on page 64 of the November-December 1965 issue of *Problems of Communism* in Lee Kerschner's enlightening article on cybernetics in the USSR. Kapitsa inferred that one must trust the theory of relativity in order to believe the atomic bomb exists.

This is a grossly misleading inference which far too many physicists who should know better continue to expound. The atomic bomb does not depend on the theory of relativity, although it was invented by scientists who believed in the theory of relativity. The basis for a theory of nuclear power can be derived from the classical formula for energy and from the empirical knowledge that matter decays into electro-magnetic energy, which was on hand ten years before relativity was introduced.

Fok's revision of general relativity involves the introduction of a "preferred coordinate system"; and in such a system the velocity of light is not constant with respect to any moving observer. But this condition, verified by experiment (Sagnac, Michelson-Gale, etc.), is contrary to special relativity, and so serves to expose the theoretical inconsistencies on which that theory is built.

There are also other roads to such an exposure, many of which have already been traveled a great distance by Western scholars (*e.g.*, Dingle, Evans, Builder, Otis) who oppose the relativistic orthodoxy—an orthodoxy which is every bit as inimical to the advance of human knowledge as was unmitigated Stalinism, and which Ernst Mach, as long ago as 1913, recognized as false and "growing more and more dogmatical." Fok's treatment of relativity has some parallels to Anuchin's treatment of the Stalinist line on environmental influences.

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IN FUTURE ISSUES—

An essay from *Safety Exit*, a forthcoming book by Ignazio Silone
Communism in Latin America: New Paths?, *by Bruce Jackson*
Economic Reforms in Poland, *by Leon Smolinski*
Moscow and Eastern Europe, *by Melvin Croan*
Spies Unlimited, *by Hugo Dewar*
Soviet Literary Developments, *by Victor Frank*

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